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Abstract 
This thesis analyses switching costs in China’s banking market in three main aspects. First, 
my thesis examines a model that investigates the effect of switching costs in the Chinese loan 
market on banking profitability. In keeping with the extant empirical literature it reports a 
positive relationship between bank profitability and switching costs. Furthermore it reports 
the estimation of a systems model of switching costs determination and profitability 
determination. The main result is that bank size measured by total assets is positively related 
to switching costs, while the ratio of deposits to assets is negatively related. The study also 
finds that banks that have higher cost-income ratios have a negative impact on switching cost. 
Second, this thesis examines the drivers of firms switching from one bank relationship to 
another. The results show that the principal driver of a switching action is the credit needs of 
the firm and a mixture of firm and bank characteristics. The findings support the extant 
literature that less opaque firms are able to switch more readily than opaque firms. The results 
also suggest that banks that develop their fee income services are more effective in locking-in 
their borrowers. Finally, this thesis determines the factors that decisions of firms to keep 
single bank loan providers or multiple bank loan providers. The results show that large firms 
are more likely to switch from single to multiple lending relationships. This study also finds 
that medium size and small firms with high quality prefer a single borrowing relationship 
while larger and higher quality firms are more likely to be involved in a large number of 
banking relationships. Increasing market competition decreases the probability of single 
bank-firm relationship.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Switching costs, which arise from the asymmetry of information between firms and banks, 
cement the bank-firm relationship (Shy, 2002; Kim et al, 2003; Vesala, 2007). Banks manage 
to gain the extra rent from their customers based on the lock-in power that is generated by 
switching costs, which weaken the substitutability of loans provided by different banks. 
However, since long and close bank-firm relationships have high likelihood to make firms 
involved in lock-in problems, a number of previous researches have pointed out that a large 
proportion of firms have considered switching to another bank to overcome the financial 
constraint when being dissatisfied with their existing lending relationship. Meanwhile, firms 
are also more likely to be locked-in by the relationship bank and face higher switching costs, 
when they are borrowing from a single bank with lower monitoring costs and collateral 
requirements (Farinha and Santos, 2002). The decisions of firms to keep single or multiple 
banking relationships is based on the dual of externality of efficient single lending or anti-
informational lock-in and less liquidity risk multiple lending.  
 
Focusing on the above three points, this thesis analyses switching costs1 in China’s banking 
market. First, the thesis examines the magnitude of switching costs and the effect of 
switching costs in the Chinese loan market on banking profitability. Second, the bank-firm 
relationship and the drivers of firms switching from one bank relationship to another are 
investigated. Finally, it investigates the determinants of firms’ choice on single or multiple 
banking relationships.  
 
                                                          
1 This thesis focuses on the switching costs caused by information asymmetry. 
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1.1 Background and Motivation 
Switching costs in banking represents a source of rent that reduces the competitiveness of the 
market. In addition to the administrative costs of changing a bank account, it is conjectured 
that in the loan market there are additional costs associated with informational asymmetries 
that the existing lender is more informed about the quality of the borrower than a potential 
new lender. It is argued that a borrower may face non-negligible switching costs when 
switching between banks in the Chinese banking market. High enough switching costs may 
completely prevent borrowers from switching and lock them in with their incumbent banks.  
 
The confidentiality associated with the customer-loan relationship allows banks to exploit 
their informational advantage over competitors and lock-in their incumbent customers to earn 
higher positive expected profits on repeated lending. Previous research has pointed out that a 
large proportion of firms have considered switching to another bank to overcome the 
financial constraint when dissatisfied with their existing lending relationship. However, a 
strong bank-firm relationship gives banks a monopoly power through information collecting, 
which can result in negative effects on firms. Firms will face a non-favourable loan offer with 
higher interest rate from ‘outside’ banks because of incomplete information about the firms’ 
financial condition. For ‘outside’ banks it is hard to distinguish ‘good’ and ‘bad’ firms. That 
means the informational disadvantage and lock-in problems can limit the ability of firms 
access to external finance resulting in financial constraints. Yet, firms switching their 
relationship banks have also been widely observed in the lending market.   
 
Plainly a long-term and stable bank-firm relationship is not the only choice for firms. They 
have a high probability to switch when they face severe financial constraints which cannot be 
solved by the existing bank. The longer the existence of the incumbent relationship, the 
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higher the probability that the borrower will find another lender (Greenbaum et al, 1989). 
Since the switching costs arising from asymmetric information makes the switching action 
costly, the switching behaviours are observed heterogeneously across firms. Firms’ 
transparency, external fund requirement and financial characteristics are the factors that drive 
the decision to switch lenders. Banks’ lending decisions are not homogenous either, which 
significantly affects a borrower’s access to external financial resources.  
 
Other than switching or non-switching, firms need to make the decision on single or multiple 
banking relationships based on their characteristics. Whether a firm maintains a single or 
multiple lending relationships with a credit provider is the outcome of a company’s strategic 
financial policy. Models of single or dual firm-banking relationships have been developed by 
Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) and Von Thadden (1998), but the literature is less clear on the 
single versus multiple firm-bank relationships. While firms borrowing from a single bank 
face lower monitoring costs and collateral requirements (Farinha and Santos, 2002), they are 
also more likely to be locked-in by the relationship bank and face higher switching costs. 
However, multiple firm-banking relationships can reduce the probability of liquidity risk and 
informational lock-in. But at the same time a multiple firm-bank relationship can involve 
significant transaction and monitoring costs.  
 
A number of studies claim that firm size has a significant influence on the number of bank 
relationships. Large firms usually require a wide range of banking relationship in order to 
satisfy firm-specific credit needs (Ongena and Smith, 2000; Detragiache et al, 2000). While it 
is a standard finding that multiple bank relationships is usually associated with large firms, 
medium size and small enterprises are widely observed borrowing from more than one bank 
in countries like US, Portugal and Germany (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Farinha and Santos, 
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2002; Brunner and Krahnen, 2013). A firms’ quality is also another key variable that affects 
the number of bank relationships (Petersen and Rajan, 1994). Low quality firms are usually 
unable to increase the credit requirements from incumbent banks and needs to seek outside 
banks for help. From a lender’s perspective, banks are willing to share bad credit clients with 
others in order to decrease their risk. Besides, banking market competition has been 
suggested as a main factor that could interpret the number of bank relationships. Single or 
multiple banking relationships can also reflect the level of competition from the credit 
demand side. A multiple firm-bank relationship is also more likely in an environment of 
competition between banks (Machauer and Weber, 2000). 
 
The Chinese banking market is large and expanding. By the end of 2012 there were over 400 
banks operating in China. However, there has been little in the way of research papers that 
investigate the topics of switching costs in the banking sector. What has been published 
focuses on the credit card or deposit market with the use of survey data or macro data. While 
these studies recognize the significance of switching costs on banks’ market share and profits, 
there has been no study of switching costs in the loan market, or the determination of 
switching costs.  
 
The reform period beginning from 2001 has made remarkable improvements in the 
performance of the banks, especially for the large commercial banks. The average non-
performing loan ratio of the major commercial banks in China decreased from 17.9% in 2003 
to 0.9% in 2011. Unlike the past where the banks were slaves to the socialist plan, Chinese 
commercial banks have focussed on credit quality when making lending decisions (Chang et 
al., 2009). Banks collect more information about firms’ private financial information in order 
to lower the associated lending risk. As with many emerging economics bank credit remains 
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the main funding source for firms in China (Allen et al, 2005). The opacity of business in 
China, and information asymmetry are viewed by some as the key impact variables that 
define the lending relationship (Chang et al., 2009; Cao et al, 2010). But it is not simply the 
characteristics of the firm that matter, the lending bank’s identity influences the lending 
decision and determines the quality of the bank-firm relationship (Hao et al., 2013).  
 
Modern credit risk management methods and risk pricing since 2004 is standard practice (He 
and Wang, 2013). Loan quality is an important factor in the lending decision. Banks reduce 
their loan exposure to individual enterprises and widen the loan portfolio to more firms in 
order to diversify the risk. Large firms are more attractive for banks since they are less likely 
to default (Chang et al., 2009). Single firm-bank relationship is associated with SMEs (small 
and medium size enterprises). Relevant research has suggested that keeping a large number of 
banking relationships is not an optimal choice for them (He and Wang, 2009). 
 
1.2 Objectives and Contribution  
The three main objectives and contribution of this study are as follows: 
 
First, this study seeks to fill a gap in the applied literature and enhance the understanding of 
the magnitude of switching costs in the loan market and its influence on profits in China’s 
banks. The objective of this part is twofold. Since switching costs are heterogeneous across 
banks and cannot be observed, this research applies the structural model developed by Shy 
(2002) to measure the switching costs for each bank in the data sample, and analyse the 
determinants of the magnitudes of switching costs in the Chinese banking sector and their 
effects on banks’ profits in a simultaneous equations system. Consistent with previous studies 
with other countries’ data, this research finds that bank size shows a positive relationship 
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with switching costs; and switching costs enhance the profit banks earn from their consumers 
in the Chinese banking market. However, a particular Chinese feature is that this positive 
relationship is non-linear so that switching costs increase at a decreasing rate such that very 
large banks (the state-owned banks) exhibit lower switching costs than smaller banks. The 
principal new findings highlight that switching costs increase with the efficiency level of 
banks; and foreign banks implement low switching costs and profits because they are in a 
weak position relative to domestic banks.  
 
Second, the topic of why firms switch banks is a relatively unexplored area of research, 
especially in China’s banking market. This thesis attempts to make a contribution to fill this 
gap. The research findings are that firms usually switch banks for larger amount of loans and 
longer lending durations; and large firms, that are usually more transparent, have a higher 
probability to switch than small firms. These two findings are new in China’s banking 
research and consistent with the results of previous studies with other countries’ samples. The 
principle new findings in this research are that (i) strong financial conditions of the firm 
increase the likelihood of forming a new bank relationship; (ii) firms are more likely to 
switch to small market share banks, or low profitability banks, to seek more favourable 
lending contracts; (iii) Firms are less likely to switch banks that offer a bundled service of 
loan and bank services in order to avoid the lock-in problem. 
 
The topic of single versus multiple banking relationships in the Chinese lending market is 
also an unexplored area of research. This thesis also attempts to fill this gap. The principal 
findings, conform with the general findings of the literature, which are that (i) the probability 
of a firm having multiple banking relationships increases with firm size; (ii) among all 
samples, firms with higher cash flow ratios (high quality) are more likely to maintain a single 
relationship; (iii) increasing market competition level reduces the probability of single bank-
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firm relationship; (iv) firms that have a relationship with large banks are more likely to be 
involved in multiple lending relationships. The new finding of this research is that medium 
size and small firms of high quality tend to have a single relationship as well as large and 
high quality firms are more likely to have a large number of lending relationships. 
 
1.3 Outline  
The following part of this thesis includes five chapters. The remainder of the thesis is 
organized as follows: 
 
Chapter 2 discusses institutional details about recent banking reforms, the Chinese banking 
system; the improvement of banks’ credit quality and loan distribution of firms in recent 
years. 
 
Chapter 3 introduces the characteristics of the Chinese banking industry and reviews the 
relevant theoretical foundation and the literature on switching costs. It goes on to describe the 
methodology of the relationship between switching costs and competition, and develops the 
empirical model based on the framework. Using a sample of 151 banks over the period 2003 
to 2010, this chapter examines the effect of switching costs in the Chinese loan market on 
banking profitability. 
 
Chapter 4 firstly reviews the relevant theoretical foundation and empirical research on 
asymmetric information, bank-firm relationships and the determinants of firms switching 
decisions. Then it describes the methodology and summarizes the main hypotheses of this 
study. A framework of firms’ switching decision is developed. Based on this framework, an 
empirical model is derived. Lastly, this chapter uses a sample of matched data on firm-bank 
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lending in China over the period 1999-2012 to examine the drivers of firms switching from 
one bank relationship to another. 
 
Chapter 5 firstly reviews the relevant theoretical foundation and empirical research on the 
topics of single or multiple banking relationships and the optimal number of banking 
relationships for firms. Then it describes the methodology of firms’ banking relationship 
decisions and summarizes the main hypotheses of this study and introduces the models for 
empirical studies. In the empirical part, this study examines 1639 firms’ single and multiple 
borrowing data during the period 2003-2012.  
 
Chapter 6 is the conclusion. It provides a discussion of the overall findings and implications 
of this research and highlights the confirmatory aspects of the research that is already known 
about the Chinese banking market as well as the novel features of the research about what is 
not generally known about the Chinese banking. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 
 
Chapter 2: China’s banking industry 
2.1 Introduction 
China’s banking sector has been in a state of reform since 1978, changing from a sector that 
ran under the orders from socialist plan to an open and modern competitive industry. After 
China’s entry into WTO, most Chinese banks make lending decisions based on commercial 
principles rather than the government policies (Chang et al., 2009). Some previous studies 
suggest that bank-firm relationships become very important for firms to get access to their 
credit needs (Allen et al., 2005; Chang et al., 2009; Cao et al., 2010). It is well known that 
applied economics and empirical analysis on any particular country/countries would be 
meaningless without a thorough awareness of the context. In order to help understand the 
theoretical and empirical analyses in the rest of the thesis, this chapter serves as a preface and 
gives the necessary background information about the Chinese banking system, the role of 
commercial banks, market competition and bank-firm relationships.  
 
In this chapter, the general information about the reform of China’s banking system from 
different perspectives is reviewed in section 2, including the banking industry reform, the 
changing role of the big four state-owned banks and the context of banking system in recent 
years. Section 3 outlines the characteristics of different types of banks, their history and 
development during the last few years. Section 4 describes the increasing competition in the 
Chinese banking market since 2003, including the context about banks’ market share, profit 
level, the income structure and regional difference. Based on a decreasing non-performing 
loan ratio and improvement in the repayment ability of firms, section 5 outlines the lending 
relationships between banks and firms and banks’ lending decisions in recent years. Section 6 
concludes the chapter. 
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2.2 The reform of China’s banking system 
Banking industry reform in China has been ongoing since 1978. The reform set up a two-tier 
system with setting the People’s Bank of China as the central bank. From 1978 to 1984, the 
big four state-owned banks2 were established or re-established. They were initially limited to 
serve only their designed sectors of the economy, and then they were allowed to operate in all 
areas of the financial market since 1985. However, there was almost no competition in the 
Chinese banking market until the mid-1990s, since the big four banks mainly served as 
policy-orient lending from the government and were lack of incentives to compete (Lin et al., 
2012). In 1994, banking sector reform was launched to stimulate big four banks into 
commercialization. Three policy banks 3  were established to take over the policy-orient 
lending activities from the big four banks. In 1995, the Commercial Bank Law of China was 
issued, which officially defined the four state-owned banks as commercial banks. From 1987, 
Joint-stock commercial banks have been gradually established; the first three of them are 
China Citic Bank, Shenzhen Development Bank and China Merchants Bank. Starting from 
1995, city commercial banks and rural commercial banks were gradually established. Many 
of them were founded on the basis of urban credit cooperatives and rural credit cooperatives. 
Till the end of 2013, there are 145 city commercial banks, 468 rural commercial banks in 
China (See overview of China’s banking system in appendix A.1). Banks are encouraged to 
diversify their portfolios by increasing their services to the private sector and individual 
consumers by government since 2001. 
 
China’s economic reform has increased the role of banks in the nation’s economy and 
intensified the competition in the banking sector. Since China entered the WTO in 2001, 
                                                          
2 The big four banks are Industrial and commercial bank of China, Agricultural bank of China, bank 
of China, and China Construction Bank. 
3  Three policy banks are China Development Bank, the Export-Import Bank of China, and 
Agricultural Development Bank of China. 
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China is gradually fulfilling her obligations under the World Trade Organization accession 
agreement, such as open her financial market to foreign banks. The entry to the WTO has 
pushed the banking sector reform. In order to compete globally, Chinese domestic banks have 
to use new technologies and improve their services as western banks. In 2003, Chinese 
National People's Congress approved the establishment of the China Banking Regulatory 
Commission, which replaced the Central Bank to take the regulatory function of the banking 
market. In the same year, the law of banking supervision was promulgated. The Chinese 
banking market has entered in the age of globalization and modernization since then. 
 
2.3 The role of Chinese banks  
According to the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) annual report, banks 
operating in China’s banking market are categorized into six types: Policy banks and China 
development bank, large commercial banks, joint-stock commercial banks, city commercial 
banks, rural commercial banks and foreign banks. Banking sector is a very important industry 
in Chinese economic system. Its total asset was around twice of GDP from 2003-2008. The 
ratio of the total asset of banking sector to GDP increases from 201.1% in 2008 to 257.2% in 
2012. 
              Table 2.1: Total asset of banks (2003-2012)          unit: RMB 10 Billion 
Bank/Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Large 
commercial 
banks 
Total asset 1605 1798 2101 2424 2850 3258 4070 4689 5363 6004 
Total asset 
to GDP (%) 
118.2 112.5 113.6 112.0 107.2 103.7 119.4 116.8 113.4 115.6 
Joint-stock 
commercial 
banks 
Total asset 296 365 447 545 727 883 1182 1490 1838 2353 
Total asset 
to GDP (%) 
21.8 22.8 24.1 25.2 27.4 28.1 34.7 37.1 38.8 45.3 
City 
commercial 
banks 
Total asset 146 171 204 259 334 413 568 785 999 1235 
Total asset 
to GDP (%) 
10.8 10.7 11.0 12.0 12.6 13.2 16.7 19.6 21.1 23.8 
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Rural 
commercial 
banks 
Total asset 4 6 30 50 61 93 187 277 425 628 
Total asset 
to GDP (%) 
0.3 0.4 1.6 2.3 2.3 3.0 5.5 6.9 9.0 12.1 
Foreign 
banks 
Total asset 42 58 72 93 125 135 135 174 215 238 
Total asset 
to GDP (%) 
3.1 3.6 3.9 4.3 4.7 4.3 4.0 4.3 4.6 4.6 
Policy 
banks 
Total asset 213 241 293 347 428 565 695 765 931 1122 
Total asset 
to GDP (%) 
15.6 15.1 15.8 16.1 16.1 18.0 20.4 19.1 19.7 21.6 
Banking 
institutions 
Total asset 2766 3160 3747 4395 5312 6315 7952 9531 11329 13362 
Total asset 
to GDP (%) 
203.6 197.6 202.6 203.2 199.8 201.1 233.3 237.4 239.5 257.2 
Source: China banking regulatory commission annual report 2012; Chinese statistical yearbook 2013. 
 
Policy banks and China development bank group includes China Development Bank (CDB), 
the Export-Import Bank of China (EIBC), and Agricultural Development Bank of China 
(ADBC). They are mainly responsible for state-invested projects for developing areas, trade 
development projects, and state-invested agricultural projects. CDB is primarily responsible 
for supplying funding for large infrastructure projects. EIBC mainly provides policy financial 
support to the export and import products, technologies and services. ADBC is primarily 
responsible for the financial support to agriculture development projects in rural regions.  
 
Besides Policy banks and China development bank, others are all commercial banks who are 
chasing customers and competing for market share and profit in the banking market. Large 
commercial banks group includes Industrial and commercial bank of China (ICBC), 
Agricultural bank of China (ABC), bank of China (BOC), China Construction Bank (CCB), 
and Bank of Communications (BOCOM). The majority shares of them are held by the central 
government. Due to historical reasons, large commercial banks are also the biggest banks in 
China with the largest share of asset in the banking sector. They were dominant the banking 
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market in 1990s. In recent years, their total asset to GDP ratio takes a comparatively steady 
proportion between 107%-120% (see table 2.1). Although they are the largest group in China 
banking sector, their annual asset growth rate is slower than joint-stock banks, city and rural 
commercial banks.  
 
Joint-stock Commercial banks group includes China Citic bank, China Everbright Bank, 
Huaxia Bank, Guangdong Development Bank, Ping An Bank (Shenzhen Development Bank), 
China Merchants Bank, Shanghai Pudong Development Bank, Industrial Bank, China 
Minsheng Banking, Ever bright Bank, China Zheshang Bank and Bohai Bank. Joint-stock 
commercial banks are usually considered as having higher operational efficiency and better 
services than large commercial banks (Chang et al., 2009). Table 2.1 shows that their total 
asset to GDP ratio increases very fast, from 21.8% in 2003 to 45.3% in 2012. Their total asset 
grows to 23530 billion RMB in 2012. Joint-stock commercial banks group is the second 
largest bank group in China.  
 
City commercial banks and rural commercial banks groups have the largest number of banks 
in China. They usually have comparatively small size and mainly supply financial services in 
their local regions. The first established city commercial bank is Shenzhen City Commercial 
Bank in 1995, which located in one of the special economy zones in China. Although they are 
comparatively small, their asset growth rates are extremely high. Table 2.1 shows that the 
sum of city commercial banks and rural commercial banks’ total asset to GDP ratios increases 
from 11.1% in 2003 to 35.9% in 2012. 
 
Foreign banks have been given opportunities to enter the market after China’s entry into the 
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WTO4. Most of foreign banks choose to locate in big cities in the east part, where the 
financial development is known as more advanced than other parts of China. Table 2.1 shows 
that foreign banks group is the smallest group in China’s banking sector. Their annual asset 
growth rate is lower than joint-stock banks, city and rural commercial banks groups.   
 
2.4 China banking market 
Among the six types of banks in China’s banking system, large commercial banks group 
takes the highest market share (see figure 2.1). However, with the growth of other types of 
banks and competition of the market, the large commercial banks’ market share decreases 
from 69.6% in 2003 to 51.9% in 2012. After 2006, the banking market competition has been 
encouraged by central government. Joint-stock banks, city commercial banks and foreign 
banks have kept taking the market share from the five large commercial banks since then. 
Joint-stock banks have the highest market share growth rate which is around 5.97% during 
the past several years, and become the second largest market share group with the market 
share of 20.3% in 2012. Each of the 12 joint-stock banks has got notable increasing in market 
share portion. City commercial banks and rural commercial banks have 3.88% and 4.18% 
average annual market share growth ratio during the last nine years respectively. Their market 
share has reached 10.7% and 5.4% in 2012, respectively. This fact presumably indicates that 
small banks also have the competitive power base on their local networks (relationship with 
local enterprises), efficient operation and good customer services. Foreign banks took 1.8% 
market share in 2003, and gradually increased to 2.8% in 2007. Then the ratio decreased and 
kept fluctuated around 2%. In 2012, foreign banks hold 2.1% market share, which is the 
smallest market share group in China’s banking market. Some research suggests that as 
                                                          
4
 The WTO agreement stated that foreign banks could enter into the Chinese banking market since 2001, 
then after a transition period of 5 years (protection period of weak domestic industry) geographical and 
business restrictions were gradually eliminated. At the end of 2006, foreign banks have a non-
discriminatory manner as in China’s banking market. 
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newcomers to the Chinese banking sector, foreign banks are known to lack a relationship 
network and accumulation of information in the local market, which is a big disadvantage for 
them to raise the switching costs and extend the market share. Furthermore, foreign banks 
lack branches, which is another disadvantage for them to attract new customers and lock-in 
their incumbent clients. Since policy banks serve the policy-oriented financial projects, their 
market share is comparatively stable during the last nine years, with only a small increasing 
in 2008 and 2009 due to government stimulation policies to the national economy5.    
 
Figure 2.1: Market shares of banks (according to total asset) 
Source: Calculate from the data in China banking regulatory commission annual report 2012. Data in 
details attached in Appendix A.2. 
 
Figure 2.2 indicates that large commercial banks get the lowest profit level in 2003 but 
become the second highest in 2012. The fast growing is based on two main reasons. First, the 
government has divested approximately 1.98 trillion RMB of non-performing loans from the 
large commercial banks, helped them to change their ownership structure and brought in 
strategic foreign investors (Lin et al., 2012). Second, the banks have listed themselves on 
                                                          
5 Chinese government made a four trillion RMB stimulus package plan as its biggest reaction to 
stimulate the economy against the global financial crisis. 
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stock exchange6, which forced them to operate as ‘real and international commercial banks’ 
with improving the management level, service and operation efficient. Profits of Joint-stock 
banks have always been kept at a high level above 15%. Combined with their market share, 
this data presumably indicates that they are the best performance domestic banks. City 
commercial banks and rural commercial banks have the similar profit trend with joint-stock 
banks, not as high as but around 14% after 2007, which shows the small banks still have the 
ability to compete with large banks. Banks with small size also can make decent profits and 
extend their market share in China’s banking market. Foreign banks have the lowest profit 
level around 5%. Foreign banks may need to give more price discount and special offers than 
domestic banks to attract new consumers in order to extend their business and market share, 
which leads to lower the profit level. 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Profits level of banks (return on equity) 
Source: Calculate from the data in China banking regulatory commission annual report 2012. Data in 
details attached in Appendix A.3. 
 
                                                          
6 BOCOM was listed on Hong Kong Stock Exchanges in June 2005, and on Shanghai Stock Exchange 
in May 2007; CCB was listed on Hong Kong Stock Exchanges in Oct 2005, and on Shanghai Stock 
Exchange in Sep 2007; BOC was listed on Hong Kong Stock Exchanges in June 2006, and on 
Shanghai Stock Exchange in July 2006; ICBC was listed on Hong Kong and Shanghai Stock 
Exchanges Oct, 2006; ABC was listed on Hong Kong and Shanghai Stock Exchanges in July, 2010. 
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It shows in table 2.2 that net interest income takes stable proportion with more 60% in 
income contracture of commercial banks. The main source of Chinese banks’ profit is the 
interest from loans. Investment returns take the second largest proportion of banks’ income, 
but decrease from 27.4% in 2007 to 19.8% in 2012. In contrast, net fee-based income 
increases from 9.4% to 13.7% in the last six years. According to the conclusion made on the 
China banking regulatory commission annual report, banks’ profit level has positive 
relationship with the size of interest-bearing credit assets, operational efficiency, the 
improvement in credit risk management (lower level of non-performing loan) and the 
continuously stable interest spread. As for the competition, banks should take advantages of 
switching costs to lock in more customers and attract new customer from their rivals in order 
to raise their profit level.  
Table 2.2: Income contracture of banks 
Year 
Net interest 
income 
Net fee-based 
income 
Investment 
returns 
others 
2007 62.9% 9.4% 27.4% 0.3% 
2008 61.2% 9.7% 24.5% 4.6% 
2009 63.0% 11.8% 24.1% 1.1% 
2010 66.4% 11.9% 20.7% 1.0% 
2011 66.2% 14.0% 18.5% 1.3% 
2012 64.9% 13.7% 19.8% 1.6% 
Source: China banking regulatory commission annual report 2009-2012. 
 
The economic development level in China is different between regions, which leads the 
amount of deposits and loans are heterogeneous among regions in the banking market. The 
east part of China is the most developed area, while the central and west part of China are 
usually considered as less developed7. As figure 2.3 shows, the total deposit in east region is 
around three times more than in the central or west regions from 2005 to 2011. The loans in 
                                                          
7 East region includes Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Liaoning, Hebei, Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, 
Fujian, Guangdong and Hainan; Central region includes Shanxi, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, 
Henan, Hubei and Hunan; West region includes Sichuan, Chongqin, Neimengu, Guizhou, Yunan, 
Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia, Xingjiang, Guangxi and Tibet. 
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east region is around four times than in the middle or west regions in 2011. The regional 
difference makes domestic banks and foreign banks focus their business in east part of China. 
This is presumed to result a more fierce competition market in the east region. 
 
Figure 2.3: Regional difference in banking sector 
Source: Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking, 2010. Detail data attached in Appendix A.4.  
 
2.5 Bank-firm relationships 
The bank-firm relationships have been changed by the recent banking reform. In 1990s, the 
major of the lending relations was driven by government, from stats-owned banks to stats-
holding enterprises. This political connections affected banks’ lending decision, which could 
increase the chance for lending to risky firms (Hao et al., 2012). Before 2000, the large 
commercial banks in China had a great amount of non-performance loans, which had 
significantly negative effect on their credit quality and reputation. However, after China’s 
entry into the WTO in 2001, the reform and marketization in China’s banking sector lead to 
not only a competitive banking market, but also remarkable improvements in the 
performance of the banks. Additionally, the distribution of loans is not only concentrated in 
state-holding enterprises anymore. It also benefits the high credit quality private enterprises. 
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In China, bank-firm relationships are crucial for firms, since bank loans are the most 
important source of funding for firms (Allen et al., 2005). Not only a bank’s characteristics 
but also a firm’s characteristics influence the quality of a bank-firm relationship. Unlike the 
past where the banks were slaves to the socialist plan, Chinese commercial banks have 
focused on credit quality when making lending decisions in recent years (Chang et al., 2009). 
Nowadays, firms getting access to loans mostly depend on their credit level and performance 
other than political leverages. Risky firms are less likely to get loans.  
 
2.5.1 Improvement of banks’ credit quality 
The banking reforms push China’s banking system keep improving, then lead to a healthier 
and more competitiveness market. Banks have great improvement in their performance. The 
average non-performing loans ratios of commercial banks have consciously decreased over 
the past several years8, from 7.1% in 2006 to 1.0% in 2012 (see table 2.3). The largest 
decrease comes from the large commercial banks group, from 9.7% in 2006 to 1.0% in 2012. 
These data indicate that the commercial banks focus on their borrowers’ quality rather than 
on policy lending. And this in turn contributes to improvement in banks’ credit quality and 
reputation, which makes them more competitiveness in the globe market. 
 
Joint-stock banks have the lowest NPLs ratios from 2006 to 2012. Compared with large 
commercial banks, joint-stock banks have less historical burden. Their credit quality keeps 
improving steadily through the past several years, and reaches the lowest NPLs ratio at 0.6% 
in 2011. Meanwhile, city and rural commercial banks have remarkable improvement in their 
performance and credit quality as well. They successfully lower their NPLs ratio from 4.8% 
                                                          
8  From 1998 to 2010, approximately 100 billion USD governments authorized funding injected into 
SOCBs to help them raise the capital adequacy ratio and removed approximately 53 billion USD from the 
NPLs. Details can be found in appendix table A.6. 
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and 5.9% in 2006 to 0.8% and 1.8% in 2012, respectively. The foreign banks, considered as 
the banks with high level management and operation efficiency, always have the low NPLs 
ratio from 2006 to 2012. 
 
             Table 2.3: NPLs ratios of commercial banks                   unit: % 
                           2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Commercial banks in 
total 
7.1 6.2 2.4 1.6 1.1 1.0 1.0 
Large commercial banks 9.7 8.0 2.8 1.8 1.3 1.1 1.0 
Joint-stock banks 2.3 2.1 1.3 1.0 0.7 0.6 0.7 
City commercial banks 4.8 3.0 2.3 1.3 0.9 0.8 0.8 
Rural commercial banks 5.9 4.0 3.9 2.8 1.9 1.6 1.8 
Foreign banks 0.8 0.5 0.8 0.9 0.5 0.4 0.5 
Source: China banking regulatory commission annual report 2006-2012. 
 
Billett et al. (1995) find that a higher credit rating can raise a bank’s profit by reducing 
funding costs or permitting a more extensive derivative business. The Fitch long-term debt 
credit ratings of the 14 major domestic Chinese commercial banks, who take more than 70% 
of lending market share in China, are shown in table 2.4. The five large commercial banks 
have state-owned background. So their credit ratings are higher than joint-stock commercial 
banks. The lowest rating in large commercial banks group is A- for the Bank of 
Communications. All others get rate A since 2007. Compared with the large commercial 
banks, joint-stock banks have smaller size, shorter rating history and less branches. The 
ratings for joint-stock commercial banks are lower than large commercial banks, which are 
between BBB and BB+. In general, the major domestic commercial banks are no lower than 
BB+, which indicates that the Chinese banking market is a healthy and stable market.  
 
 
21 
 
Although the credit ratings suggest that large commercial banks have better credit quality 
than joint-stock commercial banks, but they cannot fully stand for the performance of banks. 
Large commercial banks have higher Fitch ratings, while joint-stock commercial banks have 
lower NPLs ratios. Some scholars argue that joint-stock commercial banks have higher 
efficiency and management level than large commercial banks (Fu and Hefferman, 2009; 
Jiang et al., 2009). Berger et al. (2009) also find that state-owned banks have lower efficiency 
than the foreign banks in Indian. However, recent research claims that the large commercial 
banks have attracted foreign strategic investors, which has effectively improved their 
ownership structures and efficiency level (Hao et al., 2013). Foreign capital inflow also helps 
domestic banks to improve their performance. Foreign investments have been permitted to 
buy non-controlling stakes in Chinese banking since 2003, with a limit of 25% of capital 
(joint foreign investment). Till 2010, the total amount of foreign capital inflow in the 
financial sector is approximately 50 billion USD. The improving rates of major commercial 
banks imply that competitiveness of the banks becomes higher and China’s banking market 
becomes healthier.  
Table 2.4: Fitch Rating of major commercial banks 
Bank name 
Fitch Rating 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Industrial and commercial bank of 
China 
A- A- A A A A A A 
Bank of China A- A- A A A A A A 
China Construction Bank A- A- A A A A A A 
Bank of Communications   A- A- A- A- A- A- 
Agricultural bank of China       A A 
China Citic bank       BBB BBB 
China Everbright Bank       BBB BBB 
Huaxia Bank       BB+ BB+ 
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China Guangfa Bank       BB+ BB+ 
Ping An Bank       BB+ BB+ 
China Merchants Bank       BBB BBB 
Shanghai Pudong Development 
Bank 
      BB+ BB+ 
Industrial Bank       BB+ BB+ 
China Minsheng Banking        BB+ BB+ 
Source: Bankscope Database 
 
2.5.2 Credit quality and loan distributing of firms 
The NPLs ratios not only reflect the management level and efficiency of banks, but also 
reflect credit quality of borrowers (firms) to some extent. High ratios of NPLs also indicate 
that risky firms have high probability to get access to loans. Table 2.5 shows that distribution 
of NPLs ratios by industry. First, the time series changes of all industries show that non-
performing loans have decreased from 2006 to 2012. The most significantly shrinking of 
NPLs ratio is the Farming, forestry, animal husbandry and fishing industry from 46.09% in 
2006 to 2.35% in 2012. The wholesale and retail trades and the hotels and catering services 
industries, which have the second and third highest NPLs ratio in 2006, at 17.3% and 19.55% 
respectively, have dramatically reduced to 1.61% and 1.89% in 2012 respectively. Second, 
compared by industries, financial services sector takes the lowest NPLs ratio in 2012, at 
0.21%. The manufacturing industry, which makes the famous ‘Made in China’, always keeps 
a comparatively low NPLs ratio, at 1.54% and 1.60% in 2011 and 2012 respectively. Third, 
the highest NPLs ratio in 2012 is in Farming, forestry, animal husbandry and fishing industry 
at 2.35%, which is still considered as in an acceptable range. These data implies that risky 
firms have lower probability to get loans now. Chinese commercial banks have focused on 
borrowers’ quality when making lending decisions. 
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Table 2.5: Distribution of NPLs ratios of commercial banks by industry    unit: % 
industrial 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Farming, forestry, animal husbandry and 
fishing 
46.09 47.10 7.50 4.52 3.15 2.35 2.35 
Mining 3.74 3.27 0.68 0.38 0.25 0.27 0.22 
Manufacturing 10.40 8.89 3.30 2.58 1.87 1.54 1.60 
Production and supply of electricity, gas 
and water 
2.18 2.39 2.09 1.41 1.19 1.03 0.72 
Construction 4.27 3.35 1.71 1.32 0.77 0.66 0.57 
Transport, storage and post 2.01 2.10 1.59 1.29 0.97 1.09 0.82 
Information transmission, computer 
services and software 
5.33 5.55 3.32 2.62 1.93 1.44 1.44 
Wholesale and retail trades 17.30 13.92 4.08 2.71 1.56 1.16 1.61 
Hotels and catering services 19.55 16.11 7.70 4.82 3.01 2.56 1.89 
Financial services (sector) 1.38 0.69 0.21 0.08 0.30 0.21 0.21 
Real estate 6.61 4.91 3.35 1.93 1.26 0.97 0.71 
Leasing and business services 10.61 8.02 1.84 0.90 0.73 0.60 0.47 
Scientific research, technical services and 
geologic prospecting 
13.60 11.16 4.17 2.98 1.88 0.93 1.05 
Management of water conservancy, 
environment and public facilities 
1.30 1.27 1.14 0.37 0.39 0.33 0.19 
Services to households and other services 4.78 6.01 2.63 1.68 1.29 0.98 0.87 
Education 2.38 3.79 3.24 2.29 1.64 1.62 1.20 
Health, social security and social welfare 4.31 5.68 2.60 1.61 1.03 0.73 0.46 
Culture, sports and entertainment 14.83 13.12 6.08 3.24 1.76 1.19 0.91 
Public management and social 
organizations 
5.39 6.21 1.48 0.44 0.60 0.70 0.43 
Source: China banking regulatory commission annual report 2006-2012. 
 
In the period of 1980s and earlier 1990s, banks was controlled and instructed by the central or 
local government. As one of the heritages, the relationship between state-owned banks and 
state-holding enterprises are closer. Some researchers suggest that state-holding enterprises 
have advantages in getting access to lending channel when compared with private enterprises. 
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However, the recent statistics show that there is no significant lending difference between 
state-holding enterprises and private enterprises in medium-sized enterprise9 group in 2010 
and 2012 (see figure 2.4). In small enterprise group, private enterprises can get more loans 
than state-holding enterprises. Figure 2.4 shows there is a big lending gap in large enterprise 
group between state-owned and private enterprises. However, considered most state-owned 
enterprises belongs to large enterprise group, while private enterprise are less likely to grow 
as big as state-holding enterprises, the big loans gap cannot reflect the unfair lending 
distributions between state-holding enterprises and private enterprises. In general, the data 
shows that the banking lending decisions are less relies on the background of firms, but more 
on firms’ performance and characteristics.  
 
Figure 2.4: Distribution of loans among different types of enterprises 
Source: DRCNET Statistical Database System. Detail data attached in Appendix A.7.  
 
2.6 Conclusion 
The present chapter is a context chapter aiming to provide some background information of 
China’s banking system, particularly in banking reform, market competition and bank-firm 
                                                          
9 Statistical Definitions of Large, Medium-sized and Small Enterprises are attached in Appendix table 
A.5. 
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relationships. The statistics and facts in the Chinese banking industry suggest three main 
backgrounds for the following research. First, banking sector is very important in national 
economy and plays a dominating role in China’s financial system. Unlike in some developed 
countries that only small firms are highly rely on banks to get credit, most Chinese firms rely 
on bank financing regardless of the size of their business and the scale of their operations 
(Allen et al., 2005; Chang et al., 2009). Under this condition, when firms cannot be satisfied 
with their incumbent banks, switching to others banks usually becomes their first choice and 
even the only choice. Second, China’s banking market is a fiercely competitive market in 
which more than 400 banks are poaching customers and chasing profits since 2011. With the 
growth of other types of domestic commercial banks and the competition of the market, the 
market share of large commercial banks decreases from 69.6% in 2003 to 51.9% in 2012. 
Since net interest income is the main income resource to banks, the Chinese banks have to 
focus on strategic pricing to attract and ‘lock-in’ customers. Switching costs play an 
important role in banks’ strategy and the competition of the banking market. Third, unlike 
borrowing decisions of state banks to state-owned firms were historically mandated by 
Chinese government during 1990s, which resulted in high NPL ratios for banks. In recent 
years, banks make their lending decisions based on firms’ performance and quality, which 
make them successfully lower their NPL ratios. Since borrowing-lending is a bilateral 
relationship, not only the characteristics of the firms, but the banks’ characteristics influence 
the lending decision and determine the quality of the bank-firm relationships (Hao et al., 
2013). 
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Appendix A 
A.1. Overview of China’s Banking System 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: RCC: Rural Credit Cooperatives; UCC: Urban Credit Cooperatives; TIC: Trust and Investment 
Companies. 
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Table A.2: Market share of banks (according to banks’ asset)     unit: % 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Large 
commercial 
banks 
69.6 68.1 66.8 65.2 63.0 60.9 59.5 57.3 54.9 51.9 
Joint-stock 
commercial 
banks 
12.8 13.8 14.2 14.6 16.1 16.5 17.3 18.2 18.8 20.3 
City commercial 
banks 
6.3 6.5 6.5 7.0 7.4 7.7 8.3 9.6 10.2 10.7 
Rural 
commercial 
banks 
0.2 0.2 1.0 1.4 1.3 1.7 2.7 3.4 4.4 5.4 
Foreign banks 1.8 2.2 2.3 2.5 2.8 2.5 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.1 
Policy banks 9.2 9.1 9.3 9.3 9.5 10.6 10.2 9.4 9.5 9.7 
Source: China banking regulatory commission annual report. 
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Table A.3: Return on equity of Banks          Unit: % 
Banks/years 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Large 
commercial 
banks 
-0.5 6.0 16.3 14.6 15.6 18.1 18.2 18.0 19.7 19.1 
Joint-stock 
commercial 
banks 
15.0 15.4 21.6 22.8 16.6 19.1 16.4 16.6 18.6 19.2 
City commercial 
banks 
10.9 15.0 14.6 14.9 13.2 15.3 13.8 16.0 16.3 16.9 
Rural 
commercial 
banks 
18.0 30.0 18.8 16.4 13.0 13.7 13.4 13.8 15.4 15.9 
Foreign banks 4.1 4.8 5.9 7.7 5.2 8.4 3.9 4.2 8.0 6.4 
Policy banks 
and the CDB 
10.9 11.7 18.0 18.0 13.7 6.0 8.7 9.5 10.9 13.3 
Source: China banking regulatory commission annual report 2011, 2006. (Note: Profits of banks from 
2003 to 2006 are per-profits). 
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Table A.4: Loans and deposits of banks in different regions   Unit: RMB 100 mil 
province  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
East region 
Beijing 
Deposits 
of banks 
28969.9 
 
33793.3 37700.3 43980.7 56960.1 66584.6 75001.9 
Loans of 
banks 
15335.5 18131.6 19861.5 23010.7 31052.9 36479.6 39660.5 
Tianjin 
Deposits 
of banks 
6090.5 6839.2 8242.1 9954.2 13887.1 16499.3 17586.9 
Loans of 
banks 
4722.4 5415.7 6543.8 7689.1 11152.2 13774.1 15924.7 
Hebei 
Deposits 
of banks 
10888.3 12675.8 14474.3 17844.7 22502.4 26270.6 29749.5 
Loans of 
banks 
6480.8 7480.2 8466.5 9506.7 13284.1 15948.9 18460.6 
Liaoning 
Deposits 
of banks 
12465.0 14103.0 15678.0 18778.0 23351.1 28057.0 30832.0 
Loans of 
banks 
8306.0 9456.0 10763.0 12348.0 16222.1 19662.0 22832.0 
Shanghai 
Deposits 
of banks 
22219.5 24924.7 28168.5 33055.1 41486.5 52190.0 58186.5 
Loans of 
banks 
14801.1 15968.9 18019.4 20294.8 26086.6 34154.2 37196.8 
Jiangsu 
Deposits 
of banks 
22821.6 26722.8 31338.0 38063.4 47796.0 58455.4 66215.1 
Loans of 
banks 
16282.6 19383.7 23265.8 27081.1 35132.7 42522.9 49101.2 
Zhejiang 
Deposits 
of banks 
21117.9 25005.9 29030.3 35481.2 45112.0 54478.1 60893.1 
Loans of 
banks 
17122.1 20757.8 24939.9 29658.7 39223.9 46938.5 53239.3 
Fujian 
Deposits 
of banks 
7547.2 9109.4 10187.4 11916.4 14828.9 18753.2 21106.5 
Loans of 
banks 
5280.3 6598.9 8265.1 9665.2 12682.5 15920.8 18982.8 
Shandong 
Deposits 
of banks 
17453.3 19973.8 22370.5 27220.3 35080.2 41505.9 46825.5 
30 
 
Loans of 
banks 
13803.1 16135.9 18151.9 20794.7 27241.2 32329.6 37301.8 
Guangdon
g 
Deposits 
of banks 
37736.5 42775.3 48190.9 55086.6 68392.3 79989.5 91589.5 
Loans of 
banks 
2254.8 24989.4 29326.9 32507.5 43219.9 50120.0 58611.2 
Hainan 
Deposits 
of banks 
1302.0 1560.3 1873.0 2350.9 3175.7 4217.3 4504.5 
Loans of 
banks 
994.7 1123.3 1228.0 1383.5 1940.9 2509.7 3194.6 
Center region 
Shanxi 
Deposits 
of banks 
7151.2 8656.0 10111.9 12827.6 15759.8 18636.8 21003.2 
 
Loans of 
banks 
4328.9 4878.7 5514.2 6041.9 7915.4 9728.7 11265.6 
Jilin 
Deposits 
of banks 
4374.5 5071.8 5277.3 6433.3 8405.7 9702.6 10962.2 
Loans of 
banks 
3401.3 3921.6 4361.1 4891.0 6300.4 7279.6 8240.9 
Heilongjia
ng 
Deposits 
of banks 
6256.4 7032.7 7657.7 9077.5 11116.1 12924.2 14416.4 
Loans of 
banks 
3724.6 4028.1 4330.6 4594.0 6145.7 7390.6 8761.1 
Anhui 
Deposits 
of banks 
6068.8 7177.9 8485.9 10387.0 13404.4 16477.6 19547.3 
Loans of 
banks 
4399.2 5205.2 6127.9 7030.3 9438.6 11737.8 14164.4 
Jiangxi 
Deposits 
of banks 
4510.9 5275.4 5954.4 7262.0 9352.8 11907.8 14322.1 
Loans of 
banks 
3064.1 3501.2 4083.6 4613.3 6416.2 7843.3 9302.0 
Henan 
Deposits 
of banks 
10126.7 11492.6 12669.4 15340.1 19175.1 23148.8 26774.8 
Loans of 
banks 
7550.3 8567.3 9642.6 10439.7 13437.4 15871.3 17648.9 
Hubei 
Deposits 
of banks 
8335.2 9710.0 11206.4 13563.4 17653.1 21716.6 24090.6 
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Loans of 
banks 
5855.8 6696.1 7770.9 8732.3 12018.3 14583.3 16332.1 
Hunan 
Deposits 
of banks 
6589.5 7799.5 9155.3 10971.7 14025.5 16643.3 19444.1 
Loans of 
banks 
4590.0 5233.6 6157.5 7115.3 9536.6 11521.7 13462.5 
West region 
Neimengg
u 
Deposits 
of banks 
3331.5 4075.3 4986.1 6380.5 8414.0 10278.7 12063.7 
Loans of 
banks 
2618.0 3240.0 3803.1 4564.2 6385.5 7919.5 9727.7 
Guangxi 
Deposits 
of banks 
4262.3 5029.5 5801.0 7075.0 9638.9 11819.9 13528.0 
Loans of 
banks 
3104.6 3636.9 4331.0 5110.1 7360.4 8979.9 10646.4 
Chongqin
g 
Deposits 
of banks 
4743.8 5587.5 6662.4 8102.0 11084.8 13455.0 16128.9 
Loans of 
banks 
3561.6 4443.8 5197.1 6384.0 8856.6 10888.2 13195.2 
Sichuan 
Deposits 
of banks 
10050.0 11943.6 14089.0 18787.7 25127.8 30504.1 34971.2 
Loans of 
banks 
6898.6 8003.1 9416.2 11395.4 15979.4 19485.7 22514.2 
Guizhou 
Deposits 
of banks 
2793.0 3316.0 3838.7 4750.0 5912.5 7387.8 8771.3 
Loans of 
banks 
2319.0 2708.5 3145.0 3581.5 4670.2 5771.7 6875.7 
Yunnan 
Deposits 
of banks 
5199.5 6131.3 7170.9 8418.9 11119.6 13478.9 15429.4 
Loans of 
banks 
4031.0 4803.5 5671.7 6594.3 8779.6 10706.0 12347.0 
Tibet 
Deposits 
of banks 
456.3 545.7 643.4 829.0 1028.4 1296.7 1662.5 
Loans of 
banks 
179.3 204.1 223.8 219.3 248.4 301.8 405.1 
Shaanxi 
Deposits 
of banks 
6549.0 7452.5 8553.2 10790.9 14043.4 16590.5 19227.1 
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Loans of 
banks 
4043.0 4463.2 5170.8 6056.8 8276.6 10222.2 12097.3 
Gansu 
Deposits 
of banks 
2931.4 3341.3 3765.0 4745.7 5903.1 7146.7 8460.9 
Loans of 
banks 
1942.8 2131.3 2448.2 2768.4 3739.9 4576.7 5736.2 
Qinghai 
Deposits 
of banks 
737.8 903.7 1105.2 1389.6 1791.0 2327.0 2834.8 
Loans of 
banks 
641.6 729.8 882.1 1033.9 1408.3 1832.8 2239.0 
Ningxia 
Deposits 
of banks 
993.7 1140.3 1288.2 1598.2 2068.4 2586.7 2978.4 
Loans of 
banks 
841.8 993.9 1196.5 1414.3 1928.7 2419.9 2907.2 
Xinjiang 
Deposits 
of banks 
3461.0 4068.9 4638.4 5424.4 6877.2 8898.6 10442.8 
Loans of 
banks 
2339.8 2481.2 2767.1 2918.1 3952.1 5211.4 6603.4 
Source: Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking, 2010. 
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Table A.5: Statistical Definitions of Large, Medium-sized and Small Enterprises 
(newest) 
Industry Branch Index Unit Large Medium-sized Small 
Farming, 
forestry, animal 
husbandry and 
fishing 
Operating income 
(Y) 
10,000 𝑌 ≥ 20000 500 ≤ 𝑌 < 20000 50 ≤ 𝑌 < 500 
Industry 
Employees (X) People 𝑋 ≥ 1000 300 ≤ 𝑋 < 1000 20 ≤ 𝑋 < 300 
Operating income 
(Y) 
10,000 𝑌 ≥ 40000 2000 ≤ 𝑌 < 40000 300 ≤ 𝑌 < 2000 
Construction 
Operating income 
(Y) 
10,000 𝑌 ≥ 80000 6000 ≤ 𝑌 < 80000 300 ≤ 𝑋 < 6000 
Total assets (Z) 10,000 𝑍 ≥ 80000 5000 ≤ 𝑍 < 80000 300 ≤ 𝑋 < 5000 
Wholesale 
Employees (X) People 𝑋 ≥ 200 20 ≤ 𝑋 < 200 5 ≤ 𝑋 < 20 
Operating income 
(Y) 
10,000 𝑌 ≥ 40000 5000 ≤ 𝑌 < 40000 
1000 ≤ 𝑌
< 5000 
Retail trades 
Employees (X) People 𝑋 ≥ 300 50 ≤ 𝑋 < 300 10 ≤ 𝑋 < 50 
Operating income 
(Y) 
10,000 𝑌 ≥ 20000 500 ≤ 𝑌 < 20000 100 ≤ 𝑌 < 500 
Transport 
Employees (X) People 𝑋 ≥ 1000 300 ≤ 𝑋 < 1000 20 ≤ 𝑋 < 300 
Operating income 
(Y) 
10,000 𝑌 ≥ 30000 3000 ≤ 𝑌 < 30000 200 ≤ 𝑌 < 3000 
Storage 
Employees (X) People 𝑋 ≥ 200 100 ≤ 𝑋 < 200 20 ≤ 𝑋 < 100 
Operating income 
(Y) 
10,000 𝑌 ≥ 30000 1000 ≤ 𝑌 < 30000 100 ≤ 𝑌 < 1000 
Post 
Employees (X) People 𝑋 ≥ 1000 300 ≤ 𝑋 < 1000 20 ≤ 𝑋 < 300 
Operating income 
(Y) 
10,000 𝑌 ≥ 30000 2000 ≤ 𝑌 < 30000 100 ≤ 𝑌 < 2000 
Hotels 
Employees (X) People 𝑋 ≥ 300 100 ≤ 𝑋 < 300 10 ≤ 𝑋 < 100 
Operating income 
(Y) 
10,000 𝑌 ≥ 10000 2000 ≤ 𝑌 < 10000 100 ≤ 𝑌 < 2000 
Catering 
services 
Employees (X) People 𝑋 ≥ 300 100 ≤ 𝑋 < 300 10 ≤ 𝑋 < 100 
Operating income 
(Y) 
10,000 𝑌 ≥ 10000 2000 ≤ 𝑌 < 10000 100 ≤ 𝑌 < 2000 
Soft and 
scientific 
research, 
technical 
Employees (X) People 𝑋 ≥ 300 100 ≤ 𝑋 < 300 10 ≤ 𝑋 < 100 
Operating income 
(Y) 
10,000 𝑌 ≥ 10000 1000 ≤ 𝑌 < 10000 50 ≤ 𝑌 < 1000 
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services 
Real estate 
Operating income 
(Y) 
10,000 
𝑌
≥ 200000 
1000 ≤ 𝑌
< 200000 100 ≤ 𝑋 < 1000 
Total assets (Z) 10,000 𝑍 ≥ 10000 5000 ≤ 𝑍 < 10000 
2000 ≤ 𝑋
< 5000 
Property 
Management 
Employees (X) People 𝑋 ≥ 1000 300 ≤ 𝑋 < 1000 100 ≤ 𝑋 < 300 
Operating income 
(Y) 
10,000 𝑌 ≥ 5000 1000 ≤ 𝑌 < 5000 500 ≤ 𝑌 < 1000 
Leasing and 
Business 
Services 
Employees (X) People 𝑋 ≥ 300 100 ≤ 𝑋 < 300 10 ≤ 𝑋 < 100 
Total assets (Z) 10,000 
𝑍
≥ 120000 
8000 ≤ 𝑍
< 120000 100 ≤ 𝑋 < 8000 
No specified 
industry 
Employees (X) People 𝑋 ≥ 300 100 ≤ 𝑋 < 300 10 ≤ 𝑋 < 100 
Source: National bureau of statistics of China. 
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Table A.6: Capital injections from government to the SOCBs 
Data Bank Currency Amount (Billion) Financed by: 
1998-1999 SOCBs RMB 275 Ministry of Finance 
2003-2004 CCB USD 22.5 
Central Bank 
(international reserves) 
2003-2004 BOC USD 22.5 
Central Bank 
(international reserves) 
2005 ICBC USD 15 
Central Bank 
(international reserves) 
2008 ABC USD 19 
Central Bank 
(international reserves) 
Note: SOCBs (State-owned commercial banks), CCB (China Construction Bank), BOC (Bank of 
China), ICBC (Industrial and Commercial Bank of China), ABC (Agricultural Bank of China). 
Source: China Banking Regulatory Commission. 
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Table A.7: Distribution of loans among different types of enterprises  Unit 100Mil RMB 
 Large Enterprises 
Medium-sized 
Enterprises 
Small Enterprises 
 2010 2011 2010 2011 2010 2011 
State-holding  
Enterprises 
94146.7 97400.7 42966.3 42858.5 21121.9 30687.4 
Private Enterprises 14971.8 16895.8 34928.5 42164.9 41255.6 58251.9 
Enterprises with 
Foreign Funds 
5826.8 5638.8 4956.8 5092.3 2234.8 2940.7 
Source: DRCNET Statistical Database System. 
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Chapter 3: The determinants and the effect of switching costs on 
profitability in Chinese banking 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I will study the switching costs in the Chinese bank lending market, in which a 
borrower may face non-negligible switching costs when switching between banks. High 
enough switching costs may completely prevent borrowers from switching and locks them in 
with their incumbent banks. Kim et al. (2003) claim that switching costs mainly arise from 
asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders. Some of the literature of switching 
costs and the lending relationship find that when a borrower switches the new bank often 
does not know the borrower’s quality information as well as the former one does. Hence, 
generally, before lending the borrowers know their own credit quality, repayment 
performance, and risk of defaulting on loans better than the banks. These information 
asymmetries will result in higher loan rates when the borrowers switch to new banks. The 
borrowers’ costs of switching banks include the loss of their relationship with their current 
bank and an increasing loan rate.  
 
As a kind of market power for banks, switching costs play an important role in the 
competition of the banking sector. Porter (1980) has claimed that ‘in view of the potential 
importance of switching costs, the impact of all strategic moves on switching costs should be 
considered’. The banks often take advantage of switching costs to decrease the 
substitutability of the loans provided by their competitors. On the one hand, higher switching 
costs result in a lower probability of borrowers switching. The magnitude of switching costs 
becomes an important channel to strengthen the banks’ market power. However, the 
management level, operating efficiency, and performance are heterogeneous among banks, 
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which results in different ‘information monopoly’ power, while market competition tends to 
affect this monopolization. Hence, the magnitude of switching costs is determined by three 
main factors: the extent of the information monopoly that the banks can get, to what degree 
that they can make use of this information, and the effects of the whole market lending 
condition. On the other hand, the banks which have higher switching costs will presumably 
lock in more customers and lead to more profits.  Hence, the bank’s profits will also be 
influenced by the magnitude of their switching costs.  
 
In 2006, China was the world’s second largest economy (IMF, 2006). China’s banking sector 
is massive and it has a fast growth rate, which intermediates more than 70% of capital in 
China. At the end of 2011 there were over 400 banks operating in China’s banking market, 
which created fierce competition. However, only a few papers have discussed the topic of 
switching costs in China’s banking sector. Most papers focus instead on the credit card or 
deposit markets and use survey data or macro data. Although prior studies have recognized 
that switching costs have a significant influence in the bank’s market share and profits, there 
is a lack of understanding of the effect of switching costs in the lending market, as well as the 
poor determinations of switching costs. 
 
This chapter seeks to enhance the understanding of the magnitude of switching costs and their 
influence on profits of banks in China lending market. For the empirical part, since the 
switching costs are heterogeneously among banks and cannot be observed, I firstly apply the 
structural model developed by Shy (2002) to evaluate the switching costs for each bank in all 
sample years. I then analyze the determinants of the magnitudes of switching costs in the 
Chinese banking sector and their effects on the banks’ profits in a simultaneous equations 
system. This chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 offers a brief introduction of the 
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reform and changes in China’s banking market; Section 3 reviews the relevant theoretical 
foundation and empirical researches on switching costs; Section 4 first describes the 
methodology of the relationship between switching costs and competition, it then introduces 
the model’s setting for empirical studies; Section 5 describes the data; Section 6 provides a 
discussion of the empirical results; and, Section 7 draws a number of conclusions. 
 
3.2 The Chinese banking market 
The Chinese banking industry has been in a state of reform since 1978. Numerous papers 
have described the Chinese banking market in detail and it is not the intention of this chapter 
to repeat the same here. This chapter instead focuses on the key elements of the banking 
sector that is germane to the empirical research reported in this chapter. The entry of China to 
the WTO gave an additional impetus to the process of banking sector reform. In 2003, the 
Chinese National People's Congress approved the establishment of the China Banking 
Regulatory Commission, which replaced the Central Bank’s regulatory function in the 
financial market. In the same year, the Law of Banking Supervision was promulgated.  
 
The commercial banking market can be separated into large commercial banks (state owned 
banks – SOBs), joint-stock commercial banks (JSBs), city commercial bank (CCBs), rural 
commercial banks (RCBs) and foreign banks (FBs). Despite the seemingly diverse nature of 
the banking market, more than half of market share is dominated by the five large 
commercial banks. However, with the growth of other types of banks and competition of the 
market, the five large commercial banks’ market share keep decreasing, shrinking from 69.63% 
in 2003 to 54.89% in 2011. Since China entered the WTO in 2001, the joint-stock banks, city 
commercial banks and foreign banks have increased their market share at the expense of the 
SOBs. 
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Recapitalization, profitability and cost efficiency have been joint objectives of the SOBs 
aided by international listing
10
, global outreach, and acceptance of strategic foreign investors 
(Lin et al, 2012). The profitability of the non-SOB sector has improved, as has their 
productivity and efficiency (Matthews and Zhang, 2010). The reform process has been 
extended to loan pricing and limited loan rate differentiation between banking entities has 
become a possibility since 2004. Table 3.1 shows the development of interest rate 
deregulation in China banking market. In 1996, the loan rate floating range was 
comparatively smaller, from 0.9 to 1.1 of benchmark loan rate. Then, in 1999, this rate range 
extended to 0.9-1.3 times of the benchmark for small and medium enterprises, while it 
remained the same for large enterprises. However, in 2004, the upper limit of loan rate had 
been moved, as well as the lower limit of the deposit rate. Hence, banks are almost free to set 
price according to their strategy. The statistics shows that during December 2004 and 
December 2008 less than 30% of all loans were made at the benchmark rate (Xu et al., 2013). 
This suggests that most borrowers had been charged higher lending rate. 
Table 3.1:  Interest rate deregulation 
Year Loan Deposit 
1996 
All enterprises: 0.9-1.1 of benchmark 
rate 
Equal to the benchmark rate 
1998 
Medium and large enterprise: 0.9-1.1 
times; small enterprise: 0.9-1.2 times 
Equal to the benchmark rate 
1999 
Large enterprise: 0.9-1.1 times; small 
and medium enterprise: 0.9-1.3 times 
Equal to the benchmark rate 
January 2004 All enterprises: 0.9-1.7 times Equal to the benchmark rate 
October 2004 0.9 times - Upper limit removed. No lower limit-benchmark rate 
Note: The interest rate liberalization process started in 1996 and halted in 2004. 
                                                          
10  BOCOM was listed on Hong Kong Stock Exchanges in June 2005, and on Shanghai Stock 
Exchange in May 2007; CCB was listed on Hong Kong Stock Exchanges in Oct 2005, and on 
Shanghai Stock Exchange in Sep 2007; BOC was listed on Hong Kong Stock Exchanges in June 
2006, and on Shanghai Stock Exchange in July2006; ICBC was listed on Hong Kong and Shanghai 
Stock Exchanges Oct, 2006; ABC was listed on Hong Kong and Shanghai Stock Exchanges in July, 
2010. 
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Sources: Podpiera (2006) 
Table 3.1 suggests that Chinese banks have the capability to price differentiate and use 
strategic pricing to attract and ‘lock-in’ customers by developing switching costs. 
3.3 Literature review 
3.3.1 Earlier research on switching cost theories 
The concept of switching costs was invented by Porter (1980). Many theoretical studies have 
since explored the effects of the consumers’ switching behaviour on a firm’s competition 
strategy and market outcome. For example, Farrell and Shapiro (1988) use a dynamic model 
to study the effects of switching costs on firm’s competition strategy. Their findings suggest 
that firms with larger market shares tend to compete less aggressively on attracting new 
consumers. Sharpe (1990) has formulated a model of borrowing under asymmetric 
information to explain the loyalty of borrowers to the banks from which they borrow money. 
His theory suggests that banks make the best offers to their existing borrowers because they 
know the quality of their existing borrowers better than their competitors do. Customers are 
then ‘informational captured’ by their own banks and will thus be charged a higher price if 
they switch since they are unable to transfer their quality information to new banks. Beggs 
and Klemperer (1992) evaluate the duopolists’ prices and market share in a market with 
switching costs in an advanced multi-period model, in which new consumers arrive while 
some of the old consumers leave every period. They find that equilibrium prices and firms’ 
profits are higher in a market with switching costs than in a market without switching costs. 
Klemperer (1995) summarizes relevant research and concludes that, in general, switching 
costs for consumers exist in many markets and these raise the market prices. Vesala (2007) 
distinguishes between switching costs and the informational advantage gained in a banking-
firm relationship and examines how switching costs affect the profits available from 
relationship based lending. This paper finds that the value of the informational advantage first 
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decreases and then increases due to the size of the switching costs. On the one hand, very low 
switching costs discourage competing banks from making offers because it gives a chance for 
low quality borrowers to switch banks. Very high switching costs, on the other hand, lock in 
high quality borrowers to their current bank and make it impossible for banks to extract rents.  
 
3.3.2 Earlier Empirical studies  
Based on micro-level data, some scholars use an empirical method to explore whether 
switching costs have a significant influence on bank lending and bank-customer relationships. 
Hubbard et al. (2002) use a matched sample of individual loans, borrowers, and banks with 
contract-level loan data of US to find that small firms or firms with no bond rating will face a 
higher loan rate when switching between banks. High asymmetric information is supposed to 
make the switching costly for small firms. Stango (2002) examined the credit card market 
and investigated the relationship between price setting and consumer switching costs. Using a 
detailed panel of credit card issuers, this paper found that switching costs are an important 
influence on pricing for commercial banks but have almost no influence on pricing for credit 
unions. Waterson (2003) compares switching behaviour among different industries. The 
author uses survey data to find that borrowers in the banking industry are much less likely to 
switch than those in other industries. Kim et al. (2003) apply a novel model to Norwegian 
bank-level data to estimate the magnitude of switching costs for customers. They claim that 
switching costs are encountered when a firm opens a new relationship with its current main 
banks, or when firms switch to a lender that was one of its non-main banks in the previous 
period. Their empirical results show that switching costs are on average about one-third of 
the average lending rate.
11
 Santos and Winton (2008) use contract-level loan data to find that 
                                                          
11 They take switching costs as homogenous among banks and evaluate the average value for the 
whole banking industry. 
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during a recession bank-dependent firms without accessibility to the public debt market pay 
significantly higher loan rates than those firms with the accessibility. This indicates that the 
bank-dependent firms have to pay the banks to take advantage of information monopoly 
when the credit risk rises in the lending market. But firms with public debt market 
accessibility pay lower spreads and, correspondingly, their spreads rise significantly less in 
recessions, which suggest that the macro economy is likely to affect the switching costs. In 
their study of the bank-firm level of four Italian local credit markets, Barone et al. (2011) 
empirically show that firms tend to borrow from their main bank over time because of the 
lock-in effect arising from switching costs.  
 
Since switching costs cannot be directly observed, researchers have worked on methods to 
estimate switching costs. According to Kim et al. (2003), the average costs of switching in 
the market can be estimated mainly based on bank loans, market share, interest rate, and net 
interest margin. Shy (2002) invents a ‘quick-and-easy’ way to calculate consumer switching 
costs among brands directly in a given industry based on Nash-Bertrand equilibrium model. 
This paper notes that the consumers’ switching costs will be determined by price setting 
mechanisms and the firms’ market share. The author then offers an example of evaluating 
each bank’s switching costs by using data drawn from the largest four in Finland.  
 
3.3.3 Studies of switching costs in the Chinese banking sector 
Some empirical studies of switching costs in Chinese banking sector have focused on the 
deposit account and credit card market. Su (2007) compares the competition between local 
banks and foreign banks in the view of switching costs. The author indicates that, as new 
comers to China banking market, there are far fewer branches of foreign banks than local 
banks, especially the State owned banks (SOBs), which probably raises costs when the 
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consumers switch to foreign banks. The lack of a relationship network makes it hard for 
foreign banks to lock-in customers. Su (2007) also claims that competition will decrease the 
switching costs in the market and that foreign banks can increase their market share growth 
through an advanced marketing strategy. In another study, Su and Chen (2009) use survey 
data to study the determinations of switching costs in deposit account according to 
individuals and banks characteristics. They define four types of switching, which are: 
transaction costs, learning costs, uncertainty costs and relationship costs. They then interview 
the customers through a questionnaire to find the key factors affecting the switching 
choices.
12
 Combined with the interviewer’s information and other relevant information, the 
authors collected panel data from 926 samples. Their empirical model is designed as follows: 
                 𝑌 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑋 + 𝛼2𝑍 + 𝜀                       (1) 
where Y represents the switching costs, X is the sector of consumers characteristics, and Z 
stands for the banks’ characteristics. The results show that the bank-client relationship and 
service quality significantly affect the switching costs, and young people are more likely to 
have lower switching costs than old people. Yu et al. (2008) focus on the relationship 
between banks and consumers; in their empirical study they use survey data to examine how 
switching costs affect the consumers’ decision to change deposit accounts. They measure the 
relationship in two aspects: the economic aspect and the service quality aspect. They mark 
switching equal to 1 if a consumer has changed in the last 6 months, otherwise it is set to 0. 
Similar to Su and Chen (2009), they use an OLS to study those factors that affect the 
individual’s switching. Their empirical results show that switching costs have a negative 
effect on the consumers’ switching actions. They find that the bank-client relationship is very 
important to banks, and this will lower the consumer’s switching probability.  
 
                                                          
12 Mark 1 is strongly disagrees and 5 is strongly agree. The score range is between 1 and 5. 
45 
 
Ho (2007) describes the bank reform in China and claims that consumers face switching costs 
when they change deposit banks. He adds transaction costs into a static demand model to 
explore whether the switching costs effect on the consumer preferences. The empirical results 
show that consumers face switching costs when changing, and that more branch locations and 
higher quality employees of banks are preferred by consumers. Ho (2009) improves the 
model he used in 2007, and studies the relationship between switching costs and deposit 
demand in China. The author makes the assumption that consumers only choose to use 
deposit services from the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), the Agricultural 
Bank of China (ABC), the Bank of China (BOC), and the China Construction Bank (CCB). 
The paper index the ABC, the BOC, the CCB and the ICBC are a, b, c and d, respectively. In 
period t, if consumer i switches from one bank to another bank j, then a switching cost 𝜏 must 
be incurred. The consumer’s utility from deposit services is: 
                          𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛿𝑗𝑡
𝑓 − 𝜏 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡                            (2) 
where δjt
f = −αpjt + xjtβ + ξjt. δjt
f  stands for the independent of consumer characteristics, in 
which  pjt is the service fee of bank j, xjt  is observed product characteristics of bank j, and ξjt 
is unobserved product characteristics of bank j. 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 represents consumer characteristics. The 
paper defines Ωt be the information set available to consumers in period t. The value function 
for the current consumers at the ABC is: 
𝑉𝑖(𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 , 𝑎, 𝛺𝑡) = 𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝛿𝑗𝑡
𝑓 + 𝜀𝑖𝑎𝑡 + 𝛽𝐸[𝑉𝑖(𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡+1, 𝑎, 𝛺𝑡+1)|𝛺𝑡],  𝛿𝑏𝑡
𝑓 + 𝜀𝑖𝑏𝑡 + 𝛽𝐸[𝑉𝑖(𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡+1, 𝑏, 𝛺𝑡+1)|𝛺𝑡] −
𝜏,  𝛿𝑐𝑡
𝑓 + 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽𝐸[𝑉𝑖(𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡+1, 𝑐, 𝛺𝑡+1)|𝛺𝑡] − 𝜏),  𝛿𝑑𝑡
𝑓 + 𝜀𝑖𝑑𝑡 + 𝛽𝐸[𝑉𝑖(𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡+1, 𝑑, 𝛺𝑡+1)|𝛺𝑡] − 𝜏)           (3) 
The value functions are asymmetries for BOC, CCB and ICBC. In order to simplify the 
dynamic optimization problem, the author exploits the fact that there is no outside option for 
consumers and defines the difference of value functions as: 
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              ∆𝐸𝑉(𝑗, 𝑎, Ωt) = log (
𝑒−𝜏+𝑒
∆𝛿
𝑗𝑎𝑡
𝑓
+𝛽𝐸[∆𝐸𝑉(𝑗,𝑎,Ωt+1)|Ωt]+∑ 𝑒
∆𝛿
𝑘𝑎𝑡
𝑓
+𝛽𝐸[∆𝐸𝑉(𝑘,𝑎,Ωt+1)|Ωt]−𝜏
𝑘≠𝑎
1+∑ 𝑒
∆𝛿
𝑘𝑎𝑡
𝑓
+𝛽𝐸[∆𝐸𝑉(𝑘,𝑎,Ωt+1)|Ωt]−𝜏
𝑘≠𝑎
)     (4) 
where  ∆𝐸𝑉(𝑗, 𝑎, Ωt) = 𝐸𝑉(𝑗, Ωt) − 𝐸𝑉(𝑎, Ωt), ∆𝛿𝑗𝑎𝑡
𝑓 = ∆𝛿𝑗𝑡
𝑓 − ∆𝛿𝑎𝑡
𝑓
 and 𝑗 = {𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑}. 
To compute market share, the payoff of a consumer staying in the ABC is 
uiat + βE[EV(a,Ωt+1)|Ωt] , while switching to other bank is uijt − τ + βE[EV(j, Ωt+1)|Ωt] 
(j = {b, c, d}). Then, the probability of consumer i switching from the ABC (a) to the bank j is: 
                       𝑃(𝑎 → 𝑗) =
𝑒
∆𝛿𝑗𝑎𝑡−𝜏
1+∑ 𝑒∆𝛿𝑘𝑎𝑡−𝜏𝑘≠𝑎
                            (5) 
where 𝑗 ≠ 𝑎. For the probability of consumer i in other banks (b, c, d), the functions are 
asymmetries. Based on the estimating method of Berry et al. (1995), the author uses the 
following equations to update the differences of net flow utilities: 
               Δ𝛿𝑗𝑎𝑚𝑡
𝑓′ = Δ𝛿𝑗𝑎𝑚𝑡
𝑓 +Ψ(ln (
𝑠𝑗𝑚𝑡
𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑡
) − ln (
?̂?𝑗𝑚𝑡(𝜏)
?̂?𝑎𝑚𝑡(𝜏)
))                   (6) 
where 𝑗 = {𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑}, and Ψ is the tuning parameter. Hence, the predicted market share of the 
four banks are the function of 𝜏, which are denoted by ?̂?𝑎𝑚𝑡(𝜏) , ?̂?𝑏𝑚𝑡(𝜏), ?̂?𝑐𝑚𝑡(𝜏) and ?̂?𝑑𝑚𝑡(𝜏). 
In equation (6), 𝑚 stands for the provinces market, as the author measures the market in 
Chinese provinces to construct the pool data. Hence, the bench model for estimation is:  
                      Δ𝛿𝑗𝑚𝑡
𝑓 = Δ𝑥𝑗𝑚𝑡𝛽𝑥 − 𝛼Δ𝑝𝑗𝑡 + Δξjmt.                            (7) 
Using the provincial data from the biggest four banks, this empirical study shows that 
switching cost is an important factor for consumers to make bank choices and the consumer 
needs to stand 5% of their deposit value loss as switching costs when they switch to other 
banks. This switching cost evaluation is close to the  4% that was found by Kim et al. (2003) 
in Norway’s loan market and the 0-11% found by Shy (2002) in Finland’s deposit market. 
Meanwhile, this research finds that banks reduce their service fees to attract consumers at the 
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start and then expect to earn more from consumers in the extended time period. Therefore, 
switching costs are a significant factor that affects the Chinese banking market. 
 
Shen and Chen (2011) reviewed the literature of switching costs in the credit card market. 
They collected the relevant research in four main aspects, which are: the definition of 
switching costs, types of switching costs, the effects of switching costs on customers, and the 
method to analysis switching costs. Though this literature review, they tried to provide a 
reference for future studies of switching costs in the credit card market.  
 
3.4 Methodology  
3.4.1 Estimation of switching costs 
Two-period models of switching costs affecting the market in terms of consumer’s behavior 
and competition were widely used in the 1980s, in which the representative works are 
Klemperer (1987a, b). These models usually set a Bertrand competition in a market with 
switching costs. However, allowing for switching costs in equilibrium leads to the non-
existence of Nash-Bertrand equilibrium because of the assumption of homogeneous 
switching costs (Shy, 2001). In order to solve this problem, Shy (2002) built a model that was 
based on a new equilibrium concept, which is called the undercut-proof equilibrium. The 
model of consumers changing suppliers when facing switching costs is described as follows. 
 
There are two firms A and B competing Bertrand style with brand A and brand B products, 
respectively. The marginal costs of the two firms are assumed to be 0. The consumers are 
distributed between the firms so that initially 𝑁𝐴 consumers have already purchased brand A 
and 𝑁𝐵  consumers have already purchased brand B. All of the consumers face switching 
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costs, SC>0, if they wish to change supplier. The utility function of each consumer type 
derived from the next purchase is given by: 
       𝑈𝐴 ≝ {
−𝑃𝐴              𝑖𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝐴
−𝑃𝐵 − 𝑆𝐶   𝑖𝑓 𝑏𝑢𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝐵
                     (8) 
          𝑈𝐵 ≝ {
−𝑃𝐴 − 𝑆𝐶    𝑖𝑓 𝑏𝑢𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝐴
−𝑃𝐵              𝑖𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝐵
                    (9) 
If firm A wishes to poach customers from firm B, it has to offer a lower price than firm B. 
Furthermore, the price difference has to be larger than the switching cost S to make it 
worthwhile for consumers to switch. Let 𝑁𝐴 denote the (endogenously determined) number of 
brand A buyers (the next period purchase), and 𝑁𝐵 denote the number of brand B buyers (the 
next period purchase). Then, (8) and (9) imply that: 
𝑁𝐴 = {
0                               𝑖𝑓 𝑃𝐴 > 𝑃𝐵 + 𝑆𝐶 
𝑁𝐴         𝑖𝑓 𝑃𝐵 − 𝑆𝐶 ≤ 𝑃𝐴 ≤ 𝑃𝐵 + 𝑆𝐶
𝑁𝐴 +𝑁𝐵                  𝑖𝑓 𝑃𝐴 < 𝑃𝐵 − 𝑆𝐶
                  (10) 
 𝑁𝐵 = {
0                               𝑖𝑓 𝑃𝐵 > 𝑃𝐴 + 𝑆𝐶 
𝑁𝐵          𝑖𝑓 𝑃𝐴 − 𝑆𝐶 ≤ 𝑃𝐵 ≤ 𝑃𝐴 + 𝑆𝐶
𝑁𝐴 +𝑁𝐵                  𝑖𝑓 𝑃𝐵 < 𝑃𝐴 − 𝑆𝐶
                  (11) 
Assume that the firms’ production costs are zero. Denote 𝜋𝐴 and 𝜋𝐵 as the profit of firm A 
and B. Thus, due to the equilibrium in Bertrand model, the profits of each firm are given as: 
  𝜋𝐴(𝑃𝐴, 𝑃𝐵) = 𝑃𝐴𝑁𝐵 and 𝜋𝐵(𝑃𝐴, 𝑃𝐵) = 𝑃𝐵𝑁𝐵               (12) 
A Nash-Bertrand equilibrium would be a pair of non-negative prices {𝑃𝐴, 𝑃𝐵}. For a given 𝑃𝐵, 
firm A chooses 𝑃𝐴 to maximize 𝜋𝐴, and the symmetry method to maximize 𝜋𝐵  of firm B. 
Although the Nash-Bertrand equilibrium does not exist in pure strategies, an undercut-proof 
equilibrium does. According to Shy (2002) definition 1: firm i is said to undercut firm j, if it 
sets its price to 𝑃𝑖 < 𝑃𝑗 − 𝑆𝐶, i=A, B and 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗, That is, if firm i ‘subsidizes’ the switching 
cost of firm j’s customers. 
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Prices represent an undercut-proof equilibrium if it is impossible for any firm to increase 
profits by undercutting the competitor while it is impossible for any firm to raise its price 
without being profitably undercut by the competitor. The under-proof property is formally 
designed (definition) as in Shy (2002):   
A pair of prices {𝑃𝐴
𝑈 , 𝑃𝐵
𝑈} satisfies the undercut-proof property (UPP) if: 
(a) For a given 𝑃𝐵
𝑈 and 𝑁𝐵
𝑈, firm A chooses the highest price 𝑃𝐴
𝑈 subject to the constraint  
𝜋𝐵
𝑈 = 𝑃𝐵
𝑈𝑁𝐵
𝑈 ≥ (𝑃𝐴 − 𝑆𝐶)(𝑁𝐴 + 𝑁𝐵)                 (13) 
(b) For a given 𝑃𝐴
𝑈 and 𝑁𝐴
𝑈, firm B chooses the highest price 𝑃𝐵
𝑈 subject to the constraint  
 𝜋𝐴
𝑈 = 𝑃𝐴
𝑈𝑁𝐴
𝑈 ≥ (𝑃𝐵 − 𝑆𝐶)(𝑁𝐴 + 𝑁𝐵)                 (14) 
Although firm A sets the highest price possible in order to maximize profits, the price is still 
sufficiently low to prevent firm B from undercutting and taking the whole market. Firm A’s 
price is set low enough to make firm B’s profit from not undercutting, 𝑃𝐵
𝑈𝑁𝐵
𝑈  larger than the 
profit firm B would make when undercutting and capturing the whole market, (𝑃𝐴
𝑈 −
𝑆𝐶)(𝑁𝐴 + 𝑁𝐵). But since both firms set prices as high as possible, the inequalities hold as 
equalities. These equalities give the unique pair of prices {𝑃𝐴
𝑈 , 𝑃𝐵
𝑈} where      
                  𝑃𝐴
𝑈 =
(𝑁𝐴+𝑁𝐵)(𝑁𝐴+2𝑁𝐵)∗𝑆𝐶
(𝑁𝐴)2+𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐵+(𝑁𝐵)2
                       (15) 
and 
                𝑃𝐵
𝑈 =
(𝑁𝐴+𝑁𝐵)(2𝑁𝐴+𝑁𝐵)∗𝑆𝐶
(𝑁𝐴)2+𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐵+(𝑁𝐵)2
 .                       (16) 
Then solve for the switching costs based on undercut-proof equilibrium. Inserting equations 
(13) and (14) in the equalities of definition gives that 𝑁𝐴
𝑈 = 𝑁𝐴 and 𝑁𝐵
𝑈 = 𝑁𝐵. The solutions 
for switching costs are given as follow: 
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                   𝑆𝐶𝐴 = 𝑃𝐴 −
𝑃𝐵𝑁𝐵
𝑁𝐴+𝑁𝐵
                            (17) 
                   𝑆𝐶𝐵 = 𝑃𝐵 −
𝑃𝐴𝑁𝐴
𝑁𝐴+𝑁𝐵
                           (18) 
Shy (2002) extends the model described above to a multi-firm industry for estimating 
switching cost using merely information on market shares and prices, which is based on a 
solution to the non-existence of a Nash-Bertrand equilibrium. As to the estimation in the 
banking sector, price setting by banks is measured by the average lending interest rate. Define 
𝑆𝑖  to be the switching cost of a brand i consumer, and assume that 𝑆𝑖  (i=1,2,……L) are 
known all firms and consumers. Then, each firm 𝑖 ≠ 𝐿 takes 𝑃𝐿 as given and sets maximal 𝑃𝑖 
to satisfy:  
                   𝜋𝐿 = 𝑃𝐿𝑁𝐿 ≥ (𝑃𝑖 − 𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖)(𝑁𝑖 +𝑁𝐿)         (19) 
According to the method, the switching costs estimation model is designed as follows: 
                            𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝑃𝑖𝑡 −
𝑃𝐿𝑡𝑁𝐿𝑡
𝑁𝑖𝑡+𝑁𝐿𝑡
                       (20) 
where the switching costs of bank 𝑖 are estimated as a function of the average interest P set by 
bank 𝑖 and 𝐿, and the market share of bank 𝑖 and 𝐿 at period t. 𝑃𝐿𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑁𝐿𝑡 denote the average 
interest rate and market share of bank L, which has the lowest market share in period t, 
respectively. Assume that the firm with the smallest market share, firm L, is a prey target of 
firm 1. Therefore, the price 𝑃𝐿  of firm L would make undercutting its price by firm 1 
unprofitable; that is, 
           𝜋1 = 𝑃1𝑁1 ≥ (𝑃𝐿 − 𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝐿)(𝑁1 +𝑁𝐿)              (21) 
Since 𝑃𝐿𝑡  is observed, the unobserved remaining switching cost 𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝐿𝑡  can be 
solved as treating equation (12) equality. Thus, the switching costs of the bank which has 
lowest market share at period t can be estimated as:  
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                   𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐿𝑡 = 𝑃𝐿𝑡 −
𝑃1𝑡𝑁1𝑡
𝑁1𝑡+𝑁𝐿𝑡
                      (22) 
3.4.2 A framework of the determinants and profitability of switching costs 
Determinants of switching costs  
Switching costs mainly arise from asymmetries of information, which are proved to be 
heterogeneous among different sized banks (Shy, 2002; Kim et al, 2003). Asymmetrical 
information contains two aspects, which are: information asymmetric in the bank-borrower 
relationship and lack of information sharing between banks. Large banks tend to have more 
customers, which raise the asymmetrical information comparative advantages. 
Symmetrically, small firms that are usually considered as opaque stand more for the 
asymmetrical information and are less likely to switch banks (Gopalan et al, 2011). Although 
information sharing is considered to reduce switching costs (Gehriga and Stenbacka, 2007), 
currently only negative information (bad credit information) sharing is provided in China. In 
addition, a rational bank is not willing to share their client’s information with their 
competitors. Hence, bank size plays an important role in determining the level of switching 
costs.  
 
Operational efficiency is different among banks. It is imaginable that the degree of switching 
costs are partly dependent on how efficiently the bank takes advantage of asymmetrical 
information and collect useful information. Berger et al. (2005b) argue that small banks are 
better able to collect and act on ‘soft’13 information than large banks. Hence, operational 
efficiency should be included as one determinant of switching costs. 
 
 
                                                          
13  Soft information is the internal information about the investing project cannot be credibly 
communicated from firm to non-relationship banks. 
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Banks usually create artificial switching costs to set barriers for consumers to change 
suppliers (Smidt et al., 2006). An effective strategy for banks is to develop other correlations 
and borrowing to develop a closer bank-firm relationship. Kim et al. (2003) suggested that 
when switching between credit suppliers, costs related to the loss of capitalized value of the 
previously established relationship would be involved. Having other business relationships 
with banks set the lock-in power and results in higher switching costs. 
 
Having enough funding sources enhances the banks’ market power in lending. The total loans 
in the China banking sector have increased from 2003 to 2010 at an average annual growth 
rate of 28.8%. Huge and growing loan demand has significantly challenged the banks’ 
lending capabilities. Many firms have high likelihood to switch to another bank to overcome 
the financial constraint when they are dissatisfied with their incumbent banks. An ample 
deposit can guarantee that banks satisfy the growing borrowing requirements of their 
customers and lower the probability of their customers switching to other banks for financial 
help.  
 
Based on above analysis, here I use the switching costs as the dependent variable regressed 
on the bank characteristics (measure the degree of asymmetries, operation efficient, artificial 
barrier and fund sources) and a set of macro variables (measure economy and industry 
environment) to explore whether the independent variables have explanatory power for 
switching costs; that is: 
  𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛼1 +𝑀𝑖𝑡𝛼2 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡              (23) 
where 𝑋𝑖𝑡 stands for bank characteristics, 𝑀𝑖𝑡 is a set of macroeconomics variables. 
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Determinants of banks’ profit with switching costs 
Set N banks in a competitive market, where 𝑖 ∈ {1,2, … ,𝑁}. The customers have been locked-
in to their incumbent banks in previous period. When they switch to non-relationship banks, 
they bear the switching costs. Assume when choosing from which bank to borrow that the 
firms compare the gain from the difference of prices charged by the various suppliers and the 
loss from switching costs. Here, as in Kim (2003), switching costs (𝑠) are added to the prices 
charged by the non-relationship banks. Hence, the probability of a firm staying with its bank 
is given by 𝑝𝑟𝑡(𝑖 → 𝑖) = 𝑓{𝑝𝑖𝑡, 𝑝𝑖𝑅𝑡 + 𝑠𝑖𝑡}, where 𝑝𝑖𝑡 is the price charged by the incumbent 
bank, i and 𝑝𝑖𝑅𝑡 are the prices charged by the rival banks. Since higher switching costs (𝑠𝑖𝑡) 
help bank i to lock-in more customers, there is 
𝜕𝑝𝑟𝑡(𝑖→𝑖)
𝜕𝑠𝑖𝑡
> 0. Symmetrically, the probability 
for firms switching from rival banks to bank i is given by 𝑝𝑟𝑡(𝑅 → 𝑖) = 𝑓{𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝑠𝑖𝑅𝑡, 𝑝𝑖𝑅𝑡}, 
where 𝑠𝑖𝑅𝑡 is the rival bank’s switching costs. The switching costs of rival bank’s offer a 
barrier for their customer switching to bank i, hence 
𝜕𝑝𝑟𝑡(𝑅→𝑖)
𝜕𝑠𝑖𝑅𝑡
< 0.  So the total loans of bank 
i in period t (𝐿𝑖𝑡) is given as: 
          𝐿𝑖𝑡 = 𝑝𝑟𝑡(𝑖 → 𝑖) ∗ 𝐿𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑝𝑟𝑡(𝑅 → 𝑖) ∗ 𝐿𝑖𝑅𝑡−1                 (24) 
where is the market share of rival banks of bank i.  
 
Denote πit as the profit of bank in period t. 𝑁𝑖𝑡 is probability of the non-performing lending. 
Meanwhile, 𝑟 is the interest rate of deposit, which is assumed as homogenous for all banks. 
𝐶𝑖𝑡 stands for the non-interest expense.  Here, assume that the total amount of lending is equal 
to the total amount of deposit for bank I in period t (𝐿𝑖𝑡 = 𝐷𝑖𝑡). The profit function of bank I 
in time t is as follows:          
                𝜋𝑖𝑡 = (𝑝𝑖𝑡 ∗ (1 − 𝑁𝑖𝑡) − 𝑟) ∗ 𝐿𝑖𝑡 − 𝐶𝑖𝑡                    (25) 
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By substituting equation (24) into (25), there is: 
                𝜋𝑖𝑡 = (𝑝𝑖𝑡 ∗ (1 − 𝑁𝑖𝑡) − 𝑟) ∗ [𝑝𝑟𝑡(𝑖 → 𝑖) ∗ 𝐿𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑝𝑟𝑡(𝑅 → 𝑖) ∗ 𝐿𝑖𝑅𝑡−1] − 𝐶𝑖𝑡  (26) 
In equation (26), it is clear that  
𝜕𝜋𝑖𝑡
𝜕𝑠𝑖𝑡
> 0, which suggests that switching costs have a positive 
effect on the bank’s profits. 
 
A large amount of previous studies have claimed that the bank’s profits are linked to the 
bank’s characteristics and macroeconomics variables. Similar to Stephan et al. (2009) and 
Gopalan et al. (2011), here I set the profits determination model as: 
                                   𝜋𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑠𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽2 +𝑀𝑖𝑡𝛽3 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡.        (27) 
 
3.4.3 Empirical model 
Based on above analysis, the systems model of switching costs determination and 
profitability determination is given as: 
𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 ln(𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒)it + 𝛼2𝑁𝐸𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑁𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡 
                                                  +𝛼5𝐺𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼6𝑀𝐶𝑅 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡                                     (28) 
                              𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2ln (Bank size)it + 𝛽3𝑁𝐸𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 
                                                  𝛽4𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑀𝐶𝑅 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡.       (29) 
In equation (28) and (29), switching costs are values, which have been evaluated according to 
the method of Shy (2002) and described in the appendix. GGDP stands for annual growth 
ratio of real GDP, which measures the macro effect on switching costs. The other variables 
are the banks’ characteristic variables. The details of each variable are described below: 
 
Return on asset (ROA), which is measured as net income over total asset. The switching 
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costs will be reinforced through better using of asymmetric information.  
Bank Size is defined as total assets. Stephan et al. (2009) finds that bank size has a negative 
effect on a firm’s switching behaviour, which suggests that large banks have stronger lock-in 
power. Large banks have more client and branches than small banks, which strengthens the 
asymmetrical information comparative advantage and lock-in power. Hence, bank size is 
expected to have a positive effect on switching costs.  
Non-interest expense ratio (NEI), which is defined as the ratio of non-interest expense over 
income on loans, provides information on variations in operating costs. The ratio reflects a 
firm's efficiency at generating profits and measures the management level of banks. A high 
return on asset value presumably means efficiency management, which is expected to have a 
positive effect on taking advantage of asymmetrical information. Banks with low levels of 
NEI are considered as having efficient management, are skilled employers, and are less 
bureaucratic. This will be helpful to lock-in the borrowers and make more profits. Non-
interest expense ratio is expected to have a negative influence on switching costs and on 
profits. 
Non-interest income ratio (NIR), which is defined as Non-interest income over total gross 
income, stands for the income structure of banks. Since banks with high non-interest income 
ratios tend to have more correlation (intermediary business, consulting, investment and so on) 
with firms other than lending, which presumably raise the switching costs and strengthens the 
lock-in power to enhance firms to stay with their current lending relationships. 
Capital ratio (Capitr) is expected to have a positive relationship with the bank’s profits, 
which is measured by total equity over total asset. Capital ratio reveals capital adequacy and 
captures the general average safety and soundness of the financial institution. Banks with 
higher capital to asset ratios are considered relatively safer compared to institutions with 
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lower ratios. Safer banks will normally have a lower cost of external funding, which has a 
positive effect on their profitability.    
Fund source (Deposita) is captured by the total deposit over total assets, which is expected 
to have a positive effect on switching costs and profits. Deposit is considered as the major 
and perhaps the cheapest source of funding for banks. In a lending market where there is 
increasing demand, more funding source will results in higher bargaining power and more 
market strategies for banks.  
Annual growth of GDP (GGDP) stands for annual growth ratio of real GDP, which is 
expected to have a positive relationship with switching costs. It is commonly considered that 
GDP development considered as the demand for lending is increasing (or decreasing) in 
cyclical upswings (or downswings). The banks’ market power will rise from an increase in 
lending demand. Then, consumers will be charged higher interest rate when switching banks.  
Market concentration ratio (MCR) measures the loan market structure in the banking 
industry by means of the market concentration variable, which is defined as the ratio of the 
five largest banks’ assets to the total assets of the entire banking sector. A higher market 
concentration ration tends to indicate monopoly power, which may result in higher rates 
being charged on loans and lower interest rates being paid on deposits. On the other hand, a 
higher bank concentration might be the result of a tougher competition in the banking 
industry, which would suggest a negative relationship between performance and market 
concentration (Boone and Weigand, 2000).  
 
An important difference between the banks is their heterogeneity in operation. The SOBs 
operate nationally and are constrained to operate throughout the nation. The JSBs have the 
jurisdictional capability to do the same but concentrate on the economically profitable regions 
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of the eastern coastal area. The CCBs and RCBs operate within the provincial and rural areas. 
Therefore, the backgrounds for different categories of banks are not same. These differences 
are captured by regional dummy variables. Similarly, it is argued that big banks have less 
motivation to lock-in their clients; therefore, bank size dummy variable are included to test 
whether different sized banks have different switching costs.  
 
Some control dummy variables will be added into the system regression, which include 
region dummy, bank ownership dummy and bank size dummy. The details of each variable 
are described below: 
Region dummy takes headquarter of banks in east part of China as 1, otherwise 0. The 
economic and financial development of east part of China is more advanced than other parts 
of China. The lending market in east part of China is presumed to have fierce competition.  
Foreign banks dummy (FOREIGN) measures foreign banks as 1, and Domestic banks as 
0. Foreign banks are newcomers to the banking market in China. Compared with local banks, 
foreign banks lack a network relationship. Domestic banks include large commercial banks, 
joint-stock commercial banks, city and rural commercial banks. Large commercial banks are 
the biggest banks in China, they were the first to be established, and now take the largest 
share of the banking market. Joint-stock commercial banks, city, and rural commercial banks 
are usually considered as having higher efficiency and better services than large commercial 
banks. 
Large banks dummy (Large) measures bank asset larger than 10000 Billion CNY in 2010 
as 1, otherwise 0. 
Medium size banks dummy (Medium) measures bank asset smaller than 10000 Billion 
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CNY and larger than 1000 Billion CNY in 2010 as 1, otherwise 0.   
Small size banks dummy (Small) measures bank asset smaller than 1000 Billion CNY, in 
2010 as 1, otherwise 0.   
Table 3.2: Variable definition 
Variables Definition Unit 
Switching Costs (SC) Estimated value according to Shy (2002) - 
Return On Assets (ROA) Net income over total asset % 
Bank Size Annual total asset of Banks Mil CNY 
Non-interest expense ratio 
(NEI) 
Non-interest expense over income on loans % 
Non-interest income ratio 
(NIR) 
Non-interest income over total gross income % 
Capital ratio (CAPITALR) Total equity over total asset % 
Fund source (DEPOSITA) Total deposit over total assets % 
Annual growth of GDP 
(GGDP) 
Annual growth ratio of real GDP % 
Market concentration ratio 
(MCR) 
The five largest banks’ assets over the total 
assets of the entire banking sector 
% 
Regional difference dummy 
(REGIONAL) 
Headquarter of bank located in east region of 
China equal to 1, otherwise 0 
- 
Foreign banks dummy 
(FOREIGN) 
Foreign banks equal to 1, otherwise 0 - 
Large banks dummy 
(LARGE) 
Bank asset >1×107 Mil CNY - 
Medium banks dummy 
(MEDIUM) 
1×107 Mil CNY > Bank asset > 1×106 Mil 
CNY 
- 
Small banks dummy 
(SMALL) 
1×106 Mil CNY > Bank asset - 
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3.5 Data   
The bank-level data are collected from BANKSCOPE. Only commercial banks are included 
in the sample because the three policy banks in China are government-directed lenders and 
lack market performance. In addition, the sample excludes the banks whose market share is 
less than 0.01% because they can be neglected when doing the nationwide research. The 
sample contains data from 151 banks14 over eight years, from 2003 to 201015. Some banks 
have zero cells for data during some years in their financial reports, creating gaps in the data 
set. Hence, the regression data is unbalanced.16 Total loans of the sample banks take an 
average 74.7% of total loans in the Chinese lending market.17 Loans from the policy banks 
account for an average of 13.5% of total loans in the lending market, which do not operate 
according to market competition actions. So, the banks in the sample are considered as 
sufficient to reflect the facts of the Chinese banking sector.   
 
Table 3.3 shows the average switching costs, which are estimated according to the method of 
Shy (2002),18 in different groups of banks in the sample year. Compared with the average 
profits of banks, it is easy to observe that the degree of switching costs has a positively high 
correlation with the profits of the banks (see Fig. 3.1). Since there is a lack of loans or interest 
rate data in the sample, foreign banks’ switching costs cannot be calculated in year 2003 or 
2004. 
 
 
                                                          
14  See the list of 151 banks in Appendix B.8.  
15 China Banking Regulatory Commission established in 2003, which indicated China banking market 
entry into a new age. So here the sample begins from 2003. 
16 These gaps appear randomly and it is not expected to bias the results. See Woolridge (2009). 
17 Total loans include the loans from banks and trust companies. 
18 The method to estimate described in appendix B.9. 
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Table 3.3: Estimated switching costs of banks (% of loans) 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Large commercial banks 4.62 4.56 4.82 5.14 6.16 6.67 4.69 4.71 
Joint-stock commercial banks 3.84 5.08 5.21 5.21 5.90 6.57 4.72 5.01 
City and rural commercial banks 3.89 4.14 4.86 4.59 4.91 5.96 4.65 4.96 
Foreign banks NA NA 3.56 4.77 2.70 4.64 3.11 3.20 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Scatter graph of Switching costs and ROA 
A summary of the variables used for switching costs regression and the impact of switching 
costs on bank lending profits regression is presented in the Table 3.4. Several facts are worth 
noting. The gaps between the maximum and minimum numbers of switching costs and other 
bank characteristics are very large, which indicate heterogeneity performance among banks. 
Switching costs ranges from 0.45 to 9.78, reflecting a big difference in lock-in power.19 The 
average market share is 0.945. The smallest market share numbers in each year either come 
from city commercial banks or rural commercial banks, while the highest one is ICBC in 
2004. Although the maximum value of ROA is very large, it is an occasional value. Most 
ROA of the banks are below 2%, the average value of ROA is 1.335% in the sample market. 
                                                          
19 The lowest value is switching costs of China Zheshang Bank in 2004. In 2004, China Zhejiang 
Commercial Bank was reorganized and started business as a new private bank. The highest value is 
switching costs of Qishang Bank in 2008. On March 22, 2009, Zibo City Commercial Bank changed 
its name to the Qishang Bank. 
0
2
4
6
8
10
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
ROA
S
W
IT
C
H
IN
G
 C
O
S
T
S
61 
 
The large commercial banks hold the largest market share, but do not have the highest profit 
rate. This is likely to show that the ability to get profit is not based on market share.  
Table 3.4: Summary statistics20 
 Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max 
Key variables 
Switching Costs (%) 512 4.831 1.415 0.450 9.758 
ROA(%) 630 1.335 1.226 -1.535 18.587 
Other bank’s characteristics 
Bank Size (Mil CNY) 640 518846 1629853 2164.600 13458622 
NEI (%) 512 41.819 31.449 8.212 542.783 
NIR (%) 535 11.432 1.278 5.564 20.705 
Capital ratio (%) 635 6.568 4.940 -13.714 42.024 
The effect of fund source (%) 631 75.394 16.866 0.027 103.364 
Macro Variables 
Annual growth of GDP (%) 1216 16.311 3.927 8.552 22.881 
Market concentration ratio (%) 1216 55.028 3.264 51.473 59.175 
 
3.6 Empirical results 
The system of equations is estimated simultaneous by using three stages least squares21. The 
suspect endogenous variables in the model are NEI, Deposita, Capital ratio, Bank size, 
Market concentration ratio, Annual growth of GDP and Fund source are taken lagged as 
instrumented. The independent variables have no significant correlation between each other, 
the test table attached in appendix (B.5-B.6).   
                                                          
20 Subgroup summary statistics are attached in Appendix, table B.1-B.4. 
21 3SLS has one step more than 2SLS by using estimated moment matrix of the structural disturbances 
to estimate all coefficients of the entire system simultaneously, which can effectively solve the 
problem of endogeneity in simultaneously equation model. In addition, 3SLS belongs to full 
information estimation, while 2SLS belongs to limited information estimation. 
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3.6.1 Benchmark model regression 
Table 3.5: Estimation for the simultaneous equations model with 3SLS 
Variables SWITCHING 
COSTS 
Variables ROA 
Ln(BANK 
SIZE) 
0.111*** 
(3.326) 
SWITCHING 
COSTS 
0.180*** 
(6.646) 
NEI -0.015*** 
(-3.723) 
Ln(BANK SIZE) -0.010 
(-0.445) 
DEPOSITA 0.021*** 
(5.065) 
NEI -0.010*** 
(-5.393) 
NIR 0.280*** 
(6.849) 
DEPOSITA 0.013*** 
(3.066) 
GGDP -0.042 
(-1.078) 
CAPITAL RATIO 0.099*** 
(2.701) 
MCR -0.051** 
(-1.967) 
MCR -0.046*** 
(-3.078) 
C 4.569*** 
(2.786) 
C 1.794 
(1.308) 
R
2 
0.405 R
2 
0.362 
D.W. 1.643 D.W. 1.813 
Obs 277 Obs 312 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in the parentheses. * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% 
level; *** significant at 1% level. 
     
Column 2 of table 3.5 shows the result of magnitude of switching costs. BANK SIZE, which 
has a significantly positive effect on switching costs, is consistent with expectations. First, 
large banks are most likely to have more branches locations, which is an important fact that is 
valued by consumers (Chun-Yu Ho, 2012). Second, bigger banks have more advantages in 
asymmetrical information, especially for small firms, which stand more information 
asymmetric when they facing big banks (Gopalan et al., 2012). It is noticeable that NEI 
shows a significant negative effect on switching costs at 1% level, which is the same as 
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expectations, since non-interest expense ratio is usually used to measure how efficient the 
bank is. Efficient banks are presumably better in making use of asymmetrical information, 
which turns out to be a significant positive effect on switching costs. This suggests that 
efficient management will enable banks to take advantage of ‘information monopoly’ more 
effectively and increase their market power to lock-in their customers. Meanwhile, 
DEPOSITA has positive and significant relationship with switching costs. This also satisfies 
the expectations. In a market with big loan demand like China, more fund source means more 
bargaining power in lending, which gives banks more power in lock-in and more funding 
resources for borrowing. NIR has a significantly positive effect on switching costs, which is 
consistent with our expectations. Business relationships other than lending between banks 
and firms strength the bank-firm relationships and offer the banks an advantage to hold on to 
their customers. GGDP shows no significant effect on switching costs. One aspect, the annual 
growth of GDP, indicates that loan demand is increasing to some extent. A higher demand 
level increases the market power of banks, which makes them tend to charge higher interest 
rates to customers. However, banks usually offer discounts to new customers in order to 
extend market share, which will have a negative effect on switching costs (Klemperer, 1995). 
Market concentration ratio (MCR) gives a significant negative effect on switching costs at 
1% level. The highest market concentration ratio in China lending market is 59.18%, while 
the lowest is 51.47%, which can be considered as very high. The big banks that hold the 
‘monopoly power’ tend to be less aggressive. In addition, small banks do not have enough 
resources to lock-in their customers effectively under this condition. Hence, it reflects that 
switching costs will decrease when the market becomes more concentrated (Tirri, 2007; 
Mercieca et al., 2008). 
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Column 4 of table 3.5 shows the regression result, including the influence of switching costs 
on profits of banks. Here, the dependent variable ROA takes the profit level of banks. It is 
clear that SWITCHING COSTS gives a significant positive effect on profits of banks at the 
1% level. This result is consistent with the prediction of some theoretical researches 
(Klemperer, 1987b; Beggs and Klemperer, 1992), indicating that lock-in power is an 
important variable in the banks’ profit strategies. Banks can benefit from higher switching 
costs, and then higher profits lead to a strengthening of the information asymmetries. 
Switching costs and ROA have a positive bilateral relationship. Ln(Bank size) has no 
significant relationship with profits. Larger bank size tends to lead to more income, as well as 
more costs. In addition, the operation and management efficiency of a bank is also an 
important factor in affecting bank profitability. For example, the market share of large 
commercial banks, which once took over 80% of the whole market in 1990s, has been 
decreasing in these years because of intensive competition. In addition, their average profits 
are lower than other types of banks during some sample years. The lack of a significant 
correlation between market share and profits proves that small banks also have competitive 
power and the ability to make high profits in China’s banking market. NEI is significant at 
the 5% level, which has a negative effect on profit. As low non-interest expense level can 
strengthen the switching costs, the low expense absolutely can have a passive influence on 
profit. Standing for the level of fund source, DEPOSITA gives a positive relationship with 
profit, which is consistent with the expectations. More deposits lead to depressed earnings 
only if there is insufficient loan demand, since this type of funding is costly in terms of the 
required branching network. However, China has had a huge loan demand in these years. So 
more deposits means more fund source which will result in more profit for the banks. 
CAPITAL RATIO shows a significant positive relationship with profits, which is consistent 
with expectations. First, banks with higher capital to asset ratios are considered relatively 
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safer compared to institutions with lower ratios. Then, a lower risk increases a bank’s 
creditworthiness and reduces its funding cost. In addition, banks with higher equity to assets 
ratios will normally have a lower need of external funding, which again has a positive effect 
on their profitability (Dietricha and Wanzenried, 2009; Vong and Chan 2006). Empirical 
findings confirm that there is a statistically significant negative relation between the Market 
concentration ratio and the ROA variable in China. This result is similar to Dietrich and 
Wanzenried (2011), who use Switzerland as a research target market. 
 
3.6.2 Regression on regional and banks ownership dummy 
The eastern region of China takes an average of 64.6% and 64% loans and deposits, 
respectively. In addition, 66.4% of banks in the sample set their headquarters in eastern China. 
As the most developed area of China, the competition in the lending market here is 
presumably the most intensive. Some scholars point out that firms will pay to switch to poach 
new customers. Chen (1997) suggests that firms will ‘pay to switch’ to get new customers, 
and ‘pay to switch’ makes the market more competitive. Farrell and Klemperer (2007) claims 
that small firms act aggressively and price low to attract new consumers, who they can 
exploit in the future. Using the Bolivian credit registry data between 1999 and 2003, 
Ioannidou and Ongena (2010) find that banks often have a substantial drop in their loan rate 
to attract new customers and then, after a period of about one and a half years, they start to 
increase their loan rate. However, there is no evidence that fierce competition will lead to 
information sharing between banks and reduce asymmetrical information. Therefore, the 
regional difference is supposed to have no effect on switching costs. 
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Table 3.6: Structural Estimation with regional and foreign dummy 
Variables Switching Costs Variables ROA 
Ln(BANK 
SIZE) 
0.085** 
(2.181) 
SWITCHING 
COSTS 
0.174*** 
(6.582) 
NEI -0.014*** 
(-3.349) 
Ln(BANK SIZE) -0.010 
(-0.391) 
DEPOSITA 0.020*** 
(4.203) 
NEI -0.008*** 
(-4.146) 
NIR 0.260*** 
(6.380) 
DEPOSITA 0.009*** 
(2.683) 
GGDP -0.041 
(-1.055) 
CAPITAL RATIO 0.085*** 
(2.721) 
MCR -0.067** 
(-2.522) 
MCR -0.055*** 
(-3.923) 
REGIONAL 0.156 
(0.872) 
REGIONAL -0.173** 
(-2.223) 
FOERIGN 
BANK 
-0.431** 
(-2.463) 
FOREIGN BANK -0.297** 
(-2.020) 
C 5.824*** 
(3.365) 
C 2.756*** 
(2.342) 
R
2 
0.411 R
2 
0.410 
D.W. 1.651 D.W. 1.820 
Observations 277 Observations 312 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in the parentheses. * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% 
level; *** significant at 1% level. 
 
In table 3.6, after added the regional dummy into the model, the estimation of row 2 shows 
that REGIONAL has an insignificant effect on switching costs of banks, which is consistent to 
the expectations. But it is easy to imagine that ‘pay to switch’ or poaching to new customers 
will decrease the income of banks and lower their profits. In column 4 of table 3.6, a regional 
dummy has a significant negative effect on profit at 5% level. The intensive competition in 
eastern China reduces the banks’ average profits level. While in other regions of China, the 
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less intensive competition enable banks to make more profits.  
 
Usually, foreign banks are considered as the most efficient banks in China since they have a 
longer history and more mature management than local banks. But FOREIGN BANK has a 
significant negative effect on switching costs in column 4 at 5% level. As newcomers to the 
Chinese lending market, foreign banks are known to lack a relationship network and 
accumulation of information in the local market. These are disadvantages for them because 
they cannot raise the switching costs when they compete with domestic banks. Hence, the 
lower switching costs will encumber foreign banks to make high ROA level. In column 4, 
FOREIGN BANK has a significant negative effect on profits, which support this idea. 
Furthermore, foreign banks may need to give more discounts and other special offers than 
local banks to attract new consumers in order to extend their business and market share, 
which will also lower the profit level. 
 
3.6.3 Regression with different bank size dummy variable  
Farrell and Klemperer (2007) claim that larger firms tend to be lazier and lose their 
consumers to a smaller firm, which is known as the ‘fat cat effect’, with the larger firm being 
a nonaggressive ‘fat cat’ while small firms are more aggressive in attracting and keeping 
consumers. This implies that larger banks are less motivated in raising their switching costs, 
but small size banks will be more positive. Here, the empirical study divides banks into three 
categories, large, medium and small, to test whether the effects are significant difference on 
switching costs. 
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Table 3.7: Structural Estimation of different bank size affecting on switching costs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable 
Switching 
Costs 
Switching 
Costs 
Switching 
Costs 
Switching 
Costs 
Ln(BANK 
SIZE) 
0.185*** 
(4.190) 
0.164*** 
(3.713) 
0.089** 
(2.331) 
0.137*** 
(3.328) 
NEI 
-0.016*** 
(-4.081) 
-0.015*** 
(-4.021) 
-0.016*** 
(-4.022) 
-0.015*** 
(-3.862) 
DEPOSITA 
0.020*** 
(4.900) 
0.021*** 
(5.141) 
0.022*** 
(5.166) 
0.020*** 
(4.881) 
NIR 
0.294*** 
(7.232) 
0.282*** 
(6.985) 
0.262*** 
(6.564) 
0.298*** 
(7.305) 
GGDP 
-0.015 
(-0.374) 
-0.032 
(-0.804) 
-0.047 
(-1.201) 
-0.020 
(-0.508) 
MCR 
-0.057** 
(-2.075) 
-0.061** 
(-2.147) 
-0.067** 
(-2.378) 
-0.063** 
(-2.232) 
LARGE× 
Ln(BANK 
SIZE) 
-0.083*** 
(-3.181) 
-0.044** 
(-2.336) 
  
MEDIUM× 
Ln(BANK 
SIZE) 
-0.028 
(-1.545) 
 
0.006 
(0.400) 
 
SMALL× 
Ln(BANK 
SIZE) 
 
0.033** 
(2.014) 
0.037** 
(2.152) 
 
Ln(BANK 
SIZE)
2
 
   
-0.049* 
(-3.335) 
C 
0.830 
(0.397) 
1.949 
(1.043) 
3.869** 
(2.247) 
-3.798 
(-1.230) 
R
2
 0.429 0.430 0.417 0.431 
D.W. 1.726 1.722 1.659 1.722 
Observations 277 277 277 277 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in the parentheses. * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% 
level; *** significant at 1% level. The result of another part of simultaneously equations, the ROA 
regressions, is attached in the Appendix, table B.7.    
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In row 2 of table 3.7, LARGE× Ln(BANK SIZE) shows a significant negative effect on 
switching costs at 5% level. The coefficient for the effect of large bank size on switching 
costs is 0.157, which is smaller than the other two bank types. As Farrell and Klemperer 
expected, the size of big bank contributes less to keep a higher switching costs. This is 
presumably an important reason why large commercial banks in China kept losing their 
market share in the sample years. In row 3, SMALL× Ln(BANK SIZE) gives a significant 
positive effect on switching costs, which means the small bank size has the highest 
contribution ratio to switching costs than the other two bank types. The small banks are 
hungry to poach consumers and keep the bank-client relationships. Column 4 gives a 
robustness test for regression (1) and (2), which shows that SMALL× Ln(BANK SIZE) gives a 
significant positive effect on switching costs, while MEDIUM× Ln(BANK SIZE) has no 
significant relationship with switching costs. In regression (4), Ln(BANK SIZE)2 has been 
taken into the benchmark model. It shows a significant negative relationship on switching 
costs at 10% level, which means that large banks will be less active to keep high switching 
costs.   
 
3.7 Conclusion 
I have proposed an empirical model to analyze the effect of bank characteristics and macro 
variables in the magnitude of switching costs, and the influence of switching costs on banks’ 
profits determination. I apply the Shy (2002) model to estimate switching costs of each bank 
in every sample year, and then develop equations to investigate the switching costs 
determinations and how they affect the profits of banks with bank behaviors and macro 
economy variables.  
My findings are mainly in fourfold: first, the profit over asset (ROA), which shows the 
efficiency level of banks, has a significant positive effect on switching costs. This implies that 
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efficient management can take advantage of asymmetrical information to enhance the 
switching costs of banks. The switching costs also have a significant influence on the profits 
of banks, as expected, which indicates that switching costs strengthen the ability of banks to 
make more profits. Second, bank size shows a positive relationship with switching costs in all 
sample regression. A rise in the size and number of sub-branches will obviously bring more 
information asymmetries to banks to strength their lock-in power. However, different bank 
sizes have various effects on switching costs. Small banks tend to have more motivation to 
enhance their switching costs power since they are usually eager to extend their market share; 
while large banks are less aggressive, which is called as big banks’ ‘fat cat effect’ (Farrell and 
Klemperer, 2007). The deposit level has a positive relationship with switching costs, showing 
that stronger bargaining power contribute to switching costs. Third, the profit determination 
regression results show that market share has no significant effect on profits of banks. While 
the banks’ deposit level and capital ratio have a significant positive effect on profit. Non-
interest expense ratio, which stands for the operating efficient level of banks, has a negative 
effect on switching costs. As in similar studies, the market concentration ratio has a negative 
effect both on switching costs and profits of banks. Fourth, I set dummy variable to 
distinguish the domestic banks and foreign banks, and find that different types of banks have 
different situation in the relationship of switching costs and profits. As the newcomers to the 
Chinese banking market, when compared with the domestic banks, foreign banks are in a 
weak position in terms of rising switching costs and making profits. Furthermore, considering 
the regional difference in economy development, this chapter sets a regional dummy to 
distinguish the effects from the east of China and the other parts of the country. Although 
regional difference has no significant effect on the magnitude of switching costs, the eastern 
region, which has more intensive competition, has a negative effect on the banks’ profits 
level. 
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Appendix B 
Table B.1:  Summary Statistics in subgroups: Large commercial banks 
 Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max 
Key variables 
Switching Costs (%) 40 5.171 0.890 3.453 7.162 
ROA(%) 40 1.283 0.436 0.209 1.838 
Other bank’s characteristics 
Bank Size (Mil CNY) 40 5906058 3087310 925920 13458622 
NEI(%) 40 41.661 7.09 30.143 55.421 
NIR(%) 40 15.372 0.934 10.243 20.705 
Capital ratio (%) 40 3.992 4.861 -13.714 7.751 
The effect of fund source (%) 40 83.113 8.152 69.665 103.364 
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Table B.2:  Summary Statistics in subgroups: Stock-joint banks 
 Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max 
Key variables 
Switching Costs (%) 76 5.202 1.077 0.450 7.738 
ROA(%) 81 1.026 0.569 -1.534 2.500 
Other bank’s characteristics 
Bank Size (Mil CNY) 82 726679 614596 10307 2402507 
NEI(%) 76 44.865 37.773 24.166 222.771 
NIR(%) 82 12.123 1.195 8.664 18.423 
Market share (%) 82 1.337 0.870 0.028 3.237 
Capital ratio (%) 82 4.995 4.074 -1.318 31.344 
The effect of fund source (%) 82 76.179 8.957 50.669 90.849 
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Table B.3:  Summary Statistics in subgroups: City and rural commercial banks 
 Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max 
Key variables 
Switching Costs (%) 343 4.915 1.437 1.248 9.757 
ROA(%) 438 1.480 1.392 0.031 18.586 
Other bank’s characteristics 
Bank Size (Mil CNY) 445 72630 242577 2164 3389122 
NEI (%) 342 37.538 15.653 8.212 171.486 
NIR(%) 353 11.547 2.431 7.485 14.651 
Market share (%) 442 0.094 0.143 0.005 1.754 
Capital ratio (%) 441 5.890 3.345 -0.396 42.024 
The effect of fund source (%) 437 79.670 11.752 0.026 96.491 
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Table B.4:  Summary Statistics in subgroups: foreign banks 
 Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max 
Key variables 
Switching Costs (%) 53 3.498 1.289 0.889 6.654 
ROA(%) 71 0.815 0.635 -0.749 2.409 
Other bank’s characteristics 
Bank Size (Mil CNY) 72 53583 49155 4075 205620 
NEI (%) 54 64.765 72.343 11.943 542.783 
NIR(%) 60 7.183 4.756 5.564 9.352 
Market share (%) 72 0.127 0.361 0.010 3.093 
Capital ratio (%) 72 13.944 7.209 4.739 41.795 
The effect of fund source (%) 72 44.251 20.433 4.666 77.034 
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Table B.5: Correlation of independent variables in magnitude of switching costs 
 LN(SIZE) NEI 
DEPOSIT
A 
NIR GGDP MCR 
LN(SIZE) 1      
NEI 0.108** 1     
DEPOSIT
A 
0.116*** -0.159*** 1    
NIR 0.063 -0.245*** 0.121*** 1   
GGDP -0.221*** -0.074* 0.014 0.162*** 1  
MCR -0.189*** 0.055 0.162*** -0.443*** -0.013 1 
Note: *,**,*** significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
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Table B.6: Correlation of independent variables in the effect of switching costs  
on profits 
 
SC LN(SIZE) NEI DEPOSITA CAPITR MCR 
SC 1      
LN(SIZE) 0.184*** 1     
NEI -0.267*** 0.108** 1    
DEPOSITA 0.315*** 0.116*** -0.159*** 1   
CAPITR -0.179*** -0.261*** 0.115*** -0.530*** 1  
MCR -0.184*** -0.188*** 0.057 0.156*** -0.326*** 1 
Note: *,**,*** significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
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Table B.7: Structural Estimation of bank size affecting on switching costs (a)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable ROA ROA ROA ROA 
SWITCHING 
COSTS 
0.182*** 
(6.700) 
0.181*** 
(6.696) 
0.182*** 
(6.715) 
0.181*** 
(6.691) 
Ln(BANK SIZE) 
-0.012  
(-0.521) 
-0.012 
(-0.532) 
-0.015  
(-0.662) 
-0.012 
(-0.535) 
NEI 
-0.010*** 
(-5.373) 
-0.010*** 
(-5.373) 
-0.010*** 
(-5.347) 
-0.010*** 
(-5.375) 
DEPOSITA 
0.013*** 
(2.982) 
0.013*** 
(2.971) 
0.012*** 
(2.819) 
0.013*** 
(2.970) 
CAPITAL RATIO 
0.096*** 
(2.622) 
0.096*** 
(2.608) 
0.089** 
(2.439) 
0.095*** 
(2.606) 
MCR 
-0.046*** 
(-3.099) 
-0.046*** 
(-3.110) 
-0.048*** 
(-3.207) 
-0.046*** 
(-3.110) 
C 
1.865 
(1.369) 
1.883 
(1.383) 
2.077 
(1.527) 
1.887 
(1.388) 
R
2
 0.370 0.372 0.385 0.372 
D.W. 1.808 1.807 1.795 1.806 
Observations 312 312 312 312 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in the parentheses. * significant at 10% level; ** 
significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. 
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Table B.8: List of banks in sample 
Large commercial bank Zhejiang Tailong Commercial Bank 
Industrial and commercial bank of China, Qishang Bank 
Agricultural bank of China Bank of Ningxia 
Bank of China China & South Sea Bank Ltd 
China Construction Bank Bank of Liaoyang 
Bank of Communications Zhejiang Chouzhou Commercial Bank 
Joint-stock commercial bank Jiangsu Wujiang Rural Commercial Bank 
China Citic bank Bank of Luoyang 
China Everbright Bank Wuxi City Commercial Bank 
Huaxia Bank First Sino Bank 
Guangdong Development Bank (China 
Guangfa Bank) 
Commercial Bank of Zhengzhou 
Shenzhen Development Bank (Ping An 
Bank) 
Xiamen Bank 
China Merchants Bank Lanzhou City Commercial Bank 
Shanghai Pudong Development Bank 
Zhejiang Xiaoshan Rural Cooperative 
Bank 
Industrial Bank Dongying City Commercial Bank 
China Minsheng Banking Corporation Bank of Guilin 
Evergrowing Bank Yantai Bank 
China Zheshang Bank Laishang Bank 
Bohai Bank Linshang Bank 
City and Rural commercial bank Nanchong City Commercial Bank 
Bank of Beijing Bank of Inner Mongolia 
Huangshi City Commercial Bank Bank of Jinhua 
Bank of Shanghai Kunshan Rural Commercial Bank 
Bank of Jiangsu Bank of Liuzhou 
Beijing Rural Commercial Bank Zhuhai City Commercial Bank 
Chongqing Rural Commercial Bank Taizhou City Commercial Bank 
Bank of Ningbo Bank of Anshan 
Ping An Bank Suzhou City Commercial Bank 
Shanghai Rural Commercial Bank Bank of Fuxin 
Bank of Nanjing Handan Commercial Bank 
Bank of Hangzhou Dezhou City Commercial Bank 
Xuchang City Commercial Bank Nantong City Commercial Bank 
Guangzhou Rural Commercial Bank Bank of Deyang 
Huishang Bank Yingkou City Commercial Bank 
Bank of Tianjin Chinese Mercantile Bank 
Bank of Dalian Jiaxing City Commercial Bank 
Bank of Guangzhou Datong City Commercial Bank 
Bank of Chengdu Zhanjiang City Commercial Bank 
Dongguan Rural Commercial Bank Bank of Xinxiang 
Harbin Bank Ningbo Yuyao Rural Cooperative Bank 
Foshan Shunde Rural Commercial Bank Panzhihua City Commercial Bank 
Hankou Bank Nanning City Commercial Bank 
Shengjing Bank Zhejiang Mintai Commercial Bank 
Bank of Chongqing Bank of Jining 
Bank of Dongguan Changzhi City Commercial Bank 
Bank of Jilin Jiaozuo City Commercial Bank 
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Bank of Jinzhou Huzhou City Commercial Bank 
Bank of Changsha Changshu Rural Commercial Bank 
Baoshang Bank Mianyang City Commercial Bank 
Sin Hua Bank Cangzhou City Commercial Bank 
United Rural Cooperative Bank of 
Hangzhou 
Ganzhou City Commercial Bank 
Xiamen International Bank Yangzhou City Commercial Bank 
Wuhan Rural Commercial Bank Hengyang City Commercial Bank 
Kwangtung Provincial Bank Jiujiang City Commercial Bank 
Guiyang Commercial Bank Chengde City Commercial Bank 
Bank of Qingdao Foreign Bank 
Xi'an City Commercial Bank HSBC Bank (China) 
Qilu Bank Standard Chartered Bank (China) 
Guangxi Beibu Gulf Bank Bank of East Asia (China) 
China Investment Bank Citibank (China) 
Fujian Haixia Bank Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi UFJ (China) 
Bank of Hebei 
Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation 
(China) 
Jiangsu Jiangyin Rural Commercial Bank DBS BANK (China) 
Jiangsu Zhangjiagang Rural Commercial 
Bank 
Mizuho Corporate Bank (China) 
Fudian Bank Hang Seng Bank (China) 
Bank of Wenzhou Nanyang Commercial Bank (China) 
Kincheng Banking Deutsche Bank (China) 
Shenzhen Rural Commercial Bank BNP Paribas (China) 
Bank of Nanchang OCBC Bank (China) 
National Commercial Bank Royal Bank of Scotland (China) 
Bank of Jiujiang United Overseas Bank (China) 
Bank of Weifang Australia and New Zealand Bank (China) 
Weihai City Commercial Bank JP Morgan Chase Bank (China) 
Ningbo Yinzhou Rural Cooperative Bank Woori Bank (China) 
Bank of Rizhao Wing Hang Bank (China) 
China State Bank Hana Bank (China) 
Bank of Shaoxing Shinhan Bank (China) 
Yien Yieh Commercial Bank Bangkok Bank (China) 
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B.9: The method to estimate switching cost 
Switching costs are calculated through each year’s cross section data. First I got the lowest 
market share (𝑁𝐿𝑡) of bank in year 𝑡. Then multiply the corresponding bank’s average interest 
rate (𝑃𝐿𝑡 ), which calculated by income on loans divide total loans. According to follow 
equation, I can get the switching costs of bank 𝑖 in year 𝑡. 
                                               𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝑃𝑖𝑡 −
𝑃𝐿𝑡𝑁𝐿𝑡
𝑁𝑖𝑡+𝑁𝐿𝑡
                    (B.1) 
, 𝑃𝑖𝑡 is average interest rate of bank 𝑖 in year 𝑡; 𝑁𝑖𝑡 is market share of bank 𝑖 in year 𝑡.  
 
Then taking the interest rate (𝑃1𝑡) and market share (𝑁1𝑡) of biggest market share bank data 
into the follow equation to calculate the lowest market share bank’s switching costs in year 𝑡, 
with the data of 𝑃𝐿𝑡 and 𝑁𝐿𝑡. 
           𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐿𝑡 = 𝑃𝐿𝑡 −
𝑃1𝑡𝑁1𝑡
𝑁1𝑡+𝑁𝐿𝑡
                    (B.2) 
The example below illustrates; 
Example: 
 Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3 Bank 4 
Market share 40% 30% 20% 10% 
Average interest rate 5.5 5.3 5.6 5.4 
 
In this example, Bank 4 is the smallest bank. Therefore: 
SC1 = P1 −
P4N4
N1+N4
= 5.5 −
5.4∗10%
40%+10%
= 4.42  ; 𝑆𝐶2 = 𝑃2 −
𝑃4𝑁4
𝑁2+𝑁4
= 5.3 −
5.4∗10%
30%+10%
= 3.95   
𝑆𝐶3 = 𝑃3 −
𝑃4𝑁4
𝑁3+𝑁4
= 5.6 −
5.4∗10%
20%+10%
= 1.80  ; 𝑆𝐶4 = 𝑃4 −
𝑃1𝑁1
𝑁1+𝑁4
= 5.4 −
5.5∗40%
40%+10%
= 1.00   
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Chapter 4: Why do firms switch banks? Evidence from China 
4.1 Introduction 
Switching costs, which arise from asymmetry information between firms and banks, have a 
significant effect on the bank-firm relationship (Shy, 2002; Kim et al., 2003; Vesala, 2007). 
Banks tend to keep their clients private credit information and exploit their informational 
advantage over competitors. Therefore, they can manage to lock-in their incumbent 
customers and earn a higher than expected positive profit on repeated lending. Many previous 
studies have consistently pointed out that a large proportion of firms have considered 
switching to another bank to overcome financial constraints when they are dissatisfied with 
their incumbent lending relationship. However, a strong bank-firm relationship gives the 
banks monopoly power through information collecting, which then results in negative effects 
on firms. Firms usually face non-favourable loan offers with higher interest rate from outside 
banks since they are lack of firms’ financial condition information and hard to distinguish 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ firms. This means that there is an informational disadvantage and lock-in 
problem, which can limit the ability of firms getting to get access to external finance and 
results in financial constraints. However, firms switching their relationship with their banks 
have been widely observed in the lending market.  
 
Obviously, a long-term and stable bank-firm relationship is not the only choice for firms. For 
example, they have a high probability to switch when they face severe financial constraints 
that cannot be solved with the current bank. The longer existence of the incumbent 
relationship results in a higher probability that the borrower will find another lender 
(Greenbaum et al., 1989). Since the switching costs arising from asymmetric information 
makes the switching action costly, the switching behaviours are observed heterogeneity in 
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firms. The firm’s transparency, external funding requirements, and financial characteristics 
are presumably the determinants of a decision to switch lenders. In addition, the banks’ 
lending decisions are not homogenous, which can significantly affect a borrower’s access to 
external financial resources. This chapter aims to find the reason why firms switch banks, and 
it asks what kinds of banks they prefer when they form a new relationship. 
 
With the rapid growth of the economy, the Chinese credit market has expanded quickly. 
Firms are eager to get a financial supply and, since bank loans are the most popular funding 
source in the Chinese lending market, the main channel they can choose is to seek help from 
the banks (Allen et al., 2005). In China a firm’s transparency and information asymmetry are 
also considered as key impact variables on the lending relationship (Chang et al., 2009; Cao 
et al., 2010). The firm’s borrowing  characteristics as well as the lending bank’s identity 
influence the lending decision and the quality of bank-firm relationship (Hao et al., 2013). 
The recent reform, beginning from 2001, has produced remarkable improvements in the 
performance of Chinese banks, especially for the large commercial banks. For example, the 
average non-performing loan ratio of the major commercial banks in China decreased from 
17.9% in 2003 to 0.9% in 2011. The overall performance improvement of Chinese 
commercial banks shows that Chinese commercial banks are more and more focused on the 
borrower’s credit quality when they make lending decisions. Since the firm’s information is 
now very important to the banks’ lending decisions (Chang et al., 2009), the banks need to 
collect more of the firm’s private financial information in order to lower the lending risk and 
NPL ratio. Under the condition of asymmetric information and switching costs, the bank-firm 
relationship and the determinants of firms switching banks in China are worthy for further 
study.  
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The topic of why firms switch banks is a relatively unexplored area of research. This chapter 
attempts to make a contribution to fill this gap. The study has examined more than 2,000 
matched firm-bank lending deals during the period 1999 to 2012. The principal findings are 
that: (i) firms usually switch banks for larger amount of loans and longer lending durations; 
(ii) large firms, who are usually more transparent, have a higher probability to switch than 
small firms; (iii) the strong financial conditions of the firm increases the likelihood of 
forming a new bank relationship; (iv) firms are more likely to switch to small market share 
banks or lower profitability banks to seek more favourable lending contracts; and (v) banks 
that offer a bundled service of loan and bank services are more able to lock-in firms to 
maintain a current lending relationship. 
 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: section 2 reviews the relevant 
theoretical foundation and empirical research on asymmetry information, bank-firm 
relationship and the determinants of firms switching banks; section 3 describes the 
methodology of the firms’ switching decision and summarizes the main hypotheses of this 
study, it then introduces the model’s setting for empirical studies; section 4 describes the data; 
section 5 provides discussion of empirical results; and section 6 draws the conclusions.  
 
4.2 Literature review 
4.2.1 Lending relationship with asymmetrical information  
Many researches claim that asymmetric information between firms and banks create barriers 
for borrowers who wish to switch lenders. Kim et al. (2003) claim that switching costs 
mainly arise from asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders, and is incurred 
when economic agents change their suppliers. Hence, information asymmetry has a 
significant influence on firms when they switching to other funding sources. This 
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disadvantage for borrowers seeking external funding has been first observed between small 
firms and financiers. Keasey and Waterson (1993) suggest that information asymmetry is a 
main imperfection in the provision of finance to small firms. Berger and Udell (1998) analyse 
the effect of asymmetric information on lending relationship with US small firm data and find 
that informational opacity keeps small firms from obtaining large amounts of external 
funding.  Small firms are more likely to get access to external equity from venture capitalists, 
and they rely less on banks when compared with other type of firms. Some studies have 
argued that a strong banking relationship can decrease the information problem, but with 
ambiguous results about the effect of such lending relationship on a firm’s financial 
constraints. The ‘inside’ bank could make use of the information advantage that it gains from 
the lending relationship to make more informed credit decisions. However, the ‘outside’ 
banks which do not have ‘inside’ information would charge a higher interest rate when a firm 
switches, which will worsen the borrower’s financial constraints (Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992). 
Other than theoretical works, the evidences of empirical research around this topic are also 
mixed. Petersen and Rajan (1994) find that small firms are tending to borrow from banks 
which provide them informational intensive financial services. They suggest that firms spend 
more time in a lending relationship would make them get access to more fund. Berger and 
Udell (1995) get the empirical evidence that small firms with longer banking relationships 
will borrow at lower rates and have less probability to pledge collateral than other small firms. 
Besides, they find that banks accumulate the amounts of this private information over the 
duration of the lending relationship. The banks will then use this kind of information to refine 
their loan contract terms. Houston and James (1996) claim that a single strong banking 
relationship would have a negative effect on high-growth firms. In contrast, multiple lending 
relationships have a positive effect on high-growth opportunities.  
85 
 
Besides research on the impact of asymmetry information to firms, some scholars have 
focused on the relationship between the bank’s information and their lending decision. 
Through an empirical research based on US data, Berger et al. (2005b) argue that small banks 
are better able to collect and act on soft information
22
 than large banks. Large banks are most 
likely to lend to big firms with a good credit record and are less willing to lend to 
informationally ‘difficult’ credits, while small bank usually have a higher propensity to lend 
to difficult credit based on soft information. Using Japan survey data, Uchida et al. (2008) 
found similar results to Berger et al. (2005b). Their empirical evidence shows that the large 
firms tend to set the relationship with large banks, while small banks are most likely to have a 
stronger relationship with small firms. Small banks have a comparative advantage in terms of 
processing soft information and delivering relationship lending. Since banks have access to 
efficient information production through the establishment of a lending relationship, Bharath 
et al. (2007) seek to measure the direct benefits that can be obtained by banks. They find that 
the degree of information asymmetry increased the likelihood of banks winning the 
borrower’s future loan contract. Furthermore, the firms conducting IPOs had a high 
probability of keeping their current lending relationships. Sapienza (2002) finds that the 
merger action of banks will be harmful for small borrowers. Since mergers cause the banks to 
become bigger and obtain more information, they will decrease the supply of loans to small 
borrowers. Moreover, they find that bank merger increases the probability of firms being cut 
off from their lending relationship with incumbent banks. Large firms have a higher 
probability of switching banks, while small firms choose to maintain their current borrowing 
channel. 
                                                          
22  Soft information is the internal information about the investing project cannot be credibly 
communicated from firm to non-relationship banks. 
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4.2.2 The impact of specific characteristics on switching behaviour  
Papers have started to explore the impact of characteristics specific to lending relationships, 
firms, banks, and markets on the firm switching behaviour. The probability of a firm 
switching banks is heterogeneous in a firm’s characteristics, such as firm’s size, age, 
intangible, constrained, leveraged and so on. However, these studies have not analysed 
switching costs directly, but provide some evidence about the determinants that affect the 
firm-bank relationship and push the switching actions. Harhoff and Körting (1998) 
empirically examine the role of lending relationships in determining the costs and collateral 
requirements for external funds with survey data originated from a conclusive survey of small 
and medium-sized German firms. They check whether collateral will be needed when firms 
form a new lending relationship and find that the duration of the lending relationship and 
financial distress can have a negative impact on collateral requirement, while the number of 
lenders and age of firms have a positive effect on collateral requirement. In an empirical 
study on Norwegian data form 1979 to 1995, Ongena and Smith (2001) support the evidence 
that the value of the bank-firm relationship declines through time and firms tend to end the 
lending relationship to avoid lock-in. Moreover, they find that the switching costs are not 
high enough to prevent firms changing banks often, which implies that the banks did not take 
the advantage of asymmetric information very well in that period. In addition, their findings 
show that the firms prefer to switch from small banks to larger banks, and hold on to their 
long-term lending relationship. But they found no evidence that the larger banks supply more 
funds than other banks.  
Table 4.1: Determinants of lending relationship 
Paper HK (1998) OS (2001) 
Country Germany Norway 
Observation 994 383 
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Model Probit ML 
Dependent Collaterala Hazardb 
Lending Relationship 
Number of lenders ++ +++ 
Duration -- +++ 
Firm Characteristics 
Firm Size --- --- 
Financial distress +++  
Firm age --  
Profitability  +++ 
Bank loans/assets ?  
Firm leverage  +++ 
Note: +++ Positive and significant at 1%, ++ at 5%, + at 1%. --- Negative and significant at 1%, -- at 
5%, - at 1%. ? means unclear relationship, which is shown as insignificant in regression. HK, Harhoff 
and Körting (1998); OS, Ongena and Smith (2001). 
a 
Dummy variable indicating whether collateral or guarantee was required for obtaining new line of 
credit (required=1/otherwise=0). 
b
 The hazard function determines the probability that a relationship terminates. 
 
 
Detragiache et al. (2000) examine the impacts of a firm’s and bank’s characteristics on the 
probability of single banking relationship with matched bank-firm data. The empirical results 
show that the firm’s profitability has a positive impact on keeping a single banking 
relationship, while firm size and leverage have a negative effect on the probability of a single 
bank, which meant that bigger firms tend to set multi-bank relations. In contrast, bank size 
has a positive effect on keeping a single lending relationship. Similar to Detragiache et al. 
(2000), Farinha and Santos (2002) analyse the single and multiple firm-bank relationship 
choices. In their sample, they observe that almost all of the firms borrowed for the first time 
from a single bank, but soon some of them start borrowing from additional banks. 
Throughout the empirical analysis they find that the likelihood of a firm substituting a single 
relationship with multiple relationships increases with the duration of that relationship. The 
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results also show that this kind of switching is more likely to occur for firms with more 
growth opportunities and for firms with poor performance.  
Table 4.2: Determinants of firm-bank relationship 
Paper DGG (2000) FS (2002) 
Country Italian Portugal 
Observation 1754 1577 
Model OLS TVD 
Dependent single single
a
 
Lending Relationship 
Number of switching
b
  --- 
Firm Characteristics 
Firm Size -- --- 
Firm Leverage ---  
Firm age ? ? 
Profitability +++  
Bank loans/assets  --- 
Sales growth (%)  --- 
Liquidity/assets  +++ 
Bank Characteristics 
Bank size --- ? 
Assets growth (%)  ? 
Liquidity/assets
c
  ? 
Profits/assets  ? 
Market Characteristic 
Bank location  ? 
Bank concentration  ? 
Note: +++ Positive and significant at 1%, ++ at 5%, + at 1%. --- Negative and significant at 1%, -- at 
5%, - at 1%. ? means unclear relationship, which is shown as insignificant in regression.  
DGG, Detragiache et al. (2000); FS, Farinha and Santos (2002); TVD, time-varying model. 
a 
Parametric model (Weibull distribution). 
b 
Number of times firms switch banks.  
c 
Bank liquidity 
equals cash plus deposits at the central bank and interbank deposits.  
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Besides studies about the numbers of lending relationship and switching action, some papers 
have tried to answer the question of why firms switch banks and have looked at their 
behaviours after switching. Stephan et al. (2009) used unique firm-bank matched Ukrainian 
data to find the determinants of firms switching their main banks. The empirical results show 
that riskier and larger Ukrainian companies are more likely to switch banks. In contrast, large 
bank size and powerful bank leverage are the main variables that prevent switching. Their 
study highlights the essential role of ‘main bank’ power, which is measured by the share of 
firm equity hold by the bank. It turns out to have a significant positive relationship with 
switching action. Furthermore, the paper finds that firms have a lower performance after 
switching their main bank because they will be charged a higher interest rate by new banks, 
which negatively affects the firms’ financial condition. 
 
Using a large loan sample from 1990 to 2006, Gopalan et al. (2011) examine why firms 
switch to new banks for their new loans instead of staying with their relationship banks. They 
find that transparent
23
 firms are more likely to form new banking relationships. Firms who 
form new lending relationships to overcome borrowing constraints will usually take out a 
large loan after switching. As for the switching decision, firms are more likely to switch from 
small banks to large banks. Moreover, they find that firms form new banking relationship to 
obtain larger loan amounts and invest more in new property and equipment. The firms will 
then experience an increase in leverage following the switch. They highlight that firms will 
benefit from switching actions with an increase in capital expenditures and sale growth.  
 
 
                                                          
23 They use three variables to measure firm’s information quality: firm size, long term credit rating 
and the number of security analysts following the firm’s stock. 
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Table 4.3: Determinants of switching banks 
Paper STT (2009) GUY (2011) 
Country Ukraine U.S. 
Observation 8975 12806 
Model TEM FE Logit 
Dependent Switching New Relationship 
Lending Relationship 
Amount  --- 
Long term  ? 
Short term  --- 
Long time between deals  +++ 
Prev. large bank
a
  --- 
Firm Characteristics 
Firm Size +++ +++ 
Firm Leverage +++  
Firm age  ? 
Profitability  ++ 
Non Compustat
b
  --- 
Bank Characteristics 
Bank size --- --- 
Main bank power
c
 +++  
Bank leverage ---  
Non-performing loans/total 
asset 
++  
Note: +++ Positive and significant at 1%, ++ at 5%, + at 1%. --- Negative and significant at 1%, -- at 
5%, - at 1%. ? means unclear relationship, which is shown as insignificant in regression. STT, 
Stephan et al. (2009); GUY, Gopalan et al. (2010). TEM, treatment effect dummy variable. 
a 
A 
dummy variable that identifies if any of the borrower’s relationship banks is large bank. b A dummy 
variable that identifies borrowing firms for which financial data is not available in Compustat 
database, measuring the transparency of firms. 
c Main bank power denotes the share of firm’s equity 
held by the main bank. 
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Other than determinants of switching, Ioannidou and Ongena (2010) focus on ‘the time to 
change’ and study the loan conditions and bank behaviour when firms change lenders. They 
make a clear definition about switching, which is a firm borrowing from a bank that it did not 
have a loan relationship with during the last 12 months. They distinguish banks into two 
types, ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ banks. The former is that the bank had a loan relationship with 
the firm during the prior year. The latter means that the bank does not have a loan 
relationship with the firm during the year before. The following figure shows the definition of 
switchers. They call firm A the switcher and bank 3 the outside bank for firm A, as bank 3 
lent to other firms but not to firm A during the last year. Bank 1 and 2 were the switcher’s 
inside banks, as they had lending relationship in the last year. 
Bank 1
Bank 2
Bank 3
Switching loan
Firm A
= Starting and ending dates of a loan
t= -12 t=0
 
Figure 4.1: Switchers, inside banks, and outside banks 
Source: Ioannidou and Ongena (2010) 
 
Using the Bolivian credit registry data between 1999 and 2003, their empirical results 
indicate that turning to a new bank (‘outside’ bank) leads to a substantial drop in loan rate. 
Then, after a period of about one and a half years, the ‘new’ (now ‘inside’ bank) bank started 
increasing its loan rate. After three years, the loan rate will be back to its level before the 
change. They claim that this bank strategy is consistent with the existence of hold-up costs in 
bank-firm relationships. They also highlight that information-sharing regime is very 
important for banks selecting firms. 
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4.2.3 Relevant studies about China bank-firm relationship  
Studies stick to bank-firm relationships, a few have focused on the effect of asymmetric 
information on switching costs and the determinants for firms to switch banks. Huang (2003) 
researched the impact of firm listing on its lending relationship in China. The author takes 
bank-firm relationship as a dependent variable, and denotes setting lending relationship as 1, 
otherwise 0. Using logistic regression, the paper finds that the performance of a firm has a 
significant positive effect on setting lending relationship before listing. However, the 
performance of a firm will be less important for lending decision after listing. Clearly, the act 
of listing makes more information about the firm available, which effectively lowers the 
bank’s information collecting costs. Using survey data with 308 questionnaires from the 
firms’ senior executives, Liu and Mei (2009) analyse the determinants of continuance or 
terminating banking relationship. They claim that switching costs are the main determinant 
for a firm pursing the lending relationship with an incumbent bank. Bank characteristics are 
also significant effect on the switching decision of firms.  
Table 4.4: Analysis on bank-firm relationship and switching costs  
in Liu and Mei (2009) 
  Switching costs Switching costs Switching costs 
Quality of bank-
firm relationship 
Pearson Correlation 0.247*   
Sig (2-tailed) 0.030   
No. Observation 308   
Benefit of bank-
firm relationship 
Pearson Correlation  0.034*  
Sig (2-tailed)  0.008  
No. Observation  308  
Firms stay with 
incumbent 
banking 
relationship 
Pearson Correlation   0.043* 
Sig (2-tailed)   0.000 
No. Observation   308 
* stands for significant at 5% level 
93 
 
Based on the survey data of World Bank on 1186 SMEs in China, He and Wang (2009) 
conduct an empirical study on the impact of bank-firm relationship on the growth of firms. 
The empirical model they used is as follows: 
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑗 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐿𝑛(1 + 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑒)𝑗 + 𝛼2𝐿𝑛(1 + 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ)𝑗 + 
                                                    𝛼3𝐿𝑛(1 + 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ)𝑗 + 𝑋𝛼4 + 𝜀𝑗                                  (1) 
, where 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ denotes the annual sales growth ratio of firms, 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑒 is the number of bank-
firm relationship, 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ stands for the average duration of lending, and 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ is a dummy 
variable to indictae whether firms can borrow without collateral.  𝑋  is a set of firm’s 
characteristics. They find that the longer duration and more number of lending relationship 
will slow down the growth of firms. Their results imply that large firms had a high 
probability of switching banks.  
 
Chang et al. (2009) study the impact of information from lending relationship to loan default 
in China. They distinguish information as ‘hard’ and ‘soft’, which stands for the publication 
information and the information arising from repeated lending, respectively, and focused 
their research on the economic role of banks’ soft information. Their logit model is set as 
follows: 
Pr(𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡) = 𝑓(𝑆𝑜𝑓𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦, 𝜆𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟)   (2) 
,where 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 is a dummy equal to 1 if a firm is in the stage of defaulting its loan, and 
0 otherwise. They find that soft information and firm size have a significant negative effect 
on the duration of both short and long-term lending relationships. Moreover, their study 
suggests that the lending decisions of Chinese banks are mostly based on commercial 
principles other than government policies during their sample period from 2003 to 2006. 
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4.3 Methodology 
4.3.1 Model and Hypotheses 
This chapter’s primary objective is to determine how a firm chooses between a relationship 
bank and a non-relationship bank for their repeat borrowing needs. Consider a firm that has 
no financial resources and wants to implement a project. The investment of the project 
borrows from bank. In period 0, the project return (cash flow) denote as 𝐾. The investment 
(borrowing) cost is (1 + 𝑟)𝐼0, where 𝑟 is bench interest rate. Similar as Vesala (2007), here I 
set firms (loan applicants) have heterogeneous types, which are good credit firms (G) and bad 
credit firms (B). Denote Q as the quality of the firm. 
                𝑄 = {
𝐺 (𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚),          𝑖𝑓 𝐾 − (1 + 𝑟)𝐼0 > 0
𝐵 (𝑏𝑎𝑑 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚),             𝑖𝑓𝐾 − (1 + 𝑟)𝐼0 < 0
                        (3) 
As with Von Thadden (2001), there are two assumptions for this model, as follows: first, 
good firms consume any profit after period 0; and second, the outstanding debts of bad firms 
are forgiven. Under the relationship lending of this period, information is gathered by the 
lender beyond the relatively transparent data available in the financial statements. For non-
relationship banks, they are free to get transparent information and the obverse part of opaque 
information, but this is not as accurate as the information held by the relationship bank. 
 
In period 1, firms come to a new round of borrowing procedures. Firms have relationship 
with an incumbent bank, which is denoted as the ‘inside’ bank, otherwise they are ‘outside’ 
banks. Here I assume that although the ‘inside’ bank knows the information that they have 
gathered from the relationship firms, it has a ‘noisy signal’. Denote 𝑃𝑔 the probability that a 
good credit firm will be viewed as good, and 1 − 𝑃𝑔 as the probability that be viewed as bad. 
Better performances of firms ensure that they have higher probability to be viewed as good 
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firm, which is  𝑃𝑔 =
1
1+𝑧−(𝐾−(1+𝑟)𝐼0)
 , where 𝑧 > 1. Let 𝑃𝑏 be the probability that a bad credit 
firm will be viewed as a bad firm, and denote 1 − 𝑃𝑏 as the probability that the firm will be 
viewed as a good credit firm. Symmetrically, firms with a worse performance will have a 
higher probability to be viewed as a bad firm, which is 𝑃𝑏 =
1
1+𝑧(𝐾−(1+𝑟)𝐼0)
. Hence the ‘inside’ 
bank still has the information advantage  𝑃𝑔, 𝑃𝑏 ∈ (
1
2
, 1). 
 
The ‘outside’ bank has a higher probability to misjudge the quality of firms because of the 
existence of asymmetrical information between firms and ‘the outside’ bank. Similar to 
Sharpe (1990), here the probability of ‘outside’ bank views a good firm as good is given by 
𝜆𝑔 =
1+𝜙
2
𝑃𝑔, where 0 ≤ 𝜙 < 1. Then, the probability being viewed as a bad firm is 1 − 𝜆𝑔. 
Symmetrically the probability that an ‘outside’ bank views a bad firm as bad is 𝜆𝑏 =
1+𝜙
2
𝑃𝑏, 
and the probability viewed as a good firm is 1 − 𝜆𝑏. It is clear that 𝜆𝑔 < 𝑃𝑔 and 𝜆𝑏 < 𝑃𝑏. 
 
Consider that a probability for success and failure of the lending project, I denote 𝐿𝑔  is 
probability that a bank is willing to lends to good credit firm, and let 𝐿𝑏 be the probability of  
a bank lending to a bad credit firm. Since a firm in a good credit states has higher probability 
to get loans, here has 𝐿𝑔 ≫ 𝐿𝑏.  
 
If a firm chooses to process the lending relationship with incumbent bank, the value of loan it 
may get is denoted as 𝑄𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒, which is an index of the loan quality consisting of loan amount 
(𝐼1), duration (𝐷) and interest rate (𝑟). While 𝑄𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 stands for the value of loan offer that 
comes from ‘outside’ bank. Hence, 𝑄𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒/𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 =
𝐼1
1+𝑟
∗ 𝐷𝛼 , where 𝛼 > 1.The expected 
value of firm staying with current bank-firm relationship for repeating borrowing is given by: 
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   𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 = {
[𝑃𝑔𝐿𝑔 + (1 − 𝑃𝑔)𝐿𝑏] ∗ 𝑄𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒   𝑖𝑓 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚
[𝑃𝑏𝐿𝑏 + (1 − 𝑃𝑏)𝐿𝑔] ∗ 𝑄𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒   𝑖𝑓 𝑏𝑎𝑑 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚   
                    (4) 
The expected value of firm switching bank is given by: 
   𝑉𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 = {
[𝜆𝑔𝐿𝑔 + (1 − 𝜆𝑔)𝐿𝑏] ∗ 𝑄𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒   𝑖𝑓 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚
[𝜆𝑏𝐿𝑏 + (1 − 𝜆𝑏)𝐿𝑔] ∗ 𝑄𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒     𝑖𝑓 𝑏𝑎𝑑 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚
                (5) 
Then, 
𝑉𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 = {
[
1+𝜙
2
(𝑃𝑔𝐿𝑔 − 𝑃𝑔𝐿𝑏) + 𝐿𝑏] ∗ 𝑄𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒   𝑖𝑓 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚
[
1+𝜙
2
(𝑃𝑏𝐿𝑏 − 𝑃𝑏𝐿𝑔) + 𝐿𝑔] ∗ 𝑄𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒     𝑖𝑓 𝑏𝑎𝑑 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚
           (6) 
Considered transaction costs will occur when a firm changes credit supplier. Here, denote 𝑐 
as transaction costs. Firms are looking for better financial fund source from banks in period 1, 
which can be denoted as Max {𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 , 𝑉𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 − 𝑐}. Let 1 stand for switching, 0 for non-
switching. Hence, the decision equation of firms’ switching is given by: 
                                     𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔 = {
1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑉𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 − 𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 > 𝑐
0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑉𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 − 𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 ≤ 𝑐
                               (7) 
i) Switching behaviour and deal terms: 
Rewriting equation (7) as the probability of switching determination gives: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 1)~
{
 
 Qoutside >
[(PgLg−PgLb)+Lb]∗Qinside+𝑐
1+ϕ
2
(PgLg−PgLb)+Lb
    𝑖𝑓 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚
Qoutside >
[(PbLb−PbLg)+Lg]∗Qinside+𝑐
1+ϕ
2
(PbLb−PbLg)+Lg
     𝑖𝑓 𝑏𝑎𝑑 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚
     (8) 
Obviously, in equation (8) there are 
𝜕(𝑉𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒−𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒−𝑐)
𝜕𝐼1
> 0   and 
𝜕(𝑉𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒−𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒−𝑐)
𝜕𝐷
> 0 , 
which suggests that more favourable offer (large amount of loans (𝐼1) and longer lending 
duration (𝐷)) from ‘outside’ banks result in higher probability for firms switching banks. The 
first hypothesis is given as: 
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H1: Given that information asymmetry is a barrier for firms’ switching to a new bank, 
there is a higher probability to switch when firms get access to more favourable credit 
than remaining with incumbent banks
24
. 
 
Firms need to choose between a relationship and a non-relationship bank for their repeat loan 
when they have the financial need. Since bank loans are the most important source of funding 
for firms in China (Allen et al., 2005; Hao et al., 2013), it is important that Chinese firms 
account for this when they make the switching decisions. As Ioannidou and Ongena (2010) 
claim, turning to a new bank is a defining moment for both the firm and its current lenders, 
firms often take these strategic decision at the highest level. Switching costs arise from 
asymmetrical information, which sets a barrier for switching. This implies that favourable 
loans are the key motivation when Chinese firms plan to switch to overcome a financial 
constraint. Hence, the first hypothesis expects that more generous lending contracts from 
‘outside’ bank will drive firm to switch. 
ii) Loan demand and a firm’s characteristics: 
Firms are willing to form new lending relationship when they get more attractive loans from 
an ‘outside’ bank. Published or shared information about transparency and reputation are 
very important, such as firm size and financial condition. Under the condition of equation (8), 
there are 
𝜕(𝑉𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒−𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒−𝑐)
𝜕𝜙
> 0,
𝜕(𝑉𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒−𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒−𝑐)
𝜕𝐾
> 0;  
Otherwise, 
 
𝜕(𝑉𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒−𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒−𝑐)
𝜕𝜙
≤ 0,
𝜕(𝑉𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒−𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒−𝑐)
𝜕𝐾
≤ 0.  
                                                          
24 Interest rate has not been included into the model, since Chinese banks were not free to price their 
loans until after Oct 2004. 
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These results suggest that higher cash flow and transparency enhance the higher likelihood 
for a firm to switch. Usually, larger firms are more transparent than small firms (Elyasiani 
and Goldberg, 2004; Stephan et al., 2009). Hence, larger firms presumably have higher 
probability to change banks. The second hypothesis is given as follows: 
H2a: Given the asymmetry of information between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ banks, the 
more transparent a firm is. 
H2b: The better its financial health, the greater the probability that it will form a new 
lending relationship. 
 
The average non-performing loans ratios of Chinese commercial banks have continuously 
decreased over recent years, from 7.1% in 2006 to 1.0% in 2011. The largest decrease came 
from the large commercial banks group, from 9.7% in 2006 to 1.0% in 2011. These data 
indicate that the commercial banks focus on their borrowers’ quality rather than on policy 
lending. Since the existence of asymmetrical information between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ 
banks, the ‘outside’ banks have difficulty finding a firm’s internal credit information. Under 
this condition, transparent firms are more attractive to ‘outside’ banks.  In contrast, borrowers 
with poor financials may repeat borrow from their relationship lenders (Diamond, 1989). 
Firm size is likely to have a positive relationship with information transparency (Lin et al., 
2007; Stephan et al., 2009). Furthermore, firm size usually reflects the bargaining power of 
larger borrower (Harhoff and Körting, 1998). In summary, more transparent firms (larger 
firms) and firms in better financial conditions have a higher propensity to switch.  
iii) Loan supply and bank’s characteristics: 
Lending decisions are wildly observed as heterogeneous between different banks. Large 
banks are usually considered as nonaggressive when poaching new customers, which is 
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known as the ‘fat cat’ effect (Farrell and Klemperer, 2007), and tend to have a lower 
probability to lend. While small banks or banks with low profitability have a higher 
likelihood to lend, even to some ‘risky’ borrowers, since they need to extend market share 
and improve profitability. Furthermore, small banks are usually more efficient than larger 
banks in collecting ‘soft’ information, which makes them more willing to preserve or create 
bank-firm business relationship (Berger et al., 2005). Hence, the lending probability (𝐿𝑔/𝑏) is 
effected by the bank’s characteristics, which can be written as: 
𝐿𝑔/𝑏 = 𝑓(𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠). The following hypothesis addresses the effect of bank 
characteristics on switching.  
H3a: Firms are more likely to switch to small banks for their credit needs than large 
banks.  
H3b: Low profitability banks are more attractive to firms since they have higher 
likelihood to satisfy the firm’s credit requirements. 
In China the banking industry is heterogeneous and it has a mix of large and small banks with 
intensive competition in the market. The five large commercial banks hold the largest part of 
market share, but this has decreased by about 14.74% from 2003 to 2011. In the same period, 
joint-stock banks have the highest share growth, around 5.97%, and have become the second 
largest market share group in the Chinese banking industry with 18.81% market share in 
2011. City commercial banks and rural commercial banks had a 3.88% and 4.18% market 
share growth during the last nine years, respectively. From these observations, it is clear that 
small banks are eager to extend their business and have higher propensity to lend than large 
banks.
25
 Large banks usually rely more on observable firm characteristics in making lending 
decision than small banks (Cole et al., 1999), which implies they are less willing to lend than 
small banks under the same information asymmetry condition. Furthermore, small banks are 
                                                          
25 Evidence of this is reported in Ferri (2009). 
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more efficient at lending to small firms than large banks (Sapienza, 2002). It is presumed that 
medium and small firms are more likely to switch to small banks.  
4.3.2 Empirical models 
Based on the above analysis, the switching determination of a firm can be effected by deal 
terms, characteristics of firm and bank, which implies that these variables are the 
determinants of switching behaviour. Equation (7) can be rewritten as:   
𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 𝑓(𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑠, 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠, 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠)     (9) 
Similar to the many relevant empirical studies, the firms’ classification and bank-firm 
relationship dummy variables have been added into the model. The basic model that I 
estimate using probit regressions has variants of the following form:  
𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖 = 𝛼0 +𝐷𝑖𝛼1 + 𝐹𝑖𝛼2 + 𝐵𝑖𝛼3 + 𝑢𝑖                (10) 
, where the 𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖 stands for the switching behaivor, 𝐷𝑖 indicates the deal terms
26
, 𝐹𝑖   is 
a set of firms’ characteristics variables, 𝐵𝑖  stands for the banks characteristics and 𝑅𝑖 
indicates the bank-firm relationship variables. Note that 𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 1 indicates that the 
firm switches the lending relationship. In the above equations, the deal terms includes: the 
amount of loan, the duration of the loan, and a dummy of whether the collateral required for 
the lending. The set of a firm’s characteristics variables includes firm size, cash flow ratio 
and the dummy variables of the firm’s classification (private own enterprise, medium size 
and small firms and so on). While the market share of the bank, non-interest income ratio, 
bank’s ROA and large commercial bank dummy belongs to the bank’s characteristics 
variables. The details of variable definition are listed as follows: 
                                                          
26 Interest rate has not been included into the model, since Chinese banks cannot free to price their 
consumers until Oct 2004. 
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Table 4.5: Variables definition 
Variables Definition Unit 
Switching 
A firm borrows from a bank which did not have a loan 
relationship with the firm during last 12 month, denote 
switching=1; otherwise switching=0 
- 
Amount of loan 
(Amount) 
The amount of money of each loan contract CNY 
Duration of loan 
(Duration) 
The duration of each loan contract Year 
Collateral 
(Collateral) 
Whether collateral is required when a firm borrowing 
from a bank. Collateral needed=1; otherwise=0 
- 
Total asset of firm 
(Tasset) 
Annual total asset of firm CNY 
Total sales of firm 
(Firmsales) 
Annual total sales of firm CNY 
Cash flow ratio 
(Cashflows) 
Firm’s annual net cash flow over total sales % 
Private enterprise 
(Private-Own) 
Dummy variable to distinguish the private enterprise and 
state-own enterprise. Private enterprise=1, otherwise=0 
- 
Agriculture b  
Dummy variable for industry Classification a.  
Agriculture industry=1, otherwise=0 
- 
Manufacture c 
Dummy variable for industry Classification.  
Manufacture industry=1, otherwise=0 
- 
Real estate d 
 
Dummy variable for industry Classification.  
Real estate industry=1, otherwise=0 
- 
Energy e 
Dummy variable for industry Classification.  
Energy industry=1, otherwise=0 
- 
Services f 
Dummy variable for industry Classification.  
Services industry=1, otherwise=0 
- 
Medium and small 
firm 
(M-S firm) 
Statistical definitions of medium-sized and small 
enterprises from National Bureau of Statistics of China g. 
Denote that  medium and small firm M-S firm=1; 
otherwise equal to 0 
- 
Market share of bank 
(Marksh) 
Bank’s loan over total loans in the market % 
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Variables Definition Unit 
Total asset of bank 
(Bankasset) 
Annual total asset of bank CNY 
Non-interest income 
ratio 
Bank’s non-interest income over total gross income % 
Bank’s return on asset 
(Bankroa) 
Bank’s net profit over total earning assets % 
Large commercial 
bank 
(Large bank) 
Large commercial bank=1, otherwise=0 - 
Banking market 
Competition ratio 
(HHI) 
The sum of the squares of the market shares (percentage 
of banks’ assets over the total assets of the entire banking 
sector) of the five largest banks 
- 
a
 Industry Classification here according to "Listed Company Industry Classification Guidelines (2012 
Revision)", China Securities Regulatory Commission 
b
 Agriculture: Farming, forestry, animal, husbandry and fishing industry 
c
 Manufacture: Manufacture Industry 
d 
Real estate: Real estate industry  
e
 Energy: Production and Supply Electric Power, thermal Power, gas and water industry 
f 
Services: Wholesale, retail, trades hotels and catering services industry 
g
 Statistical definitions of medium-sized and small enterprises table is attached in Appendix C.1. 
 
As since the target of this study is to estimate the determinant of a firm’s switching behaviour 
with deal terms and characteristics of firm and bank, the empirical study is in two stages. The 
first step of my analysis is to estimate the impacts of a firm’s characteristics and deals terms 
on the propensity to form a new banking relationship. This study then analyses the 
relationship between post-switching banks’ characteristics and new banking relationship. 
Since switching is only available from the borrower’s second deal onwards, the empirical 
studies drop the first deal in the regression. The specific model for the determinants of deal 
terms and firms’ characteristics on switching is: 
𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖 + 𝛼2𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛼3𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝛼4𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖 +
   𝛼5𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠𝑖 + 𝛼6𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 + 𝛼7𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖                (11) 
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The specific model for the relationship between post-switching bank characteristics and a 
firm’s preference when switching is as follows: 
𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝐹𝑖𝛽3 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑠ℎ𝑖 + 
                                        𝛽5𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽6𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖                                  (12) 
The last stage, the robustness check model is designed as: 
          𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝐷𝑖𝛼1 + 𝐹𝑖𝛼2 + 𝐵𝑖𝛼3 + 𝑅𝑖𝛼4 + 𝛼5𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖                (13) 
, where 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖 stands for banking market concentration ratio.  
 
4.4 Data 
The basic source of the data that I have used in this study for corporate characteristics is the 
CSMAR (China Stock Market Financial Statements) database. The financial reports of China 
banks are taken from the Bankscopes database. I then match the two samples with the 
corresponding lending deals. Since the research take past deals to code switching, the data 
only contains the deal from second borrowing (data detail in appendix C.2). The sample 
includes 311 firms (non-financial firm) and 41 banks,
27
 from 1999-2012, with 2102 matched 
data. However, some firms and banks characteristics variables lack data in some sample years, 
making the regression unbalanced. Since these gaps appear to be completely random, they 
should not affect the estimations in any way other than reducing the sample size (Wooldridge, 
2009).  
 
A total of 51.5% firms switched after their last pervious borrowing. Firms are more likely to 
switch to a multiple bank-firm relationship instead of keep single lending relationship. Only 
                                                          
27 The sample includes 5 large commercial banks, 12 joint-stock commercial banks, 19 City and Rural 
commercial bank, and 5 foreign banks. Details are attached in Appendix C.3. 
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25% kept their single bank-firm relationship after switching.  The average deal amount is 
89835613 CNY. The highest and lowest loan amount is 259000000 and 1500000, 
respectively. Here the logarithm is taken on the absolute values in order to smooth the data 
and lower the probability of heterogeneity problems. The average Ln(deal amount) is 17.498, 
and the highest and lowest value is 22.386 and 14.221, respectively. In the sample, all of the 
deals only involve a single lender, which means that no syndicate of lenders are involved. 
The average number of lending relationships is 3.901. In the first period of a firm’s lending 
deals, 77.3% borrow from large banks. The average lending duration is 1.528 year, and 68.4% 
deal durations are between 1 and 2 years.  
 
Although the firms in this sample are all listed, they are heterogeneous in size. The largest 
total asset is 138000000000 CNY, while the smallest is only 5220090. The values are also 
taken logarithm in regression. The average cash flow to total sales ratio is -3.616. 
Observations from private firms take a small proportion as 7.7% and from the medium size 
and small firms takes 24.6%. Nearly half of the switching or non-switching behaviours in the 
observations come from manufacturing firms, and around 1/3 come from real estate and 
services firms. As to bank characteristics, there is a big gap between the highest and lowest 
market share. Although the large banks’ market shares keep decreasing due to the 
competition during the sample years, they still hold the most clients. The highest is the 
market share of ICBC in 2001, while the lowest is the market share of Deyang City 
Commercial Bank in 2008. Besides the market share index, the dummy variable large bank is 
also used to distinguish large banks and others. The statistic shows that 54.4% borrowing 
deals are with large banks. 
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Table 4.6: Summary Statistics 
 Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max 
Dependent variable 
Switching  2102 0.511 0.497 0 1 
Deal Characteristics 
Ln(Amount) 2047 17.498 1.158 14.220 22.386 
Ln(1+Duration)  1802 0.811 0.401 0.077 3.060 
Collateral 2102 0.738 0.439 0 1 
Firm Characteristics 
Ln(Tasset) 2102 21.557 1.035 15.468 25.651 
Ln(Firmsales) 2097 20.853 1.323 15.468 25.838 
Cashflows  2095 -3.616 39.186 -81.412 77.211 
Private-Own 2102 0.077 0.267 0 1 
Agriculture 2102 0.021 0.146 0 1 
Manufacture 2102 0.471 0.499 0 1 
Real estate 2102 0.164 0.371 0 1 
Energy 2102 0.048 0.231 0 1 
Services 2102 0.142 0.349 0 1 
M-S firm 2012 0.264 0.440 0 1 
Bank’s Characteristics 
Marksh (%) 1882 7.613 0.396 0.021 24.176 
Ln(Bankasset) 1886 14.550 1.514 2.805 16.554 
Non-interest income ratio 
(%) 
1884 13.420 1.356 7.585 21.406 
Bankroa (%) 1865 1.245 0.897 -0.282 34.063 
Large bank 2102 0.544 0.498 0 1 
Market Characteristics 
HHI 2102 714.305 105.102 564.589 941.224 
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4.5 Empirical results 
This study aims to investigate why firms switch their relationship banks. Switching action is 
defined as a firm borrowing from a bank that did not have a loan relationship with the firm 
during the last 12 months. Hence, the dependent variable switching is a dummy variable, 
either 0 or 1. As in many previous studies, I have used the probit method to estimate the 
regression models.
28
 Since the endogeneity of a firm’s switching decision problem existence 
is suspected in the model, a probit model with continuous endogenous (ivprobit) has been 
used for the following empirical study.
29
 All of the data in regression are winsorized at the 1
st
 
and 99
th
 percentiles.  
 
4.5.1 New lending relationship, deal terms, and a firm’s characteristics 
The estimates for the determinants of switching probability are shown in Table 4.7. The 
outcomes provide evidence that the probability of a firm switching banks is determined by 
deal terms, firm characteristics and bank-firm relationship. In table 4.7, Ln(amount) has the 
significant positive effect for firms to form new borrowing deals, which indicates that one of 
the reasons why firms switch is to seek more loans. When the sample is divided into 
switching and non-switching groups, the statistic shows that the average amount of loan in 
switching group is 35.6%, which is higher on average than in the non-switching group. Since 
the amount of loan, impact of duration of loan is similar in the firms’ decision to form new 
banking relationship, duration has a significant positive effect on the probability of switching 
above the 5% level. The statistical analysis shows that the average contract duration increased 
from 1.31 year to 1.73 year after switching. Since a long contract usually indicates a stable 
                                                          
28 Correlation table of independent variables are attached in Appendix C.4. 
29 Lagged terms of Firm’s characteristics have been selected as instrument variables except dummy 
variables. 
107 
 
relationship, it is normal that firms chase for a long and stable lending relationship. 
Furthermore, a longer relationship means that more information has been passed to the banks 
(Farinha and Santos, 2002). Hence, banks prefer to offer a longer contract to their new clients 
with good credit. The above results prove Hypothesis 1. Collateral has no significant effect 
on a firms’ behaviour in the regressions. 
 
As for the firm’s characteristics, Ln(Tasset) (firm size) shows a signification positive 
relationship with switching behaviour at 1% level in column (2)-(6), which indicates that 
large firms have a high probability of forming a new banking relationship. Since firm 
transparency is usually considered to have positive relationship with firm size, which implies 
that small firms are less transparent than larger firms (Elyasiani and Goldberg, 2004; Stephan 
et al., 2009), the positive relationship shows that more opaque firms are less likely to switch 
banks. Asymmetrical information can contribute to lock-in power of banks but transparent 
firms can decrease the asymmetry information level and suffer less from switching costs 
(although this cannot be observed). This result is consistent with Stephan et al. (2009) and 
Gopalan et al. (2011). Another key variable of the firm’s characteristics is Cashflows (cash 
flow ratio), which indicates the ability of a company to generate cash from its sales. In this 
case, cashflows has a significant positive effect on switching banks behaviour. High cash 
flow ratio presumably indicates a good performance. Firms with higher internal cash flows 
ratio and good performance should be less reliant on the incumbent relationship, which drives 
firms to have a high likelihood to switch. On the other hand, they have good financial 
conditions, which are attractive for ‘outside’ banks. These results support Hypothesis 2a&b. 
The private-own variable gives an insignificant result, which shows that there is no 
significant difference in switching behaviour between state-own or private-own enterprise. 
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The heterogeneity in industries is found in the regression. The regression results show that 
the firms in the energy and service industries have higher likelihood to switch banks. 
Table 4.7: The determinants of deal terms and firms’ characteristics on switching 
 Pr(Switching) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Deal terms 
Ln(amount) 
0.118*** 
(3.951) 
0.114*** 
(3.776) 
0.112*** 
(3.724) 
0.121*** 
(4.174) 
Ln(1+Duration) 
0.174** 
(2.095) 
0.168** 
(2.012) 
0.172** 
(2.073) 
0.165** 
(1.989) 
Collateral 
-0.037 
(-0.536) 
-0.051 
(-0.726) 
-0.043 
(-0.614) 
 
Firm characteristics 
Ln(Tasset) 
0.106*** 
(3.058) 
0.082** 
(2.406) 
0.084** 
(2.500) 
0.085** 
(2.550) 
Cashflows 
0.002** 
(2.439) 
0.002** 
(2.153) 
0.002** 
(2.252) 
0.002** 
(2.228) 
Private-own  
0.075 
(0.067) 
0.154 
(1.342) 
0.136 
(1.203) 
 
Agriculture  
0.066 
(0.288) 
  
Manufacture  
-0.145 
(-1.565) 
  
Real estate  
-0.144 
(-1.385) 
  
Energy  
0.316* 
(1.948) 
0.377** 
(2.458) 
0.368** 
(2.395) 
Services  
0.365*** 
(3.181) 
0.429*** 
(4.223) 
0.430*** 
(4.224) 
C 
-4.362*** 
(-5.594) 
-3.373*** 
(-4.770) 
-3.838*** 
(-4.945) 
-4.010*** 
(-5.223) 
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Wald Chi
2
 69.46 98.87 98.04 94.81 
Obs 1781 1781 1781 1781 
Prob: Wald test of 
exogeneity
30
 
0.424 0.384 0.435 0.443 
Note: Z statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Regression result with regular probit is attached in Appendix C.5.  
 
 
4.5.2 The propensity to form new banking relationship based on bank characteristics 
The regression of this part is to test what types of banks and firms are more likely to form a 
lending relationship. Since the details of a loan deal may have correlations with a bank’s 
characteristics, as in Gopalan et al. (2011), the duration of loans
31
 is not included in the 
following probit model with continuous endogenous (ivprobit) regressions. Although I 
control the firms’ characteristic and bank-firm relationship variables in these regressions, I do 
not report the results in the following table other than banks’ characteristics (the full table is 
attached in Appendix C.6). The results are presented in table 4.8. 
Table 4.8: Post-switching bank characteristics and new banking relationship 
 Pr(switching) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Marksh 
-0.020*** 
(-3.989) 
-0.016*** 
(-3.119) 
-0.021*** 
(-3.965) 
  
Marksh*M-S firm  
-0.029*** 
(-2.681) 
   
Bankroa 
-0.241*** 
(-3.252) 
-0.211*** 
(-2.838) 
-0.206*** 
(-2.711) 
-0.206*** 
(-2.783) 
-0.171** 
(-2.295) 
Bankroa*M-S firm   
-0.193*** 
(-2.770) 
 
-0.186*** 
(-2.692) 
Large Bank    -0.268*** -0.269*** 
                                                          
30 Wald test of exogeneity do not reject the null that there is exogeneity in the regression. 
31 When bank facing liquidity crisis, they are tending to lend in short term other than long term. 
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 Pr(switching) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(-4.279) (-4.272) 
Non-interest income 
ratio 
-0.093*** 
(-3.601) 
-0.094*** 
(-3.627) 
-0.092*** 
(-3.528) 
-0.095*** 
(-3.714) 
-0.094*** 
(-3.650) 
C 
-2.887*** 
(-2.942) 
-3.670*** 
(-3.491) 
-4.039*** 
(-3.601) 
-2.932*** 
(-3.004) 
-4.043*** 
(-3.617) 
Wald Chi
2
 105.63 111.66 110.76 106.40 112.33 
Obs 1812 1812 1812 1812 1812 
Prob: Wald test of 
exogeneity
32
 
0.454 0.488 0.482 0.455 0.477 
Note: Z statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Regression result with regular probit is attached in Appendix C.7. 
 
In columns (1), (2) and (3), market share of banks (Marksh) shows a significant negative 
relationship with switching. This implies that firms tend to switch to small market share 
banks. The variable large bank shows a similar result in column (4) and (5). The statistics 
show that the average amount borrowing from large commercial banks is 41.4% less than 
firms borrowing from non-large commercial banks. Since small market share banks are more 
aggressive in extending their market share, they usually have a higher propensity to lend than 
large market share banks. The significant negative result of joint variables (market 
share*medium-small firms) in column (2) reflects that medium-small size firms are more 
likely to form new relationship with small market share banks than large firms. This result is 
consistent with the evidence in Berger et al. (2005b) and Gopalan et al. (2011). Since large 
firms find it easier to borrow from large banks, small firms prefer to seek financial help from 
small banks. In table 4.8, Bankroa also shows a significant negative relationship with 
switching. Banks with low profitability have a high propensity to lend since interest income 
is the main income resource for Chinese banks. Under the same asymmetry information 
                                                          
32 The Wald test of exogeneity did not reject the null that there is exogeneity in the regression. 
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condition, lower profitability firms are more likely to lend. The significant negative results of 
joint variables (market share*medium-small firms) in column (3) and (5) reflect that medium-
small size firms are more likely to form new relationship with this kind of banks since they 
are more opaque than large firms. The results above show strong evidence that is consistent 
with Hypothesis 3a&b. Interestingly, the results show that high non-interest income ratios 
lower the probability for firms to switch to a new bank. Since banks with high non-interest 
income ratios tend to have more correlation (intermediary business, consulting, investment 
and so on) with firms other than lending, this presumably raises the switching costs and 
strengthens the lock-in power to enhance firms to stay with their current lending relationships. 
It is obvious that firms tend to avoid being locked-in and keep a simple lending relationship 
with their banks. 
 
4.5.3 Robustness check 
Table 4.9: The determinants of firms switching banks 
 
Pr(switching) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Deal Terms 
Ln(Amount) 
0.145*** 
(4.518) 
0.157*** 
(5.527) 
0.161*** 
(5.679) 
0.162*** 
(5.763) 
0.143*** 
(4.699) 
0.144*** 
(4.983) 
0.126*** 
(4.407) 
Ln(1+Duration) 
0.122** 
(2.247) 
    
 0.105** 
(2.013) 
Collateral 
-0.003 
(-0.044) 
0.043 
(0.572) 
0.058 
(0.761) 
0.046 
(0.612) 
0.025 
(0.311) 
 
 
Firm Characteristics 
Ln(Tasset) 
0.128*** 
(3.264) 
   
0.094** 
(2.169) 
0.085** 
(1.985) 
0.077** 
(2.268) 
Ln(Firmsales)  
0.082** 
(2.544) 
0.075** 
(2.344) 
0.078** 
(2.467) 
 
 
 
Cashflows 0.002** 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 
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Pr(switching) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(1.975) (1.886) (1.707) (1.832) (1.974) (1.981) (2.282) 
Private-own 
0.284 
(1.364) 
0.189 
(0.941) 
0.082 
(0.738) 
 
0.057 
(0.507) 
 
 
Private-own*M-
S Firm 
-0.252 
(-1.004) 
 
-0.151 
(-0.635) 
  
 
 
Energy      
0.285* 
(1.885) 
0.411** 
(2.768) 
Services      
0.294*** 
(3.460) 
0.469*** 
(4.980) 
Bank characteristics 
Marksh  
-0.019*** 
(-3.775) 
  
-0.020** 
(-3.919) 
-0.019*** 
(-3.665) 
 
Ln(Bankasset)   
-0.121*** 
(-5.316) 
-0.262*** 
(-4.152) 
 
 
 
Bankroa  
-0.251*** 
(-3.334) 
-0.168* 
(-1.860) 
-0.216*** 
(-2.868) 
-0.247** 
(-2.666) 
-0.231*** 
(-3.190) 
 
Non-interest 
income ratio 
 
-0.089*** 
(-3.422) 
-0.093*** 
(-3.622) 
-0.091*** 
(-3.504) 
-0.091*** 
(-3.229) 
-0.095*** 
(-3.710) 
 
Market characteristic 
HHI     
-0.0001 
(-0.405) 
 
 
C 
-5.383*** 
(-6.176) 
-2.853*** 
(-3.042) 
-1.446 
(-1.485) 
-2.879*** 
(-3.131) 
-2.562 
(-0.812) 
-2.497** 
(-2.559) 
-3.979*** 
(-5.147) 
Wald Chi
2
 72.74 104.55 116.51 101.06 105.87 116.09 92.89 
Obs 1781 1812 1812 1812 1812 1812 1781 
Prob: Wald test 
of exogeneity
33
 
0.372 0.416 0.457 0.444 0.451 0.488 0.337 
Note: Z statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Regression result with regular probit is attached in Appendix C.8. 
 
                                                          
33 The Wald test of exogeneity did not reject the null that there is exogeneity in the regression. 
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Some studies point out that medium size and small firms in China have difficulty in obtaining 
financing support from banks (Lin, 2007), especially for private enterprises who do not have 
a government background. This could lead medium size and small private firms to tend to 
stick with their incumbent banks since they experience difficulty finding external financing. 
In column (1) and (2), other Private-own and Private-own*M-S FIRM variables are 
insignificant, which suggests that the medium size and small private firms in the sample (all 
listed firms) have not shown a significant switching preference.  
 
Then I denote firm total sales and bank size as firm size and bank size (instead of market 
share), respectively, and take them into regression to check the robustness of the previous 
results.  In column (3) and (4), Firm total sales gives the same effect as Firm total asset to 
switching behaviours, which again supports that big firms are more likely to form a new 
banking relationship. Compared with the Wald Chi
2 statistic result in column (2) and the 
result from column (1) of table A.5, it is clear that variable Ln(Tasset) offers a higher Chi 
square, which suggests better results. In column (3), the impact of Bank asset on dependent 
variable is significantly negative, which is consistent with the previous result that firms tend 
to switch to small banks.  
 
As in other studies (Herrera and Minetti, 2007; Uchida et al., 2008), here I add the banking 
market concentration variable as a control for the macro effect into regression to check the 
robustness of the results in table 4.7 and 4.8. In column (5), marker competition ratio (HHI) 
shows no significant relations to switching, but other variables results are consistent with the 
previous regressions. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
Using firm-bank 2012 matched data originated during 1999-2012, this chapter has examined 
why firms switch to new banks for their repeat loans instead of staying with their relationship 
banks. This study defines switching action as a firm borrowing from a bank that it did not 
have a loan relationship with during last 12 month. The results provide evidence that the chief 
determinations of switching action come from the firm’s credit needs, as well as the firm’s 
and bank’s characteristics.  
 
This study finds that firms usually switch banks for larger loans and longer lending durations 
in order to overcome borrowing constrains. However, collateral requirement of lending has 
no significant effect on firms’ switching behaviour. More favourable loan contract usually 
link with ‘price cut’ from bank to firms, which are also based on how banks observe their 
potential customers (Ioannidou and Ongena, 2010). Because of lack of interest rate data and 
Chinese banks incompetence to free price their consumers until Oct 2004, interest rate has 
not been involved into this study. 
 
Since large firms are usually considered as more transparent than small firms (Stephan et al., 
2009), this study finds a positive relationship between firm size and the probability of bank 
switching. Firms who have a better ability to generate cash from its sales are more likely to 
form a new bank relationship since they are attractive to banks and find it easy to get new 
loans. From banks’ prospective, large firms or firms who have a better ability to generate 
cash are more attracted for them. 
 
These findings suggest that firms are more likely to switch to small market share banks, or 
lower profitability banks, since these banks more aggressively extend their business and take 
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more risks to earn their profits, which will results in more loans for firms. Since banks with 
high non-interest income ratios tend to have more correlation with firms other than lending, 
this offers a lock-in power to enhance firms to stay with current lending relationships. Firms 
are less likely to switch to this kind of bank. It is good for firms to set ‘pure’ lending 
relationship with banks to avoid to be trapped in higher switching costs barrier. 
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Appendix C 
Table C.1: Statistical Definitions of Large, Medium-sized and Small Enterprises (newest) 
Industry Branch Index Unit Large Medium-sized Small 
Farming, 
forestry, animal 
husbandry and 
fishing 
Operating income 
(Y) 
10,000 𝑌 ≥ 20000 500 ≤ 𝑌 < 20000 50 ≤ 𝑌 < 500 
Industry 
Employees (X) People 𝑋 ≥ 1000 300 ≤ 𝑋 < 1000 20 ≤ 𝑋 < 300 
Operating income 
(Y) 
10,000 𝑌 ≥ 40000 
2000 ≤ 𝑌
< 40000 
300 ≤ 𝑌
< 2000 
Construction 
Operating income 
(Y) 
10,000 𝑌 ≥ 80000 
6000 ≤ 𝑌
< 80000 
300 ≤ 𝑋
< 6000 
Total assets (Z) 10,000 𝑍 ≥ 80000 
5000 ≤ 𝑍
< 80000 
300 ≤ 𝑋
< 5000 
Wholesale 
Employees (X) People 𝑋 ≥ 200 20 ≤ 𝑋 < 200 5 ≤ 𝑋 < 20 
Operating income 
(Y) 
10,000 𝑌 ≥ 40000 
5000 ≤ 𝑌
< 40000 
1000 ≤ 𝑌
< 5000 
Retail trades 
Employees (X) People 𝑋 ≥ 300 50 ≤ 𝑋 < 300 10 ≤ 𝑋 < 50 
Operating income 
(Y) 
10,000 𝑌 ≥ 20000 500 ≤ 𝑌 < 20000 
100 ≤ 𝑌
< 500 
Transport 
Employees (X) People 𝑋 ≥ 1000 300 ≤ 𝑋 < 1000 20 ≤ 𝑋 < 300 
Operating income 
(Y) 
10,000 𝑌 ≥ 30000 
3000 ≤ 𝑌
< 30000 
200 ≤ 𝑌
< 3000 
Storage 
Employees (X) People 𝑋 ≥ 200 100 ≤ 𝑋 < 200 20 ≤ 𝑋 < 100 
Operating income 
(Y) 
10,000 𝑌 ≥ 30000 
1000 ≤ 𝑌
< 30000 
100 ≤ 𝑌
< 1000 
Post 
Employees (X) People 𝑋 ≥ 1000 300 ≤ 𝑋 < 1000 20 ≤ 𝑋 < 300 
Operating income 
(Y) 
10,000 𝑌 ≥ 30000 
2000 ≤ 𝑌
< 30000 
100 ≤ 𝑌
< 2000 
Hotels 
Employees (X) People 𝑋 ≥ 300 100 ≤ 𝑋 < 300 10 ≤ 𝑋 < 100 
Operating income 
(Y) 
10,000 𝑌 ≥ 10000 
2000 ≤ 𝑌
< 10000 
100 ≤ 𝑌
< 2000 
Catering Employees (X) People 𝑋 ≥ 300 100 ≤ 𝑋 < 300 10 ≤ 𝑋 < 100 
117 
 
services 
Operating income 
(Y) 
10,000 𝑌 ≥ 10000 
2000 ≤ 𝑌
< 10000 
100 ≤ 𝑌
< 2000 
Soft and 
scientific 
research, 
technical 
services 
Employees (X) People 𝑋 ≥ 300 100 ≤ 𝑋 < 300 10 ≤ 𝑋 < 100 
Operating income 
(Y) 
10,000 𝑌 ≥ 10000 
1000 ≤ 𝑌
< 10000 
50 ≤ 𝑌
< 1000 
Real estate 
Operating income 
(Y) 
10,000 
𝑌
≥ 200000 
1000 ≤ 𝑌
< 200000 
100 ≤ 𝑋
< 1000 
Total assets (Z) 10,000 𝑍 ≥ 10000 
5000 ≤ 𝑍
< 10000 
2000 ≤ 𝑋
< 5000 
Property 
Management 
Employees (X) People 𝑋 ≥ 1000 300 ≤ 𝑋 < 1000 
100 ≤ 𝑋
< 300 
Operating income 
(Y) 
10,000 𝑌 ≥ 5000 1000 ≤ 𝑌 < 5000 
500 ≤ 𝑌
< 1000 
Leasing and 
Business 
Services 
Employees (X) People 𝑋 ≥ 300 100 ≤ 𝑋 < 300 10 ≤ 𝑋 < 100 
Total assets (Z) 10,000 
𝑍
≥ 120000 
8000 ≤ 𝑍
< 120000 
100 ≤ 𝑋
< 8000 
No specified 
industry 
Employees (X) People 𝑋 ≥ 300 100 ≤ 𝑋 < 300 10 ≤ 𝑋 < 100 
Source: National bureau of statistics of China 
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C.2 Data details 
 
 
This analysis uses information from the CSMAR (China Stock Market and Accounting 
Research) Database of GTA Information Technology Ltd. GTA offers the most accurate, 
reliable, and useful China financial data. Their databases are developed by a team of 
experienced talents based on the standards and adjustment rules of well-known databases 
such as CRSP and Compustat.  
 
The CSMAR Database provides listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market 
since 1990. According to the statement types announced by the listed companies, this study 
collects the data based on three categories: Balance Sheet Statement, Income Statement, and 
Statement of Cash Flow. The data relevant with firm’s loan (contract duration, amount, date, 
lending bank etc.) is collected from Balance Sheet Statement. Firm’s characteristics are 
obtained from all the three categories. Here borrowers (firms) from the financial services 
sector are excluded. 
 
Since this study distinguishes switching or non-switching behaviour of firms by using the 
criteria that a firm borrows from a bank which did not have a loan relationship with the firm 
during last 12 month, the loan contract data with beginning date and ending date are needed. 
The firms who are absent with this kind of data are deleted from the sample. The study 
restricts our analysis to 311 firms listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market between the 
years 1999 and 2012. 
 
CSMAR Database provides relationship bank’s name. Financial reports of China banks are 
taken from the Bankscope database, which is collected by coding bank’s name. Then this 
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study connects the relationship banks’ data (market share, non-interest income ratio, bank’s 
ROA etc.) with firms’ characteristics in the corresponding year. The loans could be financed 
either by a single lender or by several lenders. Each lender’s data is separately connected to 
the relationship firm. Finally, 2102 matched data are obtained by manually checking and 
matching. However, the sample is unbalanced because of a lack of data in some years but 
since these gaps appear at random. 
 
 
To construct New Relationship, this study uses all the previous deals in the sample and codes 
switching equal to 1. Note that switching=0 indicates that the firm repeats borrowing from a 
relationship bank. Since past deals are used to code switching or non-switching behaviour, 
this study constructs variables only from the borrower’s 2nd deal onwards. 
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Table C.3: List of banks in sample 
Type of Bank Name of Bank 
Large commercial 
bank 
Industrial and commercial bank of China 
Agricultural bank of China 
Bank of China 
China Construction Bank 
Bank of Communications 
Joint-stock 
commercial bank 
China Citic bank 
China Everbright Bank 
Huaxia Bank 
Guangdong Development Bank (China Guangfa Bank) 
Shenzhen Development Bank (Pingan Bank) 
China Merchants Bank 
Shanghai Pudong Development Bank 
Industrial Bank 
China Minsheng Banking Corporation 
Evergrowing Bank 
China Zheshang Bank 
Bohai Bank 
City and Rural 
commercial bank 
Bank of Beijing 
Weihai Commercial Bank 
Bank of Shanghai 
Bank of Jiangsu 
Harbin Bank 
Chongqing Rural Commercial Bank 
Bank of Ningbo 
Bank of Dalian 
Shanghai Rural Commercial Bank 
Bank of Nanjing 
Bank of Hangzhou 
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Jiaxing Commercial Bank 
Wenzhou Bank 
Huishang Bank 
Bank of Jiujiang 
Baoshan Bank 
Bank of Guangzhou 
Bank of Chengdu 
Bank of Chongqing 
Foreign bank 
HSBC Bank (China) 
Bank of East Asia (China) 
Citibank (China) 
DBS BANK (China) 
Nanyang Commercial Bank (China) 
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Table C.4: Correlation of independent variables  
 
Ln(Am
ount) 
Ln(1+
Duratio
n) 
Ln(Tas
set) 
Ln(firm
sales) 
Cashflo
ws 
Marksh
are 
Ln(Ban
kasset) 
Bank 
Roa 
Nonint
erest 
Ln(Amou
nt) 
1.000         
Ln(1+Dur
ation) 
0.392 
** 
1.000        
Ln(Tasset
) 
0.270 
*** 
0.208 
*** 
1.000       
Ln(firmsa
les) 
0.145 
*** 
0.076 
*** 
0.825 
** 
1.000      
Cashflow
s 
0.030 
*** 
0.054 
*** 
0.090 
0.241 
** 
1.000     
Markshar
e 
0.004 
*** 
0.103 
*** 
-0.166 
*** 
-0.207 
** 
-0.009 
*** 
1.000    
Ln(Banka
sset) 
0.028 
*** 
0.150 
*** 
0.039 
*** 
0.015 
** 
0.049 
* 
0.750 
** 
1.000   
Bank Roa 
0.008 
*** 
0.110 
** 
0.322 
* 
0.368 
*** 
0.118 
** 
-0.075 
*** 
0.291 
** 
1.000  
Nonintere
st 
-0.123 
** 
-0.203 
** 
-0.319 
*** 
-0.350 
*** 
-0.075 
0.253 
*** 
-0.012 
** 
-0.336 
*** 
1.000 
Note: *,**,*** significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
123 
 
Table C.5: The determinants of deal terms and firms’ characteristics on switching  
(Regular probit) 
 Pr(Switching) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Deal terms 
Ln(amount) 
0.117*** 
(3.930) 
0.110*** 
(3.625) 
0.113*** 
(3.769) 
0.121*** 
(4.225) 
Ln(1+Duration) 
0.176** 
(2.085) 
0.173** 
(2.024) 
0.176** 
(2.054) 
0.169** 
(1.990) 
Collateral 
-0.037 
(-0.533) 
-0.060 
(-0.847) 
-0.053 
(-0.714) 
 
Firm characteristics 
Ln(TASSET) 
0.098*** 
(3.444) 
0.089*** 
(3.106) 
0.090*** 
(3.162) 
0.090*** 
(3.233) 
CASHFLOWS 
0.002*** 
(3.008) 
0.002*** 
(2.904) 
0.002*** 
(2.923) 
0.002** 
(2.955) 
Private-own  
0.077 
(0.691) 
0.144 
(1.267) 
0.113 
(1.007) 
 
Agriculture  
0.079 
(0.343) 
  
Manufacture  
-0.143 
(-1.629) 
  
Real estate  
-0.142 
(-1.359) 
  
Energy  
0.317* 
(1.955) 
0.420*** 
(2.820) 
0.408*** 
(2.748) 
Services  
0.368*** 
(3.190) 
0.475*** 
(5.036) 
0.470*** 
(4.990) 
C 
-4.268*** 
(-6.121) 
-3.903*** 
(-5.467) 
-4.101*** 
(-5.841) 
-4.264*** 
(-6.186) 
Wald Chi
2
 76.17 111.74 108.09 106.53 
Obs 1781 1781 1781 1781 
Note: Z statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table C.6: Post-switching bank characteristics and new banking relationship 
 Pr(switching) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Deal terms 
Ln(amount) 
0.142*** 
(4.788) 
0.151*** 
(5.056) 
0.152*** 
(5.059) 
0.146*** 
(4.889) 
0.154*** 
(5.172) 
Collateral 
0.027 
(0.360) 
0.035 
(0.452) 
0.033 
(0.437) 
0.033 
(0.431) 
0.038 
(0.500) 
Firm Characteristics 
Ln(TASSET) 
0.095** 
(2.398) 
0.123*** 
(2.894) 
0.140*** 
(3.056) 
0.094** 
(2.365) 
0.137*** 
(2.994) 
CASHFLOWS 
0.002** 
(2.029) 
0.001** 
(1.989) 
0.001** 
(1.929) 
0.001* 
(1.855) 
0.001* 
(1.724) 
Private-own 
0.057 
(0.507) 
0.138 
(1.186) 
0.174 
(1.452) 
0.067 
(0.604) 
0.180 
(1.518) 
Bank Characteristics 
MARKSH 
-0.020*** 
(-3.989) 
-0.016*** 
(-3.119) 
-0.021*** 
(-3.965) 
  
MARKSH*M-S firm  
-0.029*** 
(-2.681) 
   
BANKROA 
-0.241*** 
(-3.252) 
-0.211*** 
(-2.838) 
-0.206*** 
(-2.711) 
-0.206*** 
(-2.783) 
-0.171** 
(-2.295) 
Bankroa*M-S firm   
-0.193*** 
(-2.770) 
 
-0.186*** 
(-2.692) 
Large Bank    
-0.268*** 
(-4.279) 
-0.269*** 
(-4.272) 
NON-INTEREST 
INCOME RATIO 
-0.093*** 
(-3.601) 
-0.094*** 
(-3.627) 
-0.092*** 
(-3.528) 
-0.095*** 
(-3.714) 
-0.094*** 
(-3.650) 
C 
-2.887*** 
(-2.942) 
-3.670*** 
(-3.491) 
-4.039*** 
(-3.601) 
-2.932*** 
(-3.004) 
-4.043*** 
(-3.617) 
Wald Chi
2
 105.63 111.66 110.76 106.40 112.33 
Obs 1812 1812 1812 1812 1812 
Prob: Wald test of 
exogeneity
34
 
0.454 0.488 0.482 0.455 0.477 
Note: Z statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
                                                          
34 Wald test of exogeneity do not reject the null that there is exogeneity in the regression. 
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Table C.7: Post-switching bank characteristics and new banking relationship  
(Regular Probit) 
 Pr(switching) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Deal terms 
Ln(amount) 
0.148*** 
(5.069) 
0.157*** 
(5.323) 
0.156*** 
(5.315) 
0.151*** 
(5.179) 
0.159*** 
(5.413) 
Collateral 
0.027 
(0.353) 
0.034 
(0.448) 
0.033 
(0.428) 
0.032 
(0.424) 
0.038 
(0.489) 
Firm Characteristics 
Ln(TASSET) 
0.072** 
(2.325) 
0.094*** 
(2.894) 
0.108*** 
(3.134) 
0.070** 
(2.262) 
0.105*** 
(3.039) 
CASHFLOWS 
0.002*** 
(3.153) 
0.002*** 
(2.986) 
0.002*** 
(2.965) 
0.002*** 
(3.024) 
0.002*** 
(2.841) 
Private-own 
0.062 
(0.555) 
0.138 
(1.184) 
0.165 
(1.385) 
0.072 
(0.647) 
0.171 
(1.438) 
Bank Characteristics 
MARKSH 
-0.021*** 
(-4.041) 
-0.017*** 
(-3.267) 
-0.021*** 
(-4.032) 
  
MARKSH*M-S 
firm 
 
-0.026*** 
(-2.500) 
   
BANKROA 
-0.234*** 
(-3.214) 
-0.206*** 
(-2.787) 
-0.203*** 
(-2.744) 
-0.199*** 
(-2.730) 
-0.168** 
(-2.269) 
Bankroa*M-S firm   
-0.166*** 
(-2.550) 
 
-0.159** 
(-2.458) 
Large Bank    
-0.271*** 
(-4.321) 
-0.271*** 
(-4.324) 
NON-INTEREST 
INCOME RATIO 
-0.098*** 
(-3.792) 
-0.099*** 
(-3.846) 
-0.097*** 
(-3.768) 
-0.100*** 
(-3.920) 
-0.099*** 
(-3.895) 
C 
-2.411*** 
(-2.786) 
-3.059*** 
(-3.375) 
-3.341*** 
(-3.538) 
-2.447*** 
(-2.835) 
-3.344*** 
(-3.550) 
Wald Chi
2
 115.39 121.68 110.76 115.87 121.93 
Obs 1812 1812 1812 1812 1812 
Note: Z statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table C.8: Robustness check (Regular Probit) 
 
Pr(switching) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Deal Terms 
Ln(Amount) 
0.147*** 
(4.551) 
0.166*** 
(5.915) 
0.163*** 
(5.728) 
0.167*** 
(5.932) 
0.149*** 
(5.039) 
0.144*** 
(5.057) 
0.121*** 
(4.225) 
Ln(1+Duration
) 
0.182** 
(2.214) 
    
 0.169** 
(1.990) 
Collateral 
0.001 
(0.018) 
0.061 
(0.806) 
0.058 
(0.762) 
0.056 
(0.733) 
0.022 
(0.272) 
 
 
Firm Characteristics 
Ln(TASSET) 
0.104*** 
(3.296) 
   
0.070** 
(2.114) 
0.072** 
(2.330) 
0.090** 
(3.223) 
Ln(Firmsales)  
0.057** 
(2.272) 
0.062** 
(2.456) 
0.060** 
(2.360) 
 
 
 
CASHFLOWS 
0.002** 
(2.831) 
0.002*** 
(2.710) 
0.002*** 
(2.725) 
0.002*** 
(2.811) 
0.002*** 
(3.152) 
0.002*** 
(3.112) 
0.002*** 
(2.955) 
Private-own 
0.262 
(1.269) 
0.076 
(0.682) 
0.177 
(0.885) 
 
0.062 
(0.552) 
 
 
Private-
own*M-S 
FIRM 
-0.211 
(-0.852) 
 
-0.138 
(-0.583) 
  
 
 
Energy      
0.285* 
(1.911) 
0.408*** 
(2.748) 
Services      
0.292*** 
(3.430) 
0.470*** 
(4.990) 
Bank characteristics 
MARKSH  
-0.024*** 
(-4.720) 
  
-0.021*** 
(-3.930) 
-0.019*** 
(-3.654) 
 
Ln(Bankasset)   
-0.132*** 
(-5.560) 
-0.123*** 
(-4.152) 
 
 
 
BANKROA  
-0.172*** 
(-2.423) 
-0.148** 
(-2.060) 
-0.183*** 
(-2.462) 
-0.247** 
(-2.653) 
-0.237*** 
(-3.327) 
 
NON-INTEREST 
INCOME RATIO 
 
-0.096*** 
(-3.713) 
-0.093*** 
(-4.129) 
-0.101*** 
(-3.951) 
-0.095*** 
(-3.353) 
-0.097*** 
(-3.764) 
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Market  
MCR     
-0.0001 
(-0.218) 
 
 
C 
-4.967*** 
(-6.458) 
-4.170*** 
(-6.361) 
-0.701 
(-0.782) 
-0.911 
(-1.041) 
-2.305** 
(-2.324) 
-2.407*** 
(-2.805) 
-4.264*** 
(-6.186) 
Wald Chi
2
 77.31 115.51 132.28 128.00 115.43 129.43 106.53 
Obs 1781 1812 1812 1812 1812 1812 1781 
Note: Z statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Chapter 5: Single versus Multiple banking relationship in Chinese lending 
market-indictors of firm’s size, quality or market Competition 
5.1 Introduction 
Single or multiple lending relationships that a firm maintains with banks are key 
characteristics of its financial policy. Strong theoretical research explain a firm’s choice on 
single banking or two banking relationships (Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996; Von Thadden, 
1998), but less clear for banking involving more banks. On one hand, previous studies 
suggest that firms borrowing from single bank are advantageous because it reduces the 
monitoring costs and the requirement of collaterals (Farinha and Santos, 2002). However, 
firms are easily to be lock-in by relationship bank when they keep single banking relationship. 
On the other hand, benefit of multiple banking relationships is suggested by some literatures 
that firms can reduce the probability of liquidity risk and the informational lock-in. But a 
number of considerations suggest that firms deal with more than one bank will be involved in 
significant transaction costs and monitoring costs, which make multiple banking more costly.  
 
Firms need to make the decision on single or multiple banking relationships based on their 
characteristics. Many studies claim that the size of a firm has a significant influence on the 
number of bank relationships. Large firms usually require a wide range of banking 
relationships in order to satisfy their firm-specific credit needs (Ongena and Smith, 2000; 
Detragiache et al., 2000). Meanwhile, in countries like US, Portugal and Germany, even if the 
number of bank relationships tends to increase with firm size, medium size and small 
enterprises are often observed to borrow from more than one bank (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; 
Farinha and Santos, 2002; Brunner and Krahnen, 2013). A firm’s quality is considered as 
another key variable that affects the number of bank relationships (Petersen and Rajan, 1994). 
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Low quality firms are usually unable to increase the credit requirements from incumbent 
banks and need to seek help from outside banks. From the lender’s point of view, banks are 
willing to share bad credit clients with others in order to decrease their risk. In addition, 
banking market competition has been suggested as a main factor behind the number of bank 
relationships. Single or multiple banking relationships can reflect the level of banking 
competition from the credit demand side. A high degree of competition between banks is a 
possible lead to a large number of bank relationships, since firms can benefit from having 
access to more credit when the banks compete against each other (Machauer and Weber, 
2000).  
 
In the Chinese banking market, the reform period beginning from 2001 has made remarkable 
improvements in the performance of the banks, especially for the large commercial banks. 
Unlike in the past where the banks were slaves to the socialist plan, Chinese commercial 
banks have been able to focus on credit quality when making lending decisions (Chang et al., 
2009). The average non-performing loan ratio of the major commercial banks in China 
decreased from 17.9% in 2003 to 0.9% in 2011. Credit risk control is very important in bank 
lending and banks charge different risk premium to their clients according to their features 
(He and Wang, 2013). Loan quality is a very important factor for banks to make their lending 
decisions. Analysis of the Chinese experience shows that banks choose to reduce the size of 
the loans granted and to finance more firms in order to diversify the risk. Large firms are 
more attractive for banks since they are less likely to default on a loan (Chang et al., 2009), 
while it has been shown that maintaining a large number of banking relationships is not an 
optimal choice for small and medium size firms (SMEs) (He and Wang, 2009). Within the 
banking sector itself, although the five biggest banks still dominate the market, their market 
share has continued decreasing, from 69.63% in 2003 to 54.89% in 2011. Although 
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constrained by relatively high entry barriers and interest rate regulations, the level of bank 
competition is still significantly extending.  
 
The topic of single versus multiple banking relationships in the Chinese lending market is an 
unexplored area of research. This chapter attempts to make some contribution to fill this gap. 
This study examines 1639 firm level single and multiple borrowing data during the period 
2003-2012. The principal findings are that: (i) the probability of a firm maintaining multiple 
banking relationships increases with firm size; (ii) among all samples, firms with higher cash 
flow ratios (high quality) are more likely to keep a single relationship; (iii) medium size and 
small firms with high quality tend to have single relationship, while large and high quality 
firms are more likely to keep a large number of lending relationships; (iv) increasing market 
competition level reduces the probability of single bank-firm relationship and drives firms to 
have higher likelihood to set relationship with more banks; and, (v) firms who have 
relationships with large banks are more likely to be involved in multiple lending relationships.  
 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant theoretical 
foundation and empirical research on the topics of single or multiple banking relationships 
and the optimal number of banking relationship for firms. Section 3 describes the 
methodology of a firms’ banking relationship decisions and summarizes the main hypotheses 
of this study, it then introduces the models that will be used in the empirical study. Section 4 
describes the data. Section 5 provides discussion of empirical results. And finally, Section 6 
draws conclusions.  
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5.2 Literature review 
5.2.1 Theoretical explanations  
5.2.1.1 Theoretical models of single versus multiple banking relationships 
Detragiache et al. (2000) develops a theory of the optimal number of banking relationships 
with three-period model, which explains the determinant on firm’s choices between multiple 
or single banking relationships. They find that the multiple bank relationship can decrease the 
probability of the liquidation problem but multiple relationships are more costly than a single 
relationship. The model is briefly described as follows. 
 
Consider a firm who implements a project. The project starts at period 0 with the investment 
cost 𝐼0. It is expected to produce a return (cash flow) 𝐾 at the period 2 with the probability 𝑝. 
In period 1, the project needs a second allotment of funds 𝐼1, which needs to borrow from 
bank(s). To keep the analysis simple, the authors make an assumption that 𝑝𝐾 − 𝐼1 ≥ 0. 
Denote 𝜀 as the probability of liquidity crises, which is independent events across banks. 
Hence, the probability that at least one of the relationship banks is available is 1 − 𝜀𝑛  in 
period 1.  Denote c as the fixed cost for applying bank loans. Since banks need legal action to 
recover a loan if firms refuse to repay, 𝑣 is introduce as the discount fraction. The expected 
profit firms can get through n bank(s) at period 0 is given by:  
𝜋(𝑛) = (1 − 𝜀𝑛) (∫ (𝑝𝐾 − 𝐼1)
1
𝐼1
𝑣𝐾
𝑓(𝑝)𝑑𝑝) − (𝐼0 + 𝑐𝑛)             (1) 
Maximizing By maximizing expected profits by choice of n, the result is: 
        𝑛∗ =
𝑙𝑛𝑐−ln ((−∫ (𝑝𝐾−𝐼1)
1
𝐼1
𝑣𝐾
𝑓(𝑝)𝑑𝑝)(𝑙𝑛𝜀))
𝑙𝑛𝜀
                               (2) 
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From equation (1), it is clear that the increase in 𝑛  (higher number of multiple banking 
relationships) will raise the expected profitability of firms. Then, the optimal number of 
banking relationship is determined by the probability of liquidity crisis 𝜀 (equation 2). The 
larger that 𝜀 is, the larger number of banking relationships there will be. 
1
n
    
 
Figure 5.1: The determinants of optimal number of banking relationships 
𝜀− and 𝜀+ are the thresholds for 𝜀 defined the multiple banking area. From 𝜀− < 𝜀 < 𝜀+ firms chose 
to borrow multiple banks; while for very low (𝜀 < 𝜀−) or very high (𝜀 > 𝜀+) values of 𝜀 firms chose a 
single bank. 
Source: Detragiache et al. (2000). 
 
The model suggests that single banking relationship offer lower costs than multiple banking 
relationships. The probability of a liquidity crisis is the key determinant of the number of 
relationships since relationship banks may be unable to continue funding projects owing to 
unexpected problems and a firm may thus have to refinance from non-relationship banks. 
However, because the non-relationship banks did not know the quality of the deals, they had 
high a probability of rejection. To this point, large firms are more likely to choose multiple 
relationships since they are less sensitive to the costs. 
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Barboni and Treibich (2013) designed a lending game model to analyse the determinant of 
single or multiple bank relationship. Both supply and demand sides are in this game with an 
experimental credit market. Similar to other studies, they set an assumption that the borrower 
may not repay their loans. The information type is also assumed to significantly affect the 
lending decision in their model. They suggest that borrowers who are credit rationed and 
unable to stabilize their lending source will prefer to keep multiple relationships. The model 
is briefly described as follows. 
 
Denote D as the loan getting from lender, which will use to invest into project. s is identified 
as the ‘administrative costs’ during the loan application produces. At the first period, the firm 
should decide whether to borrow D from single bank (full decision), or borrow D/2 from 
multiple (two) banks (partial decision). The probability that the bank gives the credit is 
denoted as 𝛾.  The gain from project defines as 𝐼 condition on getting D, and 𝐼/2 condition on 
getting D/2  . Interest rate of loan is named as 𝑟 . The probability of the project being 
successful is 𝛼. In the second period, the condition on the success of project, the borrower 
chooses to repay the loan with probability 𝛽 , and reject to repay with probability 1 − 𝛽 
(Strategic default). After the agent’s game play, the borrower’s profit (𝜋𝐵) will be given as: 
𝜋𝐵 =
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
−2𝑠                                                                                       𝑖𝑓 𝑛𝑜 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 (𝛾1 = 𝛾2 = 0)
𝛼[𝐼 − 𝐷(1 + 𝑟)] − 𝑠                           𝑖𝑓 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑖𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑 (𝛽 = 1), 𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦
𝛼[𝐼 − 𝐷(1 + 𝑟)] − 2𝑠         𝑖𝑓 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑖𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑, 𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦 (𝛾1 = 1; 𝛾2 = 0)
                                                                             𝑜𝑟 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦 (𝛾1 = 𝛾2 = 1)
𝛼 [
𝐼
2
−
𝐷
2
(1 + 𝑟)] − 2𝑠                                 𝑖𝑓 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑖𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑, 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦
𝛼𝐼 − 𝑠                                             𝑖𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑐 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 (𝛽 = 0), 𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦
𝛼𝐼 − 2𝑠                  𝑖𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑐 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡, 𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦 𝑜𝑟 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦
𝛼
𝐼
2
− 2𝑠                                                  𝑖𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑐 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡, 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦
    (3) 
Correspondingly, the lender’s profit will be: 
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𝜋𝐿 =
{
 
 
 
 
𝑠                                                                                                      𝑖𝑓 𝑛𝑜 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 
𝛼𝐷(1 + 𝑟) + 𝑠                   𝑖𝑓 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑖𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑 (𝛽 = 1), 𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦
𝛼𝐷
2
(1 + 𝑟) + 𝑠                            𝑖𝑓 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑖𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑, 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦
−𝐷 + 𝑠                         𝑖𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑐 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 (𝛽 = 0), 𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦
−
𝐷
2
+ 𝑠                                         𝑖𝑓 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑖𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑, 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦
        (4) 
It is clear in equation (3) that the firms can get more profits through a single bank relationship 
under the normal condition (repay the loan). Equation (4) suggests that banks’ lending 
decision (profitability level) is highly dependent on the information about  α and β (whether 
the project is profitable and the borrower is in good credit). If the lender cannot get the 
information about α and β, they tend to end up playing the game. Based on this model, the 
authors make four main hypotheses, which are: borrowers are more likely to keep single-bank 
relationships if long-term relationships can be feasible; lenders prefer single relationship 
when relationship lending is feasible; borrowers in established lending relationships are less 
likely to switch; and, lenders are more likely to give the loans when project riskiness is low 
(α is high). 
 
5.2.1.2 Theoretical explanations on the optimal number of banking relationships  
The arguments with the effect of information asymmetric between lenders and borrowers on 
the number of banking relationship are not unique. Rajan (1992) suggests that the optimal 
strategy for a firm is to engage with a single bank because of the higher costs arising from 
asymmetrical information if they engage in multiple lending relationships. A single bank 
relationship is also most easily monitored, which results in cheaper financing for the firm.  
However, a single relationship offers banks the monopoly power to get access to the private 
information of the borrower, which will result in ‘information hold up’ and a ‘lock-in’ effect. 
Establishing a relationship with other banks can effectively avoid or reduce the hold-up 
problem (Sharpe, 1990; Von Thadden 1992), although firms face higher costs to keep 
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multiple relationships than they stay with single bank. Von Thadden (1998) recommends that 
firms with two banking relationships can limit the costs as well as reduce the risk of 
‘information capture’. However, the ‘winner’s curse’ problem will rise from this two bank 
relationships system. Finally, the informed bank will leave the other banks to seek custom 
from only lower quality firms.  
 
The transparency level of a firm is a very important effect factor on banking relationships. 
The relationship bank can exploit its information advantage to hold up the relationship firm, 
which will result in a worsening the firm’s financial constraints (Gopalan et al., 2011). In 
order to avoid being held-up by the relationship bank, firms prefer to borrow from multiple 
banks, even if they can benefit from single bank relationship. However, banks face high costs 
to collect information from non-relationship firms, which will make opaque firms even 
harder to access external funds (Ziane, 2003). Therefore, firms who lack transparency have a 
higher likelihood of keeping a single banking relationship since the informational costs to 
switch to other banks are more likely to be higher than keeping an exclusive banking 
relationship (Berger et al., 2001). 
 
Many scholars suggest the large and small firms have different behaviour in keeping single or 
multiple banking relationships. Firm size has been viewed as important indicator of the 
number of banking relationships. From the firm’s point of view, firm size is usually regarded 
to have a positive relationship with the financial need. Large firms are more likely to keep 
multiple lending relationships since one bank can hardly satisfy their credit needs (Berger et 
al., 2005). Moreover, the costs of maintaining multiple lending relationships are higher than a 
single relationship. Compared with small firms, large firm will be less affected by this kind of 
expense (Machauer and Weber, 2000).  From the bank’s point of view, firm size plays a role 
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with the lending credit risk: lending to a large firm is less risky. Large firms tend to keep 
multiple banking relationships, which can be explained as the lending desire of banks to 
diversify the default risk (Detragiache et al., 2000). 
 
From the view of banks, the fragility of banks causes many firms to tend to keep a large 
number of relationships since they need to ensure themselves against a premature withdrawal 
of credit.  Firms keep more multiple banking relationships when there are financially fragile 
banks in the market (Detragiache et al., 2000).  The effect of bank ownership type on the 
number of lending relationship has been noted. Since foreign banks are considered to have 
greater efficiency and are more competitive in developing countries (Bonin et al., 2005; 
Claessens and Laeven, 2004), firms are more likely to have a relationship with foreign banks 
to diversify their banking relationship, which usually results into a multiple banking 
relationship (Berger et al., 2005). The degree of bank competition also plays a role in 
determining the number of banking relationships. When a market is dominated by a few 
banks (i.e. the market competition is low), there is less motivation from banks to have a 
smaller number of banking relationships. In contrast, firms are more likely to keep a large 
number of banking relationship when market concentration is lower (Sterken and Tokutsu, 
2003).      
 
The duration of the lending relationship also plays a significant role in the determinant of the 
number of banks. Ongena and Smith (2000) argues that long-term lending relationships are 
more likely to push firms to terminate because the marginal gain has been decreasing and 
firms feel that they are being locked-in. On the other hand, duration is correlated with a 
firm’s age. Younger firms who have only been operating for several years tend to have 
exclusive relationship while elder firms have a more significant average number of banking 
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relationship. Hence, long term established relationships are more likely to end because firms 
start to borrow from more than one bank (Fariha and Santos, 2002). 
 
5.2.2 Prior empirical evidence  
5.2.2.1 Empirical studies on single versus multiple banking relationships 
Using Italian bank-firm data, Detragiache et al. (2000) examined why firms switch from a 
single bank to multiple banks. The banks in this study had a selection problem because of 
asymmetrical information, which may result in their refusal to lend. Under this circumstance, 
they predict that firms who keep a multiple relationship can reduce the probability of 
experiencing a liquidation problem. Their empirical findings support this prediction. They 
find that a higher profitability level makes firms tend to stick with a single bank, while firm 
size and firm age as well as firm leverage has a significant negative relationship on 
maintaining single bank relationship. In contrast, if the relationship bank size is large, firms 
prefer a single relationship other than multiple relationships since their credit requirement is 
easily satisfied. Similar with Detragiache et al. (2000), Farinha and Santos (2002) analysed 
the single and multiple firm-bank relationship choices. In their sample, they observe that 
almost all firms borrowed for the first time in their life from a single bank, but soon some of 
them switched to borrowing from multiple banks. They used a duration analysis of Portugal 
firm level data. Instead of studying the duration of relationship, they focus on the end of the 
exclusive relationships caused by firm switching behaviour. They find that firms with a high 
growth rate or with poor performance are more likely to keep multiple relationships. Firm 
size also shows a negative effect on single banking relationship. A longer duration of banking 
relationship increases the probability of firms to maintain multiple banking relationships.  
Cosci and Meliciani (2002) analysed why firms keep multiple banking relationship other than 
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single relationship, with Italian firm data provided by a large Italian bank. They find that a 
firm is more likely to be engaged in multiple relationships as their size grows and as they 
grow older. Higher firm leverage pushed firms to borrow from multiple banks. The funding 
demand from high tech firms results in a multiple relationships. Sterken and Tokutsu (2003) 
investigated the determinants of the choice between single and multiple banking relationships 
with data from Japanese listed firms. They find that a higher debt to asset ratio decreases the 
probability of a single banking relationship while liquid asset ratio plays a converse role on 
the relationship.  Firms with a higher level R&D investment, which stands for larger amount 
of funding to be needed, have a higher probability of establishing multiple banking 
relationships. 
Table 5.1: Determinants of switching from single to multiple banking relationships 
Paper 
DGG 
(2000) 
FS 
(2002) 
CM 
(2002) 
ST 
(2003) 
Country Italian Portugal Italian Japan 
Observation 1754 1577 393 20740 
Model OLS TVD Probit  Logit 
Dependent Single Single
a
 Multiple Single 
Lending Relationship 
Number of switching
b
  ---   
Firm Characteristics 
Firm Size -- --- +++ ? 
Firm Leverage ---  +++  
Firm age ? ? +++  
High tech firms   +++  
Profitability +++   ? 
Bank loans/assets  ---  --- 
Sales growth (%)  ---   
Liquidity/assets  +++  +++ 
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Firm R&D    --- 
Bank Characteristics 
Bank size --- ?   
Assets growth (%)  ?   
Profits/assets  ?   
Note: +++ Positive and significant at 1%, ++ at 5%, + at 1%. --- Negative and significant at 1%, -- at 
5%, - at 1%. ? means unclear relationship, which is shown as insignificant in regression.  
DGG, Detragiache et al. (2000); FS, Farinha and Santos (2002); CM, Cosci and Meliciani (2002); ST, 
Sterken and Tokutsu (2003). 
a: Parametric model (Weibull distribution). 
b: Number of times firms switch banks.  
 
5.2.2.2 Empirical studies on determinants of the number of banking relationships 
Machauer and Weber (2000) investigated SMEs in Germany to determine how they chose 
how many banking relationships to maintain. They found that firm size and the duration 
existence of banking relationship determine the number of banking relationships. However,  
firms who keep a house bank relationship are more likely to have a small number of lending 
relationship. Besides, more collateral will be needed if firms stick with fewer banks. Ziane 
(2003) examined the determinants of the number of credit relationship with data from small 
and medium sized French firms. In contrast with Marchauer and Weber (2000), they found 
that the existence duration of lending relationship plays a negative effect on the number of 
banking relationships. Firm size and leverage positively influences the number of relationship, 
while the profitability level of firms has a negative effect on the number. The collateral 
requirement and firm age do not show a significant effect on the choice of the number of 
banking relationships in their empirical work. Tirri (2007) claims that firms chose multiple 
lending relationships in order to decrease the probability of liquidity crisis. The empirical 
study with Italian firms’ data suggests that larger, older, and riskier firms prefer to have more 
relationships with banks. The number of banking relationships has a significant relationship 
with the growing of market concentration ratio. 
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Berger et al. (2005a) focus on the effects of banks’ characteristics and ownership on the 
number of banking relationship using data from India. Their empirical results indicate that 
firms with a relationship with a foreign-owned bank are more likely to keep a large number 
of lending relationships. The average size and liquidity of relationship banks tends to cause 
firms to have a small number of bank relationships. The listed firms, who are considered as 
transparent firms, have a high likelihood of establishing more lending relationships than other 
firms. They find that the firm’s size and age plays a positive role on firms engaging a large 
number of banks, which is also proven by Vopin (2007) with data from 18 European 
countries. Using the data from Japan, Uchida et al. (2008) examined the influence of bank 
size on lending relationship with other control variables, such as a firm’s size and age. 
Similar as Berger et al. (2005b), they find that larger banks prefer to lend to larger firms 
while smaller banks tend to lend to smaller firms. But they have found no strong evidence 
that bank size has a negative relationship with the number of credit relationships. In their 
regression, firms from the construction industry tend to prefer to engage with fewer banks 
while firms in the retail industry tend to set more banking relationships. 
Table 5.2: Determinants of the number of banking relationships 
Paper 
MW 
(2000) 
Ziane 
(2003) 
BKPZ 
(2005) 
Tirri 
(2007) 
Volpin 
(2007) 
UUW 
(2008) 
Country 
Germany 
French 
India 
Italian 
Cross 
country 
Japan 
Observation 723 1800 3422 393 899 1832 
Model 
RE 
Poisson 
Poisson 
Poisson  
GLS 
RE IV 
Dependent Number of banking relationship 
Lending Relationship 
Duration of 
relationship 
+++ -- 
    
Collateral  ?     
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requirement 
Firm Characteristics 
Firm Size +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ 
Firm size
2 
   ---   
Firm age  ? ++ +++ +++ ? 
Firm age
2 
   ---   
Firm Leverage  ++  +++   
Listed firms   +++    
Profitability  --     
Bank 
loans/assets 
  
+++    
Capital ratio      --- 
Bank Characteristics 
Bank size   ---   ? 
Bank liquidity   ---    
Foreign-owned 
Bank
a
 
  
+++    
House bank
b 
---      
Bank fragility     ---  
Market Characteristics 
HHI    ---   
HHI
2 
   +++   
Note: +++ Positive and significant at 1%, ++ at 5%, + at 1%. --- Negative and significant at 1%, -- at 
5%, - at 1%. ? means unclear relationship, which is shown as insignificant in regression.  
MW, Machauer and Weber (2000); BKPZ, Berger et al. (2005a); UUW, Uchida et al. (2008). 
a: If at least one of the relationship banks is foreign-owned, denote foreign-owned equal to 1, 
otherwise 0. b: If bank feels as house bank of the borrower. 
 
 
5.2.3 Relevant research in China 
Although many Chinese researchers have examined bank-firm relationship and relationship 
lending, only few of them have focused on the choice of single or multiple banking 
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relationship, or the determinants of the number of credit relationship. Chinese scholars have 
noted the effect of information asymmetry on lending relationships and have done some 
relevant studies. By distinguishing information as ‘hard’ and ‘soft’, which stand for the 
publication information and the information arising from repeated lending, respectively, 
Chang et al. (2009) studies the impact of information from lending relationship to loan 
default in China and focus their research on the economic role of the banks’ soft information. 
They find that the internal credit rating scores of banks play a key role in lending decision. 
While the soft information part of the rating contributes to the improvement in assessing 
credit quality, the depth of lending relationship (longer duration and larger number of 
relationships) helps to decrease the cost of asymmetrical information.  
 
Shen et al. (2009) observed the information asymmetric between the banks and firms 
affecting the lending decisions of banks and found that the lending decisions are not 
homogenous among banks. They then conducted an empirical study to examine how the 
bank’s characteristics affect the lending decision.  The authors find that smaller banks are 
most likely to lend more to the SMEs. The competition level and the manager’s (bank 
institution) wage is linked to NPL, which has had a positive effect on the propensity to lend 
to SMEs. In China, SMEs are less likely to get the loans from banks than large firms. Using 
firm level data from Dongguan City, Yao and Deng (2009) tried to find the determinants of 
the relationship lending for SMEs. Their empirical evidence shows that firm age, firm size 
and the duration of relationship lending helps firms to access repeat lending. They claim that 
SMEs need to establish a long-term relationship with banks, as well as have a sustainable 
development strategy, in order to reduce the asymmetrical information between the firms and 
the banks. 
 
143 
 
Based on the survey data of World Bank on 1,186 SMEs in China, He and Wang (2009) 
empirically studied the impact of bank-firm relationship on the growth of firms. They 
designed three variables to measure the bank-firm relationship, which are: the number of 
relationships, the duration of the relationships, and the collateral requirement when 
borrowing. They find that the duration and the number of banking relationships have a 
negative effect on the firm’s sales growth. This implies that a longer relationship can create a 
hold-up problem, which is harmful for the firm’s development. For SMEs, keeping a large 
number of banking relationships is not an optimal choice.   
 
Wang et al. (2013) examines the determinants of an enterprise’s R&D through lending 
relationship with a data sample drawn from Chinese growth enterprise market listed 
companies. Their empirical results indicate that firms with a higher R&D intensity tend to 
have higher relationship lending figure, while a higher relationship lending is most likely to 
increase the firm’s innovation efficiency. In addition, firm size has a significant negative 
effect on relationship lending, which suggests that relationship debt is more important for 
SMEs than large firms.  
Table 5.3: Determinants of bank-firm relationships-evidence from China 
Paper 
Shen et al 
(2009) 
HW 
(2009) 
YD 
(2009) 
Chang et al 
(2010) 
Wang et al 
(2013) 
Observation 662 1186 242 2063 310 
Model 2SLS OLS Logit Probit GLS 
Dependent 
SMEs loans
a
 Sales 
growth 
Pr(repeat 
loan) 
Loan default Bank loan%
b
 
Lending Relationship 
Duration of 
relationship 
 
--- 
+++ 
  
Number of 
relationship 
 
- 
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Borrow without 
collateral 
 
++ 
 
  
Firm Characteristics 
Firm Size  +++ ++ --- - 
Firm Leverage    ++ ? 
Firm age   + ?  
Profitability  +++  --- +++ 
Bank loans/assets  ? ?   
Cash flow ratio    ---  
Listed firm    ?  
Firm R&D     +++ 
Bank Characteristics 
Bank size ?     
Market share ---     
Profits/assets ---     
Wage linked to 
NPL 
+++  
 
  
Cost of deposit +     
Note: +++ Positive and significant at 1%, ++ at 5%, + at 1%. --- Negative and significant at 1%, -- at 
5%, - at 1%. ? means unclear relationship, which is shown as insignificant in regression.  
HW, He and Wang (2009); YD, Yao and Deng (2009); 
a: The proportion of loans granted to SMEs over the total loans of the bank. b: The sum of all bank 
loans divided by total debt. 
 
5.3 Methodology 
5.3.1 Frame work and hypotheses 
Who borrow from Chinese banks? The aim is to explore the characteristics of the lending 
decisions that firms make in China’s lending market and to assess whether the explanations 
from previous studies are consistent with the empirical evidence. The main hypotheses that I 
will test are given below. 
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According to the Previous research of banking relationships has shown that informationally 
opaque firms are more likely to have a single lender (Berger et al., 2001). Usually, larger 
firms are considered to be more transparent firms (Eylasiani and Goldberg, 2004; Stephan et 
al., 2009). Hence, the idea has been raised that larger firms tend to have multiple banking 
relationships and smaller firms tend to maintain a single relationship, which has been found 
by several studies (Detragiache et al., 2000; Machauer and Weber, 2000; Cosci and Meliciani, 
2002; Uchida et al., 2008). Moreover, firm size is initially regarded as having a positive 
relationship with the financial needs (Ziane, 2003). Large firms tend to have multiple 
relationships. In addition, firms who maintain more banking relationships are implied to 
experience higher quasi-fixed costs than firms who maintain a single relationship, which can 
represent a significant expense for small firms (Machauer and Weber, 2000).  
H1: Large firms have high likelihood to set multiple banking relationships and small 
firms are more likely to have a single relationship. The probability of single banking 
reduces as firm size increases. 
Many researches claim that multiple banking is costly for the borrowing firms (Farinha and 
Santos, 2002; Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Tirri, 2007) because it may involve higher 
transaction costs, monitoring costs, collateral requirements, and credit costs. Higher quality 
firms’ are easily satisfied with a single banking relationship since their banks are more likely 
to set an exclusive lending relationship with high quality customers. Hence, good firms are 
better able to keep a single banking relationship. As to low quality firms, a bank may choose 
to share the risk with their competitors by limiting the loan amount, in which low quality 
firms are forced to seek more banks for additional credit. Petersen and Rajan (1994) find that 
firms who borrow from multiple banks are of lower quality than those that borrow from a 
single bank. Hence, the second hypothesis is given as follows: 
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H2: Choices of single or multiple borrowing relationships are a proxy for a firm’s 
credit quality. Higher quality firms are more likely to keep a single banking 
relationship.  
Generally, a high market concentration ratio indicates a monopoly power, which is associated 
with non-competitive behaviour higher price and lower availability of credit. When the 
banking markets are less competitive, there are fewer potential alternatives choices of credit 
funding for firms (Mercieca et al., 2009). While, in a more competitive market banks have 
more incentive to chase customers, which may derive the firms, especially whose credit 
needs are hard to be satisfied with a single banking relationship, to set more than one banking 
relationships (Ongena and Smith, 2000). Due to the Chinese bank reforms, more banks are 
entering the market to compete with the largest five state-owned banks. By the end of 2011, 
there were over 400 banks operating in China. A more competitive market make causes tend 
to set multiple banking relationships. Hence, the third hypothesis is given as follows: 
H3: Market concentration level is negatively related with the number of banking 
relationships. Firms are more likely to have a single banking relationship in a more 
concentrated market. 
 
5.3.2 Empirical models 
The first model tests the effect of firm size, firm quality, local market competition level and 
other firm’s characteristic on a firm’s choices to maintain single or multiple banking 
relationships. The Logit model is designed as follows: 
          𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖 + 𝛼2𝑙𝑛 (𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒)𝑖 + 𝛼3𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠𝑖 + 𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 +
                               𝛼5𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝐴𝑖 + 𝛼6𝐵𝐿𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖 + 𝛼7𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖 + 𝛼8𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖            (5) 
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, where 𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒𝑖 is the dummy variable, which is equal to one when firm i keeping single 
banking relationship;  𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖 is the total asset of the firm; 𝑙𝑛 (𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒)𝑖 stands for the 
age of the firm; 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠𝑖 is the net cash flow over total asset, which measures the quality 
of firm; 𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 stands for firm’s liquidity level; 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝐴𝑖 is the firm’s total loan over total 
asset; 𝐵𝑆𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖 is firm who has a banking relationship(s) with a large bank(s)
35
; and,  𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖 is 
the banking market concentration ratio.  
 
The second model investigates the determinants of firms switching from single relationship to 
multiple relationships. Many previous research has pointed out that the firms may seek 
multiple banking relationships by switching banks to avoid the hold-up problem of a single 
relationship bank (Sharpe 1990; Rajan, 1992; Boot, 2000). Since banks try to extract rents 
from relationship firms by acquiring private information about their quality, borrowers may 
initiate multiple relationships banks to react (Von Thadden, 1998). The second stage of the 
empirical study examines the determinants of firms substituting single relationship with 
multiple relationships. The Logit model is given as: 
(𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ − 𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒)𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖 + 𝛼2 ln(𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒)𝑖 + 𝛼3𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠𝑖+𝛼4𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 
          +𝛼5𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝐴 + 𝛼6𝐵𝐿𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖 + 𝛼7𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼8𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛼9𝑙𝑛 (𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡)𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖         (6)           
, where 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖  and 𝑙𝑛 (𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡)𝑖  are the lending relationship duration and 
borrowing amount of firm before switching, respectively. 
 
The third stage of this empirical study analyses the number of relationships in the multiple 
banking relationships region. Since this area of study is very important in practice 
(Deteragiache et al., 2000; Berger et al., 2005), unlike the first stage work which tries to 
capture the determinants of different choices for single or multiple borrowing relationships, 
                                                          
35 There are five large commercial banks: Industrial and Commercial bank of China, Agricultural 
Bank of China, Bank of China, China Construction Bank, and Bank of Communications. 
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this stage of the work is designed to investigate the determinants of number of banking 
relationships when a firm has more than one banking relationships. The model with actual 
number of banking relationships is estimated by a Poisson model, which is frequently used 
with count data: 
 Numrelation𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖 + 𝛼2ln (𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒)𝑖 + 𝛼3𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠𝑖 + 𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 +
                               𝛼5𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝐴 + 𝛼6𝐵𝐿𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖 + 𝛼7𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼8𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖                   (7) 
The details of variable definition are listed as follow: 
Table 5.4: Definition of the variables 
Variables Definition Unit 
Single relationship 
(Single) 
Firms keep single relationship=1, otherwise=0 - 
Single after switching 
(Switch-Single) 
Firms keep single relationship after switching=1, 
otherwise=0 
- 
Number of relationship 
(Numrelation) 
The number of banking relationship firms keep - 
Total asset of firm 
(Firm size) 
Annual total asset of firm CNY 
Firm age The age of the firm year 
Cash flow ratio 
(Cashflows) 
Firm’s annual net cash flow over total sales % 
Liquidity/asset 
(Liquidity) 
Firm’s total current liabilities over total asset % 
Loan/asset 
(Loana) 
Firm’s total borrowing(s) from bank(s) over total asset % 
Borrowing from large 
banks (BLbank) 
If firm borrowing from large bank(s)=1, otherwise=0 - 
Pre-duration 
Duration of single banking relationship before firm’s 
switching action 
year 
Pre-amount  
Amount of the borrowing in the single banking 
relationship before firm’s switching action 
CNY 
149 
 
HHI 
The five largest banks’ assets over the total assets of the 
entire banking sector 
% 
Private enterprise 
(Private-Own) 
Dummy variable to distinguish the private enterprise 
and state-own enterprise. Private enterprise=1, 
otherwise=0 
- 
Medium and small firm 
(M-S firm) 
Statistical definitions of medium-sized and small 
enterprises from National Bureau of Statistics of China 
a
. Denote that  medium and small firm M-S firm=1; 
otherwise equal to 0 
- 
Manufacture 
b
 
Dummy variable for industry Classification
 c
.  
Manufacture industry=1, otherwise=0 
- 
Real estate 
d
 
Dummy variable for industry Classification.  
Real estate industry=1, otherwise=0 
- 
Services 
e
 
Dummy variable for industry Classification.  
Services industry=1, otherwise=0 
- 
a
 Statistical definitions of medium-sized and small enterprises table is attached in Appendix D.1. 
b
 Manufacture: Manufacture Industry 
c
 Industry Classification here according to "Listed Company Industry Classification Guidelines (2012 
Revision)", China Securities Regulatory Commission 
d 
Real estate: Real estate industry  
e 
Services: Wholesale, retail, trades hotels and catering services industry 
 
5.4 Data 
This research has a decent data set assembled from the CSMAR (China Stock Market 
Financial Statements) database, which contains information on the listed firms’ borrowing 
behaviours, their balance sheet and income statements. In all, data on 305 firms with 1,639 
lending information (single and multiple banking relationships) are employed from year 2003 
to 2012.
36
 Table 5.5 reports the patterns of firm size, age and quality with the corresponding 
number of relationships. In the sample, a single banking relationship can be observed in 
around half of the sample. This result is similar to Berger et al. (2006), which find that in 
Argentina 56.05% of lending relationships are single banking relationships. Farinha and 
                                                          
36 The China Banking Regulatory Commission was established in 2003, which indicated that the 
Chinese banking market had entered a new age. So here the sample begins from 2003. 
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Santos (2002) reported that in Portugal 55.16% of their sample had a single bank lending 
relationship. Petersen and Rajan (1994) found that a single banking relationship dominated 
the US small firm market. In contrast, Detragiache et al. (2000) found that only a small 
proportion of small Italian firms have single banking relationships. Berger et al. (2005a) 
showed that multiple banking relationships dominate the Indian market.  
 
Table 5.5 also shows that multiple relationships become more prevalent as firms get larger. 
32.46% of firms who keep single banking relationship have a total asset smaller than 1 billion 
CNY and 94.24% of firms with single banking relationship have the total asset smaller than 
10 billion CNY. The proportion among firms with five banking relationship reduce to 11.76% 
and 81.18%, respectively. A total of 29.84% of firms who keep single banking relationship 
are younger than 10 years, and 91.23% of firms with single banking relationship have been 
established less than 20 years. The proportions among firms with five banking relationship 
are 32.94% and 87.06%, respectively. It seems no big difference on firm age when the 
number of relationship varying from one to five. This may be explained by the fact that most 
Chinese enterprises have been established after 1978 due to the reform and opening policy. 
Hence, even the listed firms are comparatively young and have a lower age gap. However, 
when the whole sample is taken into comparison, it is still obvious that as firms get larger and 
older, they tend to have more banking relationships. The cash flow ratio, which usually 
stands for the quality of firms, shows a higher mean value in single relationship group, as 
well as the groups of more than six banking relationships. The mean value of cash flow ratio 
in groups where the firms keep two to five banking relationship are comparatively lower: 
26.67% of firms who keep single banking relationship have a cash flow ratio lower than 5%, 
and 76.34% of firms with a single banking relationship have a cash flow ratio lower than 
20%. However, among firms with five banking relationships, 37.95% and 83.53% have cash 
flow ratio lower than 5% and 20%, respectively, which suggests a lower proportion of high 
151 
 
quality firms than in single banking relationship group. Combined with the phenomena of 
positive relationship between firm size and number of lending relationships, this comparison 
suggests that single relationships are more prevalent among higher quality and smaller firms 
while larger and higher quality firms are most likely to be involved in more than six banking 
relationships. 
Table 5.5: Distribution of number of lending relationships  
with firms’ size, quality and age 
Number of 
relationship
s 
Proportion 
% 
Firm size (Billion CNY) Cash flow ratio (%) Firm age (year) 
Mean 
<1 
(%) 
<10 
(%) 
Mean 
<5 
(%) 
<20 
(%) 
Mean 
<10 
(%) 
<20 
(%) 
1 46.91 3.32 32.46 94.24 7.02 26.67 76.34 13.34 29.84 91.23 
2 22.16 4.58 30.69 91.23 4.15 27.40 79.45 14.06 32.06 89.59 
3 13.61 4.48 32.29 94.62 4.35 31.39 82.06 13.71 30.49 88.34 
4 5.78 3.44 14.74 96.84 5.76 21.05 81.05 15.74 14.74 81.05 
5 5.19 7.23 11.76 81.18 3.96 37.65 83.53 14.27 32.94 87.06 
6 2.82 5.05 8.33 83.33 9.11 12.50 76.62 19.13 8.33 68.75 
7 1.83 4.91 0.00 86.67 12.02 6.67 63.33 19.79 6.67 73.33 
≥8 1.71 7.05 0.00 78.57 16.88 0.00 64.29 16.36 7.14 71.43 
 
Table 5.6 reports the summary statistics of variables. The average number of relationships 
that these firms have is 2.268. Although all of the firms in the sample are listed, they are 
heterogeneous in size. Hence, the values of firm size are taken in logarithmic regression in 
order to smooth the data and lower the probability of heterogeneity problems. The averages 
of the cash flow ratio and liquidity ratio are both positive, with the value of 6.108 and 1.410, 
respectively. The average loan over total asset ratio is 12.524. The value of HHI decreased 
from 819.756 in year 2003 to 564.589 in year 2012, which indicates increasing competition 
in the Chinese banking market. Observations from private firms take a small proportion: 9.1% 
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and from the medium size and small firms takes 28.0%. Nearly half of single and multiple 
borrowing information in the observations come from manufacturing firms and 16.0% and 
12.2% come from real estate and services firms, respectively. In addition, the statistics show 
that 58.3% of lending relationships are involved with large banks.  
Table 5.6: Summary statistics 
 
Some previously studies have claimed that a single banking relationship has a high likelihood 
of leading firms to be held up by incumbent banks. Then, by dropping the first period’s data 
for each of the firms who keep a single relationship with incumbent banks, in order to 
identify the switching or non-switching behaviour, this study finds that the 192 samples keep 
a single relationship after switching and 474 samples substitute a single relationship with 
multiple relationships from then on. The results of the comparison are reported in table 5.7, 
which shows that these are two quite different groups of firms. Despite being younger, the 
 Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max 
Single 1639 0.469 0.499 0 1 
Number of banking 
relationship 
1639 2.268 1.725 1 11 
Ln(Firm Size) 1639 21.373 1.150 15.468 25.652 
Ln(Firm Age) 1637 2.538 0.484 0.693 4.111 
Cash flow ratio 1633 6.108 21.822 -50.645 49.593 
Liquidity/asset 1637 1.410 1.722 0.061 38.078 
Loan/asset 1639 12.524 16.653 0.086 89.884 
HHI 1639 748.635 86.158 564.589 819.756 
BLbank 1639 0.583 0.493 0 1 
Private firm 1639 0.091 0.288 0 1 
Medium and small firm 1639 0.280 0.449 0 1 
Manufacture 1639 0.486 0.499 0 1 
Real estate 1639 0.160 0.367 0 1 
Services 1639 0.122 0.328 0 1 
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firms that substitute a single relationship with multiple relationships are larger and have 
bigger loan requirements. The higher quality and more liquid firms are more likely to have a 
single relationship after switching. Moreover, the larger amount of firms with a former single 
lending relationship tends to drive firms to maintain a single banking relationship.  
Table 5.7: Average value in subgroups 
 
Single relationship after 
switching 
(192 samples) 
Multiple relationship 
after switching 
(474 samples) 
W-M-W 
test for 
means 
t-test for 
means 
 Mean Median S.D. Mean Median S.D.   
Ln(Firm Size) 21.11 20.82 1.16 21.30 21.11 1.03 2.06** 1.89* 
Ln(Firm Age) 2.68 2.71 0.42 2.59 2.64 0.43 1.79* 2.47** 
Cash flow ratio 11.96 9.06 21.74 -4.76 1.48 26.86 2.92*** 3.30*** 
Liquidity/asset 1.45 1.29 1.54 1.18 1.04 0.64 2.92*** 3.27*** 
Loan/asset 4.25 3.45 3.77 8.51 6.51 9.40 2.94*** 2.80*** 
HHI 690.98 646.31 90.60 689.04 738.45 644.55 0.83 0.93 
Pre-Ln(loan 
amount) 
18.55 17.47 1.26 17.52 17.50 1.14 2.95*** 2.01** 
Pre-Duration 1.80 1 2.24 2.10 1 2.00 0.63 0.90 
BLbank 
0.62 - 
0.49 
0.69 - 0.46 -
4.01*** 
-
4.05*** 
Private firm 0.10 - 0.30 0.09 - 0.28 -0.44 -0.42 
Note:  W-M-W (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney) test for difference of means: the null hypothesis of equal 
distributions for two populations is rejected at: *** at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%; t-test for difference of 
mean: the null hypothesis of equal means is rejected at: *** at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%. 
 
5.5 Empirical results 
The aim of this study is to investigate the determinants of a firm’s different choices to 
maintain single or multiple banking relationships. This empirical study has three stages: first, 
the determinants of the probability that a firm borrowing from only one bank is tested; then, 
the determinants of a firm keeping a single banking relationship after switching banks are 
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examined; finally, this study examines the determinants of the number of banking 
relationships in multiple banking regions.
37
 As in many other studies, the Logit method is 
used to estimate the first two stages of regression models, and Poisson regressions are used 
for third stage of the study.  
 
5.5.1 Single vs multiple lending relationship 
Table 5.8: Single vs multiple lending relationship 
 Pr(Single=1) 
Explanatory Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Firm Size 
-0.035*** 
(-2.951) 
-0.031*** 
(-2.611) 
-0.037** 
(-2.561) 
-0.028** 
(-2.361) 
Firm Age 
-0.016 
(-0.449) 
0.003 
(0.134) 
-0.017 
(-0.607) 
 
Cash flow ratio 
0.002*** 
(3.325) 
0.002*** 
(2.660) 
0.002** 
(2.307) 
0.001* 
(1.734) 
Liquidity/asset 
0.017* 
(1.848) 
0.019** 
(1.994) 
0.017* 
(1.910) 
0.021** 
(2.227) 
Private firm 
-0.040 
(-0.921) 
-0.043 
(-0.961) 
  
Loan/asset 
-0.009*** 
(-5.121) 
-0.009*** 
(-5.280) 
-0.008*** 
(-5.303) 
-0.008*** 
(-5.304) 
BLbank 
-0.075*** 
(-3.101) 
-0.072*** 
(-2.980) 
-0.080*** 
(-3.353) 
-0.074*** 
(-3.068) 
HHI 
0.0004*** 
(3.494) 
0.0005*** 
(3.976) 
0.0004*** 
(3.287) 
0.0005*** 
(3.866) 
M-S firm*Cash flow   
0.003*** 
(2.620) 
0.004*** 
(2.801) 
M-S*firm age   
-0.014 
(-1.105) 
 
                                                          
37 Correlation table of independent variables are attached in Appendix D.2. 
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Manufacture  
0.001 
(0.048) 
  
Real estate  
-0.080* 
(-1.935) 
 
-0.089*** 
(-2.515) 
Services  
-0.051 
(-1.163) 
  
LR Chi
2
 136.53 142.50 147.04 149.07 
Prob> Chi
2
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R
2
 0.061 0.064 0.066 0.068 
Obs 1617 1617 1617 1617 
Note: Average Marginal effects are reported in the table; Z statistics in parentheses. * significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Coefficient-report table is attached in Appendix D.3. 
              
 
Table 5.8 reports the results of single versus multiple lending relationships regressions. In all 
regressions of table 5.8, Firm size gives a negative and significant relationship with the 
probability of a single lending relationship, which indicates the increasing probability of 
multiple banking relationships as firm size increases. This result is consistent with previous 
studies (Cosci and Meliciani, 2002; Berger et al., 2005; Uchida et al., 2005). Large firms are 
usually considered as more transparent firms, which presumably results in low cost for banks 
collecting information under the asymmetrical information condition. Banks are most likely 
to choose large firms to set a relationship in order to diversify the firm-specific credit risk. 
Large firms usually have larger borrowing requirements, which make them more reliant on 
multiple banking. In addition, firms’ business scopes are likely to increase with size, and 
firms with more business have higher probability to rely on several banks (Detragiache et al., 
2000). The above result supports Hypothesis 1.  Usually, older firms may have lower barriers 
to set new banking relationships since to some extent that they are better known, so they may 
be selected by banks to form a multiple bank relationship. Somewhat surprisingly, Firm Age 
does not play a significant role in China’s listed firm’s decisions on setting single or multiple 
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relationships. The quality of the firm, which is measured as Cash flow ratio here, has a 
significant positive impact on the probability of single banking in regression (1) and (2). 
Good firms are more likely to be satisfied with their increasing credit requirement by their 
relationship banks, which drives them to keep a single relationship. They also have a higher 
ability to internally finance some of their investment. Bad firms are usually refused by banks 
for credit need, which forces them to find another bank for additional credit. From the banks’ 
scope, risk diversification drives banks tend to share the risk of low quality firms with their 
competitors. These results support Hypotheses 2. In regression (3) and (4), the study 
introduces variable M-S firm*Cash flow into the model, and finds that medium size and small 
firms with high quality are more likely to have single banking relationships. The margin 
effect of firm quality for the probability of single relationship in medium size and small firms 
is 0.004, which is higher than ratio of large firms (0.001).  
 
Liquidity/asset has a positive relationship with probability of single banking. This result 
supports the option that firms with less liquidity are more likely to keep multiple lending 
relationships since firms with low liquidity usually need to seek more banks to solve the 
liquidation problem. However, both firms with financial problems and firms who grow faster 
are most likely to have low liquidity ratio and, therefore, it could not be claimed that firms 
with less liquidity are poor quality. The dummy variable Private firm is insignificant here, 
which suggests that no heterogeneity has been found between private firms and non-private 
firms. Loan/asset shows a significant negative relationship with probability of single lending 
relationship, which is consistent with Farinha and Santos (2002). Multiple banking is more 
likely to be positive related to the amount of banking lending from a firm.  The empirical 
result shows that Borrowing from large banks (BLbank) has a negative effect on the 
probability of borrowing from a single bank. This result suggests that firms borrowing from 
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large banks are more likely to rely on multiple banking than firms borrowing from small 
banks. The firms borrowing from large banks have a higher than 7% probability, on average, 
to initiate multiple banking relationships. The HHI entries in the table are all positively and 
significant, highlighting that firms in less concentrated markets are more likely to engage in 
multiple banking relationships. First, firms have higher probability to find it easier to form 
new lending relationship under a more competitive market, so they are less like to seek help 
from several banks to satisfy their credit needs. Second, banks are tending to provide better 
terms to clients (e.g., larger amount) in order to attract firms in a competitive environment 
(Mercieca et al., 2009). The results above show strong evidence of support for Hypothesis 3. 
In addition, this empirical study finds that real estate firms have around 9% probability to 
form multiple banking than other kinds of firms. 
 
5.5.2 Single vs multiple relationship after firms’ switching behaviour 
Since firms maintaining a single banking relationship have a higher probability to be 
involved in a hold-up problem, while switching bank is an effective way to avoid being 
locked-in and having not to pay extra rents to the relationship bank. A number of previous 
researches have pointed out that a large proportion of firms choose to switch to another 
bank(s) to overcome the financial constraints that they face when they are dissatisfied with 
their exiting lending relationship. In the observation, some firms choose to switch but 
maintain a single relationship while others substitute a single relationship with multiple 
banking relationships. This stage of the empirical work analyses the determinants of a firm’s 
different choices on single or multiple borrowing relationship after switching banks. 
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Table 5.9: Switching to single vs switching to multiple banking relationships 
 Pr(single after switching=1) 
Explanatory Variable (1) (2) (3) 
Firm Size 
-0.042** 
(-2.341) 
-0.051** 
(-2.134) 
-0.056*** 
(-3.315) 
Firm Age 
-0.086* 
(1.827) 
-0.085* 
(1.813) 
-0.091** 
(2.203) 
Cash flow ratio 
0.002*** 
(3.338) 
0.008*** 
(3.213) 
0.002*** 
(3.275) 
Liquidity/asset 
0.049** 
(2.034) 
0.045* 
(1.879) 
0.043* 
(1.845) 
Private firm 
-0.015 
(-0.249) 
-0.015 
(-0.251) 
 
Loan/asset 
-0.007** 
(-2. 437) 
-0.005** 
(-2.148) 
-0.004* 
(-1.752) 
BLbank 
-0.103*** 
(-2.909) 
-0.099*** 
(-2.799) 
-0.099*** 
(-2.828) 
Pre-duration  
-0.007 
(-0.327) 
 
Ln(Pre-amount)  
0.039*** 
(3.422) 
0.039*** 
(3.463) 
HHI 
-0.0001 
(-0.334) 
-0.0001 
(-0.179) 
 
LR Chi
2
 50.21 62.58 62.34 
Prob> Chi
2
 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R
2
 0.063 0.079 0.079 
Obs 662 656 656 
Note: Average Marginal effects are reported in the table; Z statistics in parentheses. * significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Coefficient-report table is attached in Appendix D.4. 
 
In regression (1), (2) and (3) of table 5.9, the result shows that firm size significantly 
increased the probability of choosing multiple relationships after switching. Other than higher 
lending demand, which is usually positive correlated with firm size, large firms seem to be 
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more attractive to ‘outside’ banks since they are more transparent (Yin and Matthews, 2013). 
Larger firms are more likely to switch to multiple relationships while smaller firms have a 
higher probability of keeping a single bank relationship. This shows again that firm size is a 
key variable that determines the number of lending relationships. In column (1), (2) and (3), 
Firm age has a negative relationship with single relationship after switching at the 10% 
significance level. When combined with the results of firm size, this indicates that the 
growing age of smaller firms increases the probability of switching to a single relationship 
since younger firms who are less known by the public may face more severe adverse 
selection problems when seeking financial help from non-relationship banks.  
 
It is notable that, at the 1% level, the firm’s quality has a significant impact on single 
relationship. This suggests that higher quality firms are more likely to switch to a single 
relationship than multiple relationships, which is consistent with the previous results. No 
matter switching or non-switching behaviours, good firms prefer to choose a single banking 
relationship since they may have lower monitoring costs and fewer requirements for 
collateral. Some researchers claim that a long term banking relationship may results in a more 
serious lock-in problem. Hence, firms may switch to multiple borrowing relationships to 
protect themselves from further hold-up costs. However, the variable Pre-duration, which 
stands for the duration of single banking relationship before switching, does not have a 
significant effect on single or multiple relationship choice here. The variable Pre-amount, 
which stands for the amount of borrowing before switching, has a significant positive effect 
on single relationship after the firm’s switching action. This result suggests that firms who 
had larger loan requirements that were satisfied before switching would also keep single 
relationship after switching. The empirical results show that competition level (HHI) cannot 
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distinguish the firm’s choice on switching to single relationship or switching to multiple 
relationships.  
 
5.5.3 The determinants of the number of relationships in the multiple banking 
Table 5.10: The analysis of number of relationships in the multiple banking 
 Number of  banking relationships 
Explanatory Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Firm Size 
1.062*** 
(3.081) 
1.064*** 
(3.117) 
1.053** 
(2.253) 
1.062*** 
(3.002) 
Firm Age 
1.096** 
(2.012) 
1.096** 
(1.904) 
1.099** 
(2.058) 
1.081* 
(1.702) 
Cash flow ratio 
1.002* 
(1.831) 
1.002* 
(1.850) 
1.003* 
(1.931) 
 
Liquidity/asset 
0.944*** 
(-2.893) 
0.948*** 
(-2.894) 
0.941*** 
(-2.983) 
0.946*** 
(-2.893) 
Private firm 
1.002 
(0.028) 
1.007 
(0.067) 
1.104 
(0.213) 
 
Loan/asset 
1.006*** 
(6.126) 
1.006*** 
(6.218) 
1.006*** 
(6.154) 
1.006*** 
(6.913) 
BLbank 
1.095** 
(2.304) 
1.105** 
(2.523) 
1.090** 
(2.173) 
1.101** 
(2.441) 
HHI 
0.998*** 
(-5.689) 
0.999*** 
(-5.066) 
0.999*** 
(-5.592) 
0.999*** 
(-5.641) 
M-S firm*Cash flow   
0.998 
(-0.797) 
 
Private*firm age   
0.986 
(-0.660) 
 
Firm size*Cash flow    
1.0001*** 
(2.868) 
Manufacture  
1.005 
(0.099) 
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Real estate  
0.948 
(-0.780) 
  
Services  
1.138** 
(2.021) 
 
1.149*** 
(2.618) 
C 
1.767 
(1.028) 
1.481 
(0.670) 
 
1.735 
(0.992) 
LR Chi
2
 122.60 131.49 124.96 130.64 
Prob> Chi
2
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R
2
 0.038 0.040 0.038 0.040 
Obs 869 869 869 869 
Note: The incidence rate ratios (IRR) are reported in the table; Z statistics in parentheses. * significant 
at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Multiple relationships analysis is for the firms 
who have more than one banking relationships. Coefficient-report table is attached in Appendix D.5. 
 
To make the empirical specification richer, the third stage regressions are estimated here in 
order to check the determinants of the number of banking relationships, the results are 
reported in table 5.10. Several points are worth noting. First, firm size has a significantly 
positive relationship with the number of banking relationships, which indicates that the 
number of relationships tend to grow with the size of the firms. Larger firms have a higher 
likelihood to engage in more banking relationships, which is also found by Voplin (2007) and 
Uchida et al. (2008). At the 1% level, Liquidity/asset has a significant negative effect on the 
number of lending relationships, which enhances the likelihood that firms facing higher risk 
of liquidity problem are more likely to engage in larger numbers of multiple banking 
relationships.  
 
Second, unlike the insignificance of the determinate of single and multiple lending choice 
regressions, firm age shows a significantly positive effect on the numbers of banking 
relationships, which is consistent with the result of Detragiache et al. (2000). This result 
suggests that, although the firm’s choice on single or multiple banking relationships does not 
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depend on their age, if they have chosen to keep multiple banking relationships then their 
growing age will make it more likely that they will have larger numbers of relationships. In 
order to test the hypotheses that larger and higher quality firms are more likely to be involved 
in large numbers of banking relationships, a joint variable Firm size*Cash flow is introduced 
into the regression (4). The significant positive relationship shows that large and better firms 
do indeed tend to have more banking relationships. Obviously, high quality and larger firms 
are more attractive for banks.  
 
Finally, in column (1) to (4), after controlling for a number of firm-level variables and some 
macro variables, BLbank has a significant positive effect on the numbers of lending 
relationships, which suggests that firms borrowing from large banks have a higher likelihood 
to maintain a larger number of banking relationships. This result is consistent with Berger et 
al. (2005b). Large banks may be interested in selling services other than loans to their clients 
(Cosci and Meliciani, 2002; Yin and Matthews 2013), so firms usually need to seek other 
banks to borrow from. Consistent with the regressions of single versus multiple lending 
relationships, HHI shows a significant negative effect on the number of lending relationships, 
which indicates that fierce competition causes firms to have a higher probability to keep more 
lending relationships. 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
Using the data from China banking market, this chapter finds the determinants of why some 
firms choose single banking relationship while others tend to borrow from more than one 
bank. The empirical work is in three stages. First, this study explores the factors why firms 
choose to establish multiple relationships with banks instead of maintaining a single 
relationship. This chapter then investigates why firms substitute a single relationship to 
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multiple banking relationships after switching banks. Finally, the empirical study examined 
the determinants of the number of banking relationships. A Logit model and Poisson model 
are used in the empirical part.  
 
The empirical results provide evidence that firm size is a key factor that affects the firm’s 
choice of single or multiple banking relationships. The number of banking relationships is 
also predominantly influenced by firm size. Firm size increases the probability of firms 
maintaining multiple lending relationships, as well as increasing the number of relationship 
banks. As to the analysis of a firm’s choice after switching, the results indicate that larger 
firms have a higher probability to switch to multiple relationships other than single 
relationship. Firm quality is another important factor for firms making decision on single or 
multiple banking relationships. Higher quality firms prefer single relationships since a single 
relationship means most effective lending with lowest monitoring costs and requirement for 
collateral. In multiple banking relationship regions, firms with better performance have a high 
probability to have more lenders. This study also finds that medium size and small firms with 
high quality prefer a single borrowing relationship while larger and higher quality firms are 
more likely to be involved in a large number of banking relationships. Increasing levels of 
market competition, which is highlighted in this study, decrease the probability of single 
bank-firm relationship and drives firms to have higher likelihood to have a relationship with 
more banks. This is easily explained by the fierce competition that forces banks to poach 
more firms and the increased probability of firms engaging in multiple relationships. 
 
This research has also explored how firms with less liquidity are more likely to keep multiple 
lending relationships. A large amount of credit need usually drives firms to seek help from 
more banks. There is no difference between private firms and non-private on single or 
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multiple lending choices. Interestingly, firms who have relationships with large banks are 
more likely to be involved in multiple lending relationships. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
165 
 
Appendix D 
Table D.1: Statistical Definitions of Large, Medium-sized and Small Enterprises (newest) 
Industry Branch Index Unit Large Medium-sized Small 
Farming, 
forestry, animal 
husbandry and 
fishing 
Operating income 
(Y) 
10,000 𝑌 ≥ 20000 500 ≤ 𝑌 < 20000 50 ≤ 𝑌 < 500 
Industry 
Employees (X) People 𝑋 ≥ 1000 300 ≤ 𝑋 < 1000 20 ≤ 𝑋 < 300 
Operating income 
(Y) 
10,000 𝑌 ≥ 40000 2000 ≤ 𝑌 < 40000 
300 ≤ 𝑌
< 2000 
Construction 
Operating income 
(Y) 
10,000 𝑌 ≥ 80000 6000 ≤ 𝑌 < 80000 
300 ≤ 𝑋
< 6000 
Total assets (Z) 10,000 𝑍 ≥ 80000 5000 ≤ 𝑍 < 80000 
300 ≤ 𝑋
< 5000 
Wholesale 
Employees (X) People 𝑋 ≥ 200 20 ≤ 𝑋 < 200 5 ≤ 𝑋 < 20 
Operating income 
(Y) 
10,000 𝑌 ≥ 40000 5000 ≤ 𝑌 < 40000 
1000 ≤ 𝑌
< 5000 
Retail trades 
Employees (X) People 𝑋 ≥ 300 50 ≤ 𝑋 < 300 10 ≤ 𝑋 < 50 
Operating income 
(Y) 
10,000 𝑌 ≥ 20000 500 ≤ 𝑌 < 20000 
100 ≤ 𝑌
< 500 
Transport 
Employees (X) People 𝑋 ≥ 1000 300 ≤ 𝑋 < 1000 20 ≤ 𝑋 < 300 
Operating income 
(Y) 
10,000 𝑌 ≥ 30000 3000 ≤ 𝑌 < 30000 
200 ≤ 𝑌
< 3000 
Storage 
Employees (X) People 𝑋 ≥ 200 100 ≤ 𝑋 < 200 20 ≤ 𝑋 < 100 
Operating income 
(Y) 
10,000 𝑌 ≥ 30000 1000 ≤ 𝑌 < 30000 
100 ≤ 𝑌
< 1000 
Post 
Employees (X) People 𝑋 ≥ 1000 300 ≤ 𝑋 < 1000 20 ≤ 𝑋 < 300 
Operating income 
(Y) 
10,000 𝑌 ≥ 30000 2000 ≤ 𝑌 < 30000 
100 ≤ 𝑌
< 2000 
Hotels 
Employees (X) People 𝑋 ≥ 300 100 ≤ 𝑋 < 300 10 ≤ 𝑋 < 100 
Operating income 
(Y) 
10,000 𝑌 ≥ 10000 2000 ≤ 𝑌 < 10000 
100 ≤ 𝑌
< 2000 
Catering Employees (X) People 𝑋 ≥ 300 100 ≤ 𝑋 < 300 10 ≤ 𝑋 < 100 
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services 
Operating income 
(Y) 
10,000 𝑌 ≥ 10000 2000 ≤ 𝑌 < 10000 
100 ≤ 𝑌
< 2000 
Soft and 
scientific 
research, 
technical 
services 
Employees (X) People 𝑋 ≥ 300 100 ≤ 𝑋 < 300 10 ≤ 𝑋 < 100 
Operating income 
(Y) 
10,000 𝑌 ≥ 10000 1000 ≤ 𝑌 < 10000 
50 ≤ 𝑌
< 1000 
Real estate 
Operating income 
(Y) 
10,000 
𝑌
≥ 200000 
1000 ≤ 𝑌
< 200000 
100 ≤ 𝑋
< 1000 
Total assets (Z) 10,000 𝑍 ≥ 10000 5000 ≤ 𝑍 < 10000 
2000 ≤ 𝑋
< 5000 
Property 
Management 
Employees (X) People 𝑋 ≥ 1000 300 ≤ 𝑋 < 1000 
100 ≤ 𝑋
< 300 
Operating income 
(Y) 
10,000 𝑌 ≥ 5000 1000 ≤ 𝑌 < 5000 
500 ≤ 𝑌
< 1000 
Leasing and 
Business 
Services 
Employees (X) People 𝑋 ≥ 300 100 ≤ 𝑋 < 300 10 ≤ 𝑋 < 100 
Total assets (Z) 10,000 
𝑍
≥ 120000 
8000 ≤ 𝑍
< 120000 
100 ≤ 𝑋
< 8000 
No specified 
industry 
Employees (X) People 𝑋 ≥ 300 100 ≤ 𝑋 < 300 10 ≤ 𝑋 < 100 
Source: National bureau of statistics of China 
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Table D.2: Correlations of variables 
 
Firm 
size 
Firm 
age 
cashflowr Liquiditya Loanasset BSbank HHI Private 
Firm size 1.000        
Firm age 
0.156 
*** 
1.000       
Cashflowr 
0.065 
** 
-0.063 
*** 
1.000      
Liquiditya 
-0.043 
** 
-0.028 
*** 
-0.061 
*** 
1.000     
Loanasset 
-0.182 
*** 
-0.010 
** 
-0.064 
* 
0.035 
*** 
1.000    
BSbank 
0.007 
** 
-0.034 
*** 
-0.025 
*** 
-0.022 
0.019 
*** 
1.000   
HHI 
-0.486 
*** 
-0.499 
** 
-0.037 
*** 
0.067 
*** 
0.018 
** 
0.081 
*** 
1.000  
Private 
0.112 
*** 
-0.020 
*** 
-0.016 
*** 
0.133 
** 
0.097 
 
-0.086 
*** 
-0.041 
*** 
1.000 
Note: *,**,*** significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
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Table D.3: Single vs multiple lending relationship 
(Coefficients reported) 
 Pr(Single=1) 
Explanatory Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Firm Size 
-0.156*** 
(-2.963) 
-0.139*** 
(-2.589) 
-0.163** 
(-2.541) 
-0.125** 
(-2.312) 
Firm Age 
-0.070  
(-0.567) 
0.017 
(0.134) 
-0.075 
(-0.607) 
 
Cash flow ratio 
0.008*** 
(3.356) 
0.007*** 
(2.639) 
0.006** 
(2.293) 
0.005** 
(1.729) 
Liquidity/asset 
0.075* 
(1.848) 
0.084* 
(1.986) 
0.077* 
(1.903) 
0.096** 
(2.215) 
Private firm 
-0.177 
(-0.921) 
-0.188 
(-0.960) 
  
Loan/asset 
-0.038*** 
(-5.146) 
-0.039*** 
(-5.133) 
-0.038*** 
(-5.153) 
-0.039*** 
(-5.154) 
Borrowing from large 
bank 
-0.329*** 
(-3.087) 
-0.317*** 
(-2.949) 
-0.354*** 
(-3.309) 
-0.327*** 
(-3.035) 
HHI 
0.002*** 
(3.448) 
0.002*** 
(3.924) 
0.002*** 
(3.324) 
0.002*** 
(3.799) 
M-S firm*Cash flow   
0.014*** 
(2.600) 
0.015*** 
(2.776) 
M-S*firm age   
-0.062 
(-1.103) 
 
Manufacture  
0.007 
(0.049) 
  
Real estate  
-0.354* 
(-1.927) 
 
-0.396** 
(-2.497) 
Services  
-0.224 
(-1.161) 
  
C 
1.711 
(1.180) 
0.901 
(0.592) 
1.972 
(1.178) 
0.251 
(0.167) 
LR Chi
2
 136.53 142.50 147.04 149.07 
Prob> Chi
2
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R
2
 0.061 0.064 0.066 0.068 
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Obs 1617 1617 1617 1617 
Note: Z statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table D.4: Switching to single vs switching to multiple banking relationships 
(Coefficient reported) 
 Pr(single after switching=1) 
Explanatory Variable (1) (2) (3) 
Firm Size 
-0.226** 
(-2.310) 
-0.279** 
(-2.112) 
-0.303*** 
(-3.232) 
Firm Age 
-0.457* 
(1.813) 
-0.462* 
(1.798) 
-0.493** 
(2.177) 
Cash flow ratio 
0.008*** 
(3.256) 
0.008*** 
(3.141) 
0.008*** 
(3.197) 
Liquidity/asset 
0.262** 
(2.011) 
0.244* 
(1.862) 
0.234*** 
(1.829) 
Private firm 
-0.081 
(-0.249) 
-0.083 
(-0.251) 
 
Loan/asset 
-0.035** 
(-2.401) 
-0.048** 
(-2.148) 
-0.023* 
(-1.752) 
Borrowing from large 
bank 
-0.548*** 
(-2.852) 
-0.538*** 
(-2.748) 
-0.538*** 
(-2.775) 
HHI 
-0.0004 
(-0.334) 
-0.0002 
(-0.179) 
 
Pre-duration  
-0.215 
(-0.327) 
 
Ln(Pre-amount)  
0.039*** 
(3.322) 
0.215*** 
(3.360) 
C 
2.771 
(1.014) 
4.154 
(1.489) 
3.794* 
(1.853) 
LR Chi
2
 50.21 62.58 62.34 
Prob> Chi
2
 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R
2
 0.063 0.079 0.079 
Obs 662 656 656 
Note: Z statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
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Table D.5: The analysis of number of relationships in the multiple banking 
(Coefficient reported) 
 Number of  banking relationships 
Explanatory Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Firm Size 
0.060*** 
(3.081) 
0.062*** 
(3.117) 
0.052** 
(2.253) 
0.060*** 
(3.002) 
Firm Age 
0.092** 
(2.012) 
0.092** 
(1.904) 
0.094** 
(2.058) 
0.078* 
(1.702) 
Cash flow ratio 
0.002* 
(1.831) 
0.002* 
(1.850) 
0.002* 
(1.931) 
 
Liquidity/asset 
-0.058*** 
(-2.893) 
-0.053*** 
(-2.894) 
-0.061*** 
(-2.983) 
-0.056*** 
(-2.893) 
Private firm 
0.002 
(0.028) 
0.007 
(0.067) 
0.099 
(0.213) 
 
Loan/asset 
0.006*** 
(6.126) 
0.006*** 
(6.218) 
0.006*** 
(6.154) 
0.006*** 
(6.913) 
BLbank 
0.091** 
(2.304) 
0.100** 
(2.523) 
0.086** 
(2.173) 
0.096** 
(2.441) 
HHI 
-0.002*** 
(-5.689) 
-0.001*** 
(-5.066) 
-0.001*** 
(-5.592) 
-0.001*** 
(-5.641) 
M-S firm*Cash flow   
-0.002 
(-0.797) 
 
Private*firm age   
-0.014 
(-0.660) 
 
Firm size*Cash flow    
0.0004*** 
(2.868) 
Manufacture  
0.005 
(0.099) 
  
Real estate  
-0.053 
(-0.780) 
  
Services  
0.129** 
(2.021) 
 
0.139*** 
(2.618) 
C 1.767 1.481  1.735 
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(1.028) (0.670) (0.992) 
LR Chi
2
 122.60 131.49 124.96 130.64 
Prob> Chi
2
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R
2
 0.038 0.040 0.038 0.040 
Obs 869 869 869 869 
Note: The incidence rate ratios (IRR) are reported in the table; Z statistics in parentheses. * significant 
at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Multiple relationships analysis is for the firms 
who have more than one banking relationships. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusions 
Switching costs, which mainly arise from the asymmetry of information between borrowers 
and lenders, are a widely recognized issue in banking markets around the world. Nowadays, 
more than 400 banks are poaching customers and chasing profits in the Chinese banking 
market. The fierce competition makes switching costs an important determinant of banks’ 
strategy, firms’ lending choice and bank-firm relationships.  
 
To analyse the effects of switching costs in China’s banking market, this thesis has presented 
research findings on three aspects: the determination of banks’ profit; firms’ bank switching 
choices and the determination of single versus multiple bank-firm lending relationships. First, 
the thesis provides evidence that switching costs contribute to the profit of banks, and the 
level of switching costs is significantly affected by a bank’s characteristics. Second, it 
presents findings on  the reasons why firms switch banks, what characteristics make firm 
have a high probability to switch and what kind of banks are more attractive to firms. Third, 
it presents the empirical factors that determine firms’ choices on single or multiple bank-firm 
relationships.  
 
The structure of my research and main findings are shown in figure 6.1. Switching costs have 
significant effects on a bank’s strategy; a firm’s switching behaviour and bank-firm 
relationship. On the bank side, switching costs offer bank lock-in power, through which they 
can extract higher profit and maintain long-term bank-firm relationships. Switching costs 
have a significant positive effect on the level of competition in the banking market. In 
general, switching costs increase with bank size and efficiency level of banks. On the firm 
side, firms usually switch banks when they are dissatisfied with their incumbent banks. 
Favourable contracts, larger size and higher quality can enable firms to switch more easily. 
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As for the bank-firm single versus multiple relationship, the study finds that the choice of 
multiple banking relationships is preferred by large, low quality and older firms. 
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Structure of the research and main findings 
 
6.1 Switching costs and China’s banking market 
Switching costs are not necessarily anti-competitive. They are a market outcome and are part 
of how competition works in China’s banking market but they do not make the market less 
competitive. Switching costs can intensify competition because of large numbers of 
uncommitted new customers in the growing banking market. The results of the thesis indicate 
that switching costs increase with the competition level because they become more and more 
important for a bank’s strategy. Furthermore, the competition ‘softening effect’ of switching 
costs in the markets can be compensated by competition from aggressive small banks who 
offer better services and favourable contracts to attract customers. In chapter 3, the empirical 
results show that small banks are tending to have more motivation to enhance their switching 
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costs power, since they are usually eager to extend their market share; while big banks are 
less aggressive, which is known as the ‘fat cat effect’ (Farrell and Klemperer, 2007). Chapter 
4 also finds that firms are more likely to switch to small market share banks, or lower 
profitability banks, since these banks are aggressively extend their business and take risk to 
earn profit, which will result in more loans for firms. 
 
Switching costs also have a significant influence on the profits of banks, which indicates that 
switching costs provide a separate mechanism for profits generation. Market concentration 
has been found to have a negative effect on bank profitability. As a result the switching costs 
and profit performance associated with the very large state-owned banks is lower than that of 
other commercial banks in China. While SOBs remain large and dominate the banking 
market, lower switching costs increase banks consumer welfare. As competition intensifies 
and the SOBs lose market share, banks will increasingly use their lock-in power to increase 
switching costs. 
 
China’s banking market is a comparatively stable market. When a static analysis is applied to 
this research, it is easy to explain that most of the domestic banks benefiting from switching 
costs are in a “harvesting” phase. However, as the newcomers to China’s banking market, it 
may be better to take a more dynamic analysis into account that the losses (or reduced profits) 
of foreign banks facing, because they are probably in their “investment” phase. Foreign banks 
grow slowly in China’s banking market with taking around 2%-3% market share since 2003. 
The empirical results in chapter 3 suggest that when compared with the domestic banks, 
foreign banks show that they are in a weak position to increase switching costs and make 
profits. Lack of local networks and comparatively small size block them to make full use of 
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switching costs. They need to ‘invest’ in the market to attract more customers in order to 
extend their market share. 
 
6.2 Lock-in power and banks’ strategy 
Focusing on credit supplier’s side, switching costs enhance banks’ ability to lock-in their 
customers, extend their market share and gain extra profit. Analysis in theory, large 
commercial banks (The big five state-own banks) with more branches and informational 
networks have been given advantage on setting switching barriers. However, this research 
finds that bank size shows a complex relationship with switching costs. A rise in size and 
number of sub-branches do bring more information asymmetric to banks to strength the lock-
in power. But in China, the ‘very large’ banks have lower switching costs than ‘large’ banks 
suggesting a non-linear relationship between bank size and switching costs, where after some 
critical size switching costs decline.  
 
This research also find that the large banks are less concerned with the lock-in strategy of 
extracting rent from switching costs than the smaller banks, largely because the competitive 
pressure faced by the joint stock banks and city commercial banks is fiercer than that faced 
by the state-owned banks. Indeed my findings confirm the standard view that SOBs have 
social objectives as well as profit objectives, which means maintaining branches in 
unprofitable regions and conducting investment in loss-making ventures as part of a wider 
social objective. 
 
Small banks with less informational advantage can still benefit from switching costs. By 
making customers repeat borrowing from one bank, switching costs create a powerful 
incentive for the bank to improve their efficiency and services level. Empirical results show 
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that non-interest expense ratio (NEI) has a significant negative relationship with switching 
costs. It means that switching costs increasing with the efficiency level of banks, which offer 
an effective channel for small banks to extend their market share. This implies that efficient 
management can take advantage of asymmetries in information to enhance switching costs of 
banks. The facts described in chapter 2 show that the market share of large commercial 
banks, during the last ten years, has gradually been taken by other domestic banks, such as 
joint-stock banks, city and rural commercial banks. The profit determination regression 
results also show that market share has no significant effect on profits of banks. Small banks 
can raise the switching costs level to lock-in their customers and survival from the fierce 
competition with large commercial banks through increasing their operation efficiency. 
 
Offering a bundle of services to customers is a good way to help banks to raise the switching 
barrier. Banks can increase the switching costs through selling firms services other than 
lending, which tend to strength the bank-firm relationship and offer them the advantage to 
hold-up their customers deeply. Income from other services is reflected by non-interest 
income ratio on a bank’s financial report. Chapter 3 finds that non-interest income ratio has 
significantly positive effects on switching costs. The argument is that a bank that has a higher 
proportion of its revenue generated from non-interest services is more able to lock-in firms by 
offering a bundle of services alongside the loan. Furthermore, this strategy makes the product 
(loan) heterogeneous between banks, which strengths the competition in the lending market. 
By contrast, since banks with high non-interest income ratios tend to have more correlation 
with firms other than lending, which offer lock-in power to enhance firms to stay with current 
lending relationships. The results in chapter 4 show that firms are less likely to switch to this 
kind of bank. 
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6.3 Firms’ switching behaviour and relationship banking 
Switching costs make banks more difficult to win customers who have already borrowed 
from their rivals. A ‘price cut’ may be required for borrowers to switch when ‘outside’ banks 
try to attract new customers. This ‘price cut’ usually means a more favourable loan contract. 
Chapter 4 finds that firms usually switch banks for larger amount of loans and longer lending 
durations in order to overcome borrowing constrains. However, such pricing reductions of 
banks are based on how they observe their potential customers. A firm’s transparency level 
and performance are the main determinants of whether it can win a good contract or not. As 
large firms are usually considered as more transparent than small firms (Elyasiani and 
Goldberg, 2004; Stephan et al., 2009), this thesis finds that a positive relationship between 
firm size and the probability of bank switching. Firms who have a better ability to generate 
cash from sales are more likely to form new bank relationships, since they are more attractive 
to banks and can easily get new loans. As for firms’ bank selection, seeking help from small 
banks is a good choice, where they usually can get more favourable contract than large banks. 
This research finds that opaque and low quality firms find it difficult to get credit from non-
relationship banks. Firms should either become large or improve their performance to 
strengthen their leverage when switching banks. From firms’ prospective, it is good for them 
to choose ‘pure’ lending relationship with banks, since banks tend to offer a bundled service 
of loan and bank services to firms to make it hard to switch.  
 
The existence of switching costs discourages firm to keep a long and single banking 
relationship because of the hold-up problem. Increasing intensity of competition make firm 
have higher probability to be involved in a multiple banking relationships. It is shown in 
chapter 5 that increasing market competition level decreases the probability of single bank-
firm relationship and drives firms to have higher likelihood to set relationship with more 
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banks. It is easy to explain because fierce competition forces banks to poach more firms and 
increases the probability of firms engaging in multiple relationships. Chapter 2 shows that the 
average non-performing loans ratio of commercial banks continuously decreases from 7.1% 
in 2006 to 1.0% in 2012, which indicates that Chinese commercial banks have focused on 
credit quality when making lending decisions (Chang et al., 2009). Clearly, transparency and 
high quality firms are more attractive for banks. The results of chapter 5 show that firm size 
increases the probability of firms maintaining multiple lending relationships as well as the 
number of relationship banks. Firm quality is another important factor for firms making 
decisions on single or multiple banking relationships. Higher quality firms prefer single 
relationships since single relationships mean more effective lending with lower monitoring 
costs and lower collateral requirements. In multiple banking relationship regions, firms with 
better performance have high probability to get more lenders. 
 
Keeping a relationship with incumbent banks instead of terminating it, and seeking help from 
other banks is an effective way for firms to avoid switching costs and find more loans. 
However, as the previous studies point out that single banking relationship mean lower 
monitoring costs, less collateral requirements and lower transaction costs than multiple bank-
firm relationships. It is good for small and high quality firms to keep single banking 
relationships. Large and high quality firms would be better to maintain more banking 
relationships since they usually have larger credit need. Chapter 5 finds that medium size and 
small firms with high quality prefer single borrowing relationships while large and higher 
quality firms are more likely to be involved in a great number of banking relationships. For 
bad firms, keeping multiple banking relationships is a wise decision since they are more 
likely to be involved with liquidity problems. Large firms are considered as more transparent, 
which will enable large and bad firms to have a higher likelihood to set multiple banking 
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relationships, since banks know how bad they are and offer the corresponding contract. In 
contrast, since small and bad firms have difficulty acquiring loans from ‘outside’ banks, it is 
better for them to maintain at least one long-term banking relationship.  
 
6.4 Conclusions 
Compared with previous studies, this thesis finds something new in China’s banking market. 
Switching costs are found to be less important to the big-five banks when compared with 
other domestic banks. Small banks are more aggressive in extending market share and 
making profit. For firms, strong financial conditions can increase the likelihood of switching 
banks. Firms prefer to switch to small market share banks, or lower profitability banks to 
seek more lending contracts. Banks that offer a bundled service of loan and bank services will 
have more capacity to lock-in firms. But firms dislike switching to this kind of bank. They 
prefer ‘pure lending’ to avoid potential hold-up problems.  
 
The data I used in my research is from the Bankscope and CSMAR (China Stock Market and 
Accounting Research) database. The use of hard data makes my research more objective and 
helps to avoid some subjective selection problems associated with survey data. The data 
includes 151 banks and more than 300 listed firms’ lending behaviour, which appropriately 
shows that facts of switching costs and bank-firm relationship in the Chinese banking market. 
However, it should be recognized that the models used in this research do not represent 
dynamic, but static behaviour. The Chinese banking market is fast-growing, in which the 
strategy and performance of banks and firms may be not consistent. The results of my thesis 
are based on the facts and data in the past, some of them may not reflect the facts since 2012. 
I find that foreign banks are very weak at increasing switching costs and making profit when 
compared with domestic banks, but their performance may improve in the future.  I find that 
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private and state-own firms have no significant difference on bank switching behaviour, but 
the difference may become significant now. Because of the lack of data, I cannot examine 
whether the interest rates offered from inside and outside banks have effects on firms’ 
switching behaviour, which could be a very important factor in the analysis. Since this thesis 
focuses on the empirical research, no significant theoretical innovations have been made. 
 
The questions about bank-firm relationships in China’s banking market that I leave for further 
research include: Do the state-owned banks offer credit help to bad firms under government 
mandates? Does the bank-ownership type have an effect on a firm’s choice of bank? Does the 
‘inside’ bank offer a different loan rate to the ‘outside’ bank? Does switching benefit a firm’s 
performance? Further research is needed to investigate more deeply the effects of switching 
costs, bank ownership and the effect of loan rate on lending behaviour and bank-firm 
relationships.   
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